Cieľom štúdie je vysvetliť motiváciu a podstatu filozofických koncepcií, podľa ktorých je tvrdenie normatívny fenomén. Začnem tým, že zmapujem kľúčové myšlienky k problematike tvrdenia, a lokalizujem typické normatívne prístupy. Potom rozoberiem, čo vlastne znamená povedať, že tvrdenie je normatívnym fenoménom špecifického druhu, a predložím špekulatívno-hypotetickú rekonštrukciu genézy tvrdiacej jazykovej hry - presnejšie, jej protoformy - ktorá by mala vyzdvihnúť jej charakteristické sociálno-normatívne aspekty. Na tomto základe postavím kritické porovnanie dvoch reprezentatívnych normatívnych prístupov k tvrdeniu: pragmatického inferencializmu Roberta Brandoma a Knowledge Account of Assertion Timothyho Williamsona. Budem argumentovať, že Brandomov prístup adekvátnejšie vystihuje sociálnu povahu tvrdenia, esenciálnu pre túto rečovú hru., My aim in this study is to explain both motivation and main ideas of those philosophical accounts of assertion that take it to be a normative phenomenon. I first draw a map of key ideas pertaining to the problem and localize on it typical normative accounts. Then I take up the issue of what it means to say that assertion is a normative phenomenon, putting forward a speculative-hypothetical reconstruction of the genesis of the assertoric game - or, rather, its protoform - to bring to the fore social-normative aspects characteristic of it. This will provide the basis for a critical comparison of two representative normative approaches to assertion: pragmatic inferentialism of Robert Brandom, and Knowledge Account of Assertion of Timothy Williamson. I shall argue that Brandom's normative approach to assertion is superior, as it much better accounts for a social dimension of assertion that is essential to this language game., and Ladislav Koreň.
The author formulates the hypothesis that the key value which guides the reflections of John Stuart Mill about society is not freedom, as is traditionally assumed in connection with the liberal conception, but knowledge. The realisation of a free society is then shown to be one of the possible ways of achieving this value. On the basis of
Rawls’ and Berlin’s interpretations of Mill, the author shows that Mill’s idea of a free society rests on a certain ground of value which is constituted by Mill’s conviction about the importance of knowledge. There follows a discussion of the aspects of Mill’s conception of society in which the problematic of knowledge seems to be more or less evident. The evidence is then bolstered by attention to an analysis of Mill’s thinking undertaken by John Skorupski and David Brink. The author also indicates that emphasising the connection between the value of knowledge and liberty in society may provide us with new perspectives when we seek an answer to the question of how, in practice, we can create a free society.
Text sleduje motív prehodnotenia zmyslu poznania a myslenia na základe funkcie omylu spočívajúceho v nároku na podstatu/pravdu v poznaní. Problém podrobne interpretujem v úzkom rozmedzí dvoch Nietzscheho textov, Lidské, příliš lidské (prvá hlava„O prvních a posledních věcech“) a Radostná věda (piata kapitola „My nebojácní“). Analýza omylu ústi do prehodnotenia zmyslu poznania, ktoré následne môžeme rozlíšiť na pozitívne a negatívne. Negatívne poznanie je chápané ako základné, zmysel majúce, ale zmysel nehľadajúce poznanie, ktoré nemá poznatok ako predpokladaný cieľ, jeho zmysel spočíva v jeho činnosti. Poznanie pozitívne je konceptuálne poznanie, ktoré po nahliadnutí jeho základnej nefunkčnosti v oblasti pravdy nadobúda funkciu orientácie. Myslenie prestáva byť na produkt zameranou činnosťou vymedzeného úseku času, je súčasťou žitia a pohybovania sa vo svete. Toto sa v druhej časti prehlbuje na analýzach vedomia a poznania z Radostné vědy, ktoré zdôrazňujú význam netematizovanosti v myslení a poznaní, zvlášť obrazom vedomia ako zrkadla. Tu je poznanie chápané ako pojmová konštrukcia bázy, ktorou je individuálne zažitá, netematizovaná skúsenosť. Omylom je tu potreba premeny neznámeho na známe na základe strachu. Táto potreba poukazuje na neznáme ako na činiteľa vykazujúceho problém, ktorý je nutný pre udržanie poznania., The text traces the motif of the re-evaluation of the sense of knowing and thinking based on the function of error consisting in the claim to ground/truth in knowledge. I interpret the problem in detail in the narrow confines of Nietzsche’s two texts, Human, All Too Human (the first heading “On First and Last Things”) and the The Gay Science (fifth chapter “We the Fearless”). An analysis of error issues in the re-evaluation of the sense of knowledge which, subsequently, we can distinguish into the positive and negative. Negative knowledge is understood as basic, having sense, but not sense-seeking, which does not have knowledge as the assumed aim, but whose sense consists in its activity. Positive knowledge is conceptual knowledge which, once one perceives its basic non-functionality in the area of truth, gains the function of orientation. Thought, when it stops being focused on a product by the directed activity of a demarcated section of time, is a part of living and moving in the world. This, in the second part, is deepened in analyses of consciousness and knowledge from The Gay Science, which stress the meaning of the unthematised in thinking and knowledge, especially the picture of consciousness as a mirror. Here knowledge is understood as a conceptual construction of the ground by which the unthematised experience is individually lived. The error here is the need to transform the unknown into the known on the basis of fear. That need points to the unknown as the agent that reveals the problem which is necessary for the maintenance of knowledge., Daniela Šterbáková., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
This article assesses efforts to develop "open innovation". First, open innovation is put in the framework of knowledge society. It is shown that the term open innovation refers tu such different cases that it is better to assess them separately. Chesbrough´s "open innovation", the "lead user" conception, the idea of "commons-based-peer-production" and "interactive value production" is shortly explored. "Incertitude" is overviewed as basic background that urges societal praxis to turn to open innovation. At the end the article, referring to an expert material worked out for the EC DG Research, called with abbreviation TEKSS, turns interest to extending open innovation by integrating concerned groups as innovation partners as engagement, i.e. as partners though the whole innovation process., Imre Hronzsky, Ágnes Fésüs., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Studie je vnitřně soudržnou interpretací Rortyho pojetí poznání, jak je lze rekonstruovat na základě knihy Filosofie a zrcadlo přírody. Ačkoli Rorty kritizuje v podstatě všechny teorie poznání, lze ukázat, že sám pracuje s jistou pozitivní představou nejen o tom, v čem poznání nespočívá, nýbrž také o tom, oč v něm pozitivně jde. Studie popisuje podstatné ohledy Rortyho pojetí poznání (poznání jako praxe zdůvodňování, poznání jako popis, poznání jako upravování teorie, poznání jako zvládání) a předvádí Rortyho kritiku epistemologie s pozitivní oporou v konceptu sebeurčení. Závěr studie tematizuje otázku, jakým způsobem Rorty může zdůvodnit odmítnutí epistemologie a přijetí hermeneutického hlediska., This study is a systematic interpretation of Rorty’s conception of knowledge as it can be reconstructed on the basis of the book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Although Rorty is sweeping in his criticism of theories of knowledge, it can still be shown that he himself works with a certain positive conception not only of what knowledge does not consist in, but also of what it positively concerns. The study describes the basic points of Rorty’s conception of knowledge (knowledge as the practice of justification, knowledge as description, knowledge as the modification of theory, knowledge as coping), and it presents Rorty’s critique of epistemology in favour of the concept of self-determination. The conclusion of the study looks at the question of how Rorty is able to justify the rejection of epistemology and the acceptance of a hermeneutical viewpoint., and Martin Ritter.
Studie je věnována roz- manitým sociologizujícím, a později přímo i sociologickým způsobům, kterými v minulosti byla a dodnes je věda uchopována. Do sociologie se věda jako výzkumný předmět dostává spolu s osvícenskou ideou pokroku, na kterou v první polovině 19. století navazuje Auguste Comte. Teprve sociologie 20. století se však zbavila „historicismu", kterým byla sociologie nejen Comtova, ale samozřejmě i Marxova určována. Od 30. let minulého století (Merton) se pak věda stává zvláštním sociologickým tématem, které bude s postupujícím časem nabývat na síle (až po nedávný bloorovský a latourovský obrat). V samostatné části se pak prof. Petrusek věnuje fenoménem zpochybňování vědy, který spojuje s proměnami samotných našich společností. Svoji studii uzavírá zamyšlením se nad sociologickou metateorií., This study focuses on various forms of sociological accounts and understandings of science. It demonstrates that as an explanatory topic science enters the field of sociology together with the Enlightenment's idea of progress, which is then followed up by Auguste Comte in the early 19th century. However, it had taken many decades before sociologists were able to free themselves of " historicist" ways of thinking, which can easily be traced in Comte's and Marx's writings. Since the 1930s, science has become a distinct research topic within sociology (with Robert K. Merton as a leading figure) that is nowadays more and more in the centre of systematic disciplinary interest (with David Bloor or Bruno Latour as leading figures). In the final parts, the author inquires into the arguments against science and associates these arguments with the transformations of societies. Also the role of sociological metatheory is aligned with the prospects of socio- logical accounts of science., and Miloslav Petrusek.
The study expresses some personal experiences based on long collaborations and contacts with specialists in engineering or design spheres during more than two decades. These specialists had mostly bad experiences with some opinions or standpoints carried out by the decisions called as political or in the public interests or, as it was usually denoted, in the people’s interests. It was A.M. Weinberg (former US presidents’ scientific adviser and director of great laboratories) who emphasized that the public frequently cannot know what the best is. The public meaning could be manipulated by means of simple slogans, emotional elements or simplified conceptions concerning the sphere and level of risks., Studie vyjadřuje některé osobní zkušenosti z dlouhodobé spolupráce a kontaktů s odborníky v oblasti inženýrství nebo designu v průběhu více než dvou desetiletí. Tito odborníci měli většinou špatné zkušenosti s některými názory či stanovisky, která byla učiněna rozhodnutími nazývanými politickými nebo veřejnými zájmy, nebo, jak bylo obvykle označováno, v zájmu lidí. Byl to AM Weinberg (bývalý vědecký poradce amerických prezidentů a ředitel velkých laboratoří), který zdůraznil, že veřejnost často nemůže vědět, co je nejlepší. Veřejný význam lze manipulovat prostým sloganem, emocionálními prvky nebo zjednodušenými koncepcemi týkajícími se sféry a úrovně rizik., and Ladislav Tondl
Th is article proposes some refl ections on the status of the quadrivium in the epistles X–XIV of one of the best known encyclopaedia of the Brethren of Purity Rasā’il, by reconstructing the implied methodology of how the quadrivium is applied within a theoretic philosophy and therefore how all these aspects concur in order to obtain demonstrations that are in complete cohesion with soundness. Following a hermeneutical methodology, this research explores the ways to get to the universal truth and how exactly one arrives to it. Th e fi rst part explains what perceived science is and what its defi ning features are, while the second part illustrates a distribution of the application of the quadrivium in relation with what the Brethren of Purity established as methods of acquiring knowledge. Finally, the last part evaluates some examples that can be traced from a ground of the quadrivial disciplines in order to show how some elements of formal logic are evaluated. and Článek nabízí refl exi statusu kvadrivia v listech X–XIV jedné z nejznámějších encyklopedií Bratrstva čistoty Rasā’il a rekonstruuje v ní zahrnutou metodologii užívání kvadrivia v rámci teoretické fi losofi e, tedy jak v něm jsou získávány naprosto korektní důkazy. Pomocí hermeneutické metodologie jsou zkoumány způsoby, jak se přibližovat k obecné pravdě a jak přesně k ní jednotlivci dospívají. První část vysvětluje, co je to empirická věda a jaké jsou její určující rysy, zatímco druhá část dokládá, jak Bratrstvo čistoty nahlíželo na rozličná užití kvadrivia jako na metody vedoucí k poznání. Závěrečná část hodnotí některé příklady, které lze nalézt v samotných základech kvadriviálních disciplín a demonstruje na nich, jak je v nich využita formální logika.
In her article, Barbara M. Stafford argues for the conception of literacy that would encompass visual skills besides the traditional emphasis on verbal competence. Image itself is important, not merely the information it may convey. Moreover, a more extensive notion of education is necessitated by the process of radical perceptual and conceptual changes that have been occurring since the Enlightenment and are all-pervasive in Postmodernism. The new-found power and ubiquity of images needs to be recognized in order to surpass the limitative, yet enduring Platonic distrust in visual culture. Medical,environmental, physical, legal, and other practices have nonetheless profoundly benefited from the technologies of visualization.Examples from the 18th century visual endeavors such as preserving fragmented cultures, exhibition of diversity, and the externalization of somatic experience show, how images challenge the restrictions of human comprehension. With the advent of visual and electronically generated culture, the time is ripe to edify images from their low status.Visual cognition as the crucial element of knowledge should be reflected in a hybrid art-science, public policy, as well as pedagogy., Barbara Maria Staffordová., and Obsahuje bibliografii
The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally un-addressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.