In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).
An approach to indexical beliefs is presented and defended in the paper. The account is inspired by David Kaplan’s representationalist analysis of de re belief reports. I argue that imposing additional constraints on the Kaplanian notion of representation results in an elegant theory of indexical beliefs. The theory is committed to representations of limited accessibility but is not committed to relativized proposition, special de se contents or propositions of limited accessibility.
a1_Cíle. Propoziční hustota (PH), psycholingvistické měřítko, koreluje s kognitivní kapacitou ve starším věku. Tato studie zjišťuje rozdíly v propoziční hustotě v orálních výpovědích na téma z nedávné minulosti u osob zdravých a s mírnou kognitivní poruchou (MKP). MKP je v současnosti přijímána jako prodromální stádium Alzheimerovy nemoci (AN). Soubor. Soubor zahrnoval 33 osob s MKP a 32 zdravých kontrol (průměrný věk 73 let). Obě skupiny byly vyrovnané, a to co do věku a úrovně dosaženého vzdělání. Dle očekávání se lišily v skóru MMSE, který je považován za zjednodušené vyjádření úrovně kognitivního stavu. Hypotézy. Nižší PH byla očekávána u osob s MKP, neboť úkol zatěžoval vybavení z novopaměti. Přičemž obtíž se zapamatováním nových informací, a tedy i vybavením z novopaměti, je jedním z jádrových symptomů AN., a2_Analýza a výsledky. Průměrná propoziční hustota u pacientů s MKP činila 48,74 % (sm. odch. 5,78), u kontrolního vzorku seniorů bez kognitivních poruch to bylo 53,06 % (sm. odch. 4,56). Studentův t-test prokázal statisticky významný rozdíl mezi skupinami (p < 0,001). Cohenovo d 0,83 reprezentuje velký efekt příslušnosti ke skupině. Omezení. Nejpodstatnějším omezením této studie je heterogenita diagnostické jednotky MKP. Dalším omezením byla neznalost premorbidní kognitivní úrovně zdravých kontrol, proto je možné, že v kontrolní skupině byly osoby s již počínající kognitivní poruchou, jež byla při jednorázovém vyšetření nezachytitelná., b1_Objectives. It has been shown that propositional density (PD), which roughly corresponds to the number of ideas expressed in a text of given length, is related to cognitive performance in the older age. The present study investigated differences in propositional density in oral language production between healthy seniors and patients with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). MCI is generally accepted as a prodromal stage of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Sample and setting. The sample included 33 MCI persons and 32 healthy controls (mean age 73 years). The groups were equivalent as for the age and education. As expected, there was a significant difference between Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) scores between the groups, with MMSE being a simplified measure of their cognitive status. Hypotheses. Lower PD was expected in MCI persons, as the task required recent past recall which is considered one of the early deficiencies in early AD and MCI due to AD., b2_Statistical analysis. Mean PD across groups was compared using the independent samples t-test. Results. Mean propositional density in MCI persons was 48,74% (SD 5,78), and in healthy controls 53,06% (SD 4,56). The difference was statistically significant (p<0,001). Cohen’s d 0,83 represents a large effect size for the group difference. Study limitations. The main limitation is the heterogeneity of the MCI group. Also, the detailed cognitive status of the healthy controls is unknown. Thus the group could include persons with some cognitive impairment which has not been detected yet., Hana Štěpánková, Filip Smolík, Martin Vyhnálek, Tomáš Nikolai, Karolína Horáková, Markéta Niederlová., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally un-addressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.