This paper outlines Jesse Prinz’s theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz’s theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action., Tato práce nastiňuje teorii Jesse Prinze, že emoce představují hodnoty zaznamenáváním tělesných změn, diskutuje o dvou námitkách a dochází k závěru, že Prinzova teorie potřebuje modifikaci: zatímco emoce představují hodnoty, nečiní tak v první řadě registrací tělesných změn, ale zpracováním informací o tom, jak se věci starají o jízdné ve světě. Úlohou tělesných změn je především motivovat a připravovat nás na jednání., and Eva-Maria Düringer
My paper explores critical objections to the concept of the artistic canon, conceived as a summary of works with an objective aesthetic value that have stood the test of time. To begin with, the objections of feminist and postcolonial criticism are discussed and examined. However, the sociological objection questioning the axiological foundation of the canon, i.e. the possibility of generally applicable aesthetic judgment, has been identified as the most crucial. My paper proceeds to discuss the theory of ideal perception as a solution to the problem of justifying aesthetic judgments. My aim is to prove that from the axiological perspective, the theory of the ideal critic gets entangled in the never-ending regress of a logical circle, or it eventually finds its justification through a particular social practice. This theory is also problematic in its erroneous assumption of the logical independence of the descriptive and evaluating components of aesthetic concepts. The impossibility of separating the evaluating attitude from the conditions of the use of aesthetic concepts indicates the relative applicability of aesthetic value and the artistic canon, depending on the “personal economy” of the evaluating subject.
The article analyses the terms ''value'' and ''explanation'' as used in ethical studies, offers a critique of this usage and an alternative, pragmatically oriented semantics of ethical terms, based on the illocutionary act of judging. The term ''value'' is supposed to describe a super-predicate common to both ethical and aesthetical value judgments. However, the traditional over-reliance on the copulative predication and the idea that language describes reality lead to a one-sided view of ethical terms, and a construction of sentences like ''The intentional torturing of little children is morally wrong'', whose pragmatic function, and consequently meaning, is very unclear. If, on the other hand, we take as our paradigm the act of judging (in the literal sense of a judge presiding over a case) we will be able to sketch a new, lighter ethics which, admittedly, falls short of the traditional demands placed on this discipline, but whose semantics is closer to the actual words used in expressing approval and disapproval., Článek analyzuje pojmy ,,hodnota'' a ,,vysvětlení'' používané v etických studiích, nabízí kritiku tohoto užití a alternativní, pragmaticky orientovanou sémantiku etických pojmů, založenou na iluminačním aktu soudnictví. Termín ,,hodnota'' má popisovat super-predikát společný jak pro etické, tak pro estetické hodnoty. Avšak tradiční přehnané spoléhání se na kopulační predikci a myšlenka, že jazyk popisuje realitu, vede k jednostrannému pohledu na etické pojmy a konstrukci vět jako ,,úmyslné mučení malých dětí je morálně špatné'', jehož pragmatická funkce a tudíž význam, je velmi nejasný. Pokud na druhou stranu vezmeme jako naše paradigma akt posuzování (v doslovném smyslu soudce předsedajícího případu), budeme schopni načrtnout novou, lehčí etiku,což, uznávám, nenaplňuje tradiční požadavky kladené na této disciplíny, ale jejichž sémantika je blíž ke skutečné slova používaná v projeví souhlas a nesouhlas., and Marek Tomeček
Sustainable urban development requires the education of professionals dealing with the built environment. Property valuers constitute one such important albeit neglected group of actors. When the aim is to comprehend value and valuation, the questions to ask include the following: What is the ideal definition of sustainable development in a valuation context? Is it about the diversity of value systems? Or is it about long-term thinking in terms of reinvesting the profits harvested? And what is the role of generating data on these factors? This paper reports some suggestions for answering these questions in a residential context.
This article aims to reconstruct Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation as a model of practical rationality. The concept of strong evaluation offers an attractive alternative to proceduralism, whether of a utilitarian or Kantian type, because it enables specific moral claims to be legitimised in the life of a person, and their justification does not abstract from the motivation of the person who lives in harmony with these standards. The sense of the concept of strong evaluation consists in its ability to highlight the all-transcending nature of values and evaluation in the real life. We will seek a response to the question of whether Taylor’s interpretation of the concept of strong evaluation is sufficiently broad as to cover the three relevant components of ethics: the question of values, moral norms and moral evaluation. With respect to this question we will also give an overview of Laitinen’s reinterpretation of this concept which, on the view of the author, illuminates the inner relations between the subject and morality and, by a treatment of the nature of moral norms in concepts or reasons for actions (as distinguished from the Kantian grounding of morality), points to the complementary nature of values and moral norms., Zuzana Palovičová., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
V súčasnej situácii, ktorú niektorí považujú za všeobecnú krízu hodnôt a totálny relativizmus a druhí zase označujú ako víťazstvo slobody, kedy je spor medzi modernistami a postmodernistami sporom o to, či existuje alebo neexistuje aspoň jeden spoločný oporný bod, na ktorom by sme mohli v duchu Newtonovho výroku postaviť celý náš vesmír, sa myšlienkami vraciame do minulosti. Je pozoruhodné, že už v antickom Grécku môžeme pozorovať obdobný spor tomu dnešnému a to medzi relativizmom a metafyzikou, keď relativisti odmietali predstavu existencie akejkoľvek od človeka nezávislej hodnoty a naopak metafyzici sa snažili obhájiť platnosť hodnôt existujúcich za hranicou nášho sveta. Spoločným menovateľom súčasného a minulého sporu je práve hľadanie otázky na to, či je všetko závislé od vôle človeka a platnosť má potom iba arbitrárny charakter alebo naopak existuje určitá štruktúra hodnôt poznateľná rozumom, ktorej platnosť je všeobecná a nie je závislá od ľudskej vôle. Podstatu tohto sporu sme sa
snažili ukázať aj v našom článku, kde čitateľovi najskôr ozrejmíme jeho teoretickú podstatu na báze analýzy vzťahov jednotlivých princípov a následne sa teoretický problém budeme snažiť vysvetliť aj pomocou
analýzy a komparácie súčasného platného právneho poriadku s poriadkom prvej ČSR a súvisiacej judikatúry v oblasti notárskych zápisníc ako exekučných titulov resp. ich staršími verziami vykonateľných verejno-notárskych listín.V celom článku sa preto pýtame na povahu samotnej štruktúry hodnôt a princípov, ktorých vzájomné vzťahy sú buď základom pre správnu aplikáciu princípov (platónska predstava), alebo sú skôr výsledkom ustálenej aplikácie princípov (sofistická predstava). and Some consider the current situation a general crisis of values others a victory of freedom. The general dispute is being led between the modernists and the postmodernist. The main conflict is based in the question whether there is at least one common point of convergence. This dispute brings us back to the ideas of the past. It is noteworthy that already in ancient Greece we can observe a similar dispute between relativism and metaphysics, where relativist refused to accept the idea, that there exists an independent value, which is not dependent on the will of man.On the other hand metaphysics tried to defend the validity of the structure of the values which exist beyond our world. The common denominator of the current and past issues of the dispute is the question if everything is dependent on the will of man, or if there is a structure, which is general and is not dependent on
human will. The essence of this dispute is presented in the whole article, first theoretically then by way of analysis and comparison of the legal systems of the ČSR and nowadays Slovakia. Therefore we ask ourselves throughout the whole article about the nature of the structure of values and principles
which could be the basis for the correct application of the principles in their mutual relations (platonic idea) or about the structure which resulted from the application of such principles (sophistic perception).
The extension of a lattice ordered group $A$ by a generalized Boolean algebra $B$ will be denoted by $A_B$. In this paper we apply subdirect decompositions of $A_B$ for dealing with a question proposed by Conrad and Darnel. Further, in the case when $A$ is linearly ordered we investigate (i) the completely subdirect decompositions of $A_B$ and those of $B$, and (ii) the values of elements of $A_B$ and the radical $R(A_B)$.