Studie se věnuje dialogu Anselma z Canterbury De grammatico. Tento spis byl samotným autorem označen jako úvod do dialektiky. V dobové dialektice zastával klíčové místo Aristotelův spis Kategorie. Tento článek se proto pokouší interpretovat Anselmův dialog jako určitou pedagogicky koncipovanou podobu komentáře k Aristotelovým Kategoriím. V návaznosti na Anselmův spis jsou postupně představeny jednotlivé teze z Aristotelových Kategorií (jak tzv. antepredicamenta, tak pojednání o substanci, kvalitě a částečně i vlastnictví) a způsob, jakým s nimi Anselm pracoval. and The paper deals with the dialogue De grammatico written by Anselm of Canterbury. The author of the dialogue himself described the work as an introduction to dialectics. In that epoch, the leading role in the given art belonged to Aristotle's Categories. As a result, the article aims to interpret Anselm's dialogue as a commentary to Aristotle's Categories conceived in a pedagogic form. Following Anselm's treatise, the paper analyses particular theses from the Categories (firstly the so-called antepredicamenta, then the categories of substance, quality, and partly also having) and the approach Anselm employed in working with them.
V této studii se pokouším předložit postoj Margaret Cavendishové (1623-1673) ke zkoumání přírody ve druhé polovině 17. století. Pro tento účel jsem analyzovala především dílo Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666), které představuje nejucelenější filosofický výklad přírody této autorky. Prostřednictvím něho postihuji ontologické i epistemologické námitky Cavendishové k charakteru zkoumání přírody členy nově založeného vědeckého společenství – Royal Society. Z tohoto důvodu se zaměřuji rovněž na dílo Micrographia (1665) Roberta Hooka, který pro autorku tuto společnost reprezentuje. Cílem studie není rehabilitovat osobu a dílo Margaret Cavendishové, nýbrž charakterizovat způsob, jímž se pokusila zhodnotit myšlenky nové experimentální, tj. zkušenostní vědy. and The object of this study is to present the attitude of Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) to the research of nature in the second half of the 17th century. For this purpose I analysed primarily work Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666), which represents the most comprehensive philosophical interpretation of nature of this woman author. Through this work I introduce Cavendish's ontological and epistemological objections to the research of nature, which practised members of the newly established scientific community – Royal Society. In connection with this research I also concentrate on work Micrographia (1665) of Robert Hooke, who represents this company for Cavendish. The aim of my work is not to rehabilitate the status of Margaret Cavendish, but to characterize the way she tried to evaluate ideas of new experimental, i.e. empirical science.
Hans Blumenberg is often considered an intellectual solitaire, an "invisible philosopher" and a modern hieronym in the hermitage. But for Blumenberg's scientific work of the 1960s, the picture is very different. Julia Amslinger introduces Hans Blumenberg's interdisciplinary engagement within the research group Poetics and Hermeneutics that was founded in 1963.
The essay attempts to point out the benefits of reading Peter Sloterdijk's works from the perspective of German studies. In the course of the paper, Sloterdijk is introduced in his various individual roles. First, his early steps in German studies are described, followed by an assessment of the influence of his German-studies works on the formulation of philosophical problems and stances. After that, Sloterdijk is presented as an exponent of certain typical development, as a diagnostician of problems that post-war Germany faced in its transformation into a civic society. The final part consists of reflections on his observational abilities in descriptions of interdisciplinary misunderstandings and in the creation of transdisciplinary analogies.
LaFollette proposed that the best way to protect children from abuse and neglect caused by their parents would be to implement parental licenses to prospective parents. In this paper, I re-evaluate his proposal by looking at various facts and data related to child abuse and neglect. It will be suggested that (a) parenting as a profession does not satisfy the third of LaFollette's criteria for the introduction of licenses, which is "The benefits of the licensing program outweigh any theoretical reasons against it" (LaFollette 2010, 328), (b) it would subject too many people to unnecessary tests and (c) parenting cannot be compared to other professions licenses are usually issued for.
Within science fiction the topic of 'first contact' is a popular theme. How will an encounter with aliens unfold? Will we succeed in communicating with them? Although such questions are present in the background of many science fiction novels, they are not always explicitly dealt with and even if so, often in a poor way. In this article, I will introduce a typology of five dominant types of solutions to the problem of first contact in science fiction works. The first four solutions are the more dominant, but also the least interesting ones. There is a fifth category that addresses the question of first contact in a more interesting way, exemplified by the work of Stanisław Lem. This fifth option defines itself as a critique of the four previous categories, or of their shared assumption of what Lem (1967) has called 'the myth of cognitive universality'. Lem is sceptical of the common optimism that first contact will always be successful. In books such as Solaris (1961), His Master's Voice (1967) and Fiasco (1986), humanity makes first contact with an alien phenomenon, but fails to comprehend the phenomenon. Fundamentally, it will be argued that Lem's work shows that in such an encounter we will typically not only lack the right answers to our questions, but that we also often lack the correct questions: we simply do not have the right categories or instruments to even recognize, let alone meaningfully interrogate, the alien phenomenon. The article ends with an exploration of the implications of Lem's pessimism and whether it is the most plausible option for first contact. Moreover, the article will draw some lessons for philosophy of science, by exploring the parallel with the confrontation of novel or deviant phenomena in science. Lem's work is helpful here because it succeeds in articulating what has not always been appreciated in the philosophy of science, namely that the right questions by which to interrogate scientific phenomena are not given, but that their articulation always requires work.
Obsah této studie se zaměřuje na mýtus o prvotním hříchu a jeho dopadu na encyklopedické práce v raném novověku. Jejím hlavním cílem je zde zodpovězení otázky do jaké míry byly encyklopedie tímto příběhem ovlivněny a následně popsat konkrétní změny, které byly tímto mýtem zapříčeněny. Hlavní pozornost je věnována zejména nejvýznamnějším anglickým encyklopedickým pracím v raném novověku a to Cyclopaedii (1728) od Ephraim Chamberse a Lexiconu Technicumu (1704) od Johna Harrise. and The content of this study is focused on the myth of original sin and its impact on the encyclopedic works in the early modern period in the Europe. The main goal here is to answer questions to what extent encyclopedia affected by this story and then describe the changes that caused it. The main attention is devoted to most important English encyclopedic works in early modern times: Cyclopaedia (1728) by Ephraim Chambers and Lexicon Technicum (1704) by John Harris.
Baruch Spinoza's philosophy of mind stirs up the disputes about the nature of body-mind relations with its rigorous and naturalistic monism. The unity of body and mind is consequential of his metaphysics of the substance, but the concept of the unity of the mind and its idea rightfully confuses Spinoza's commentators. Many have been tempted to interpret this as a possible account of consciousness, but it still has not yet been fully understood. This paper attempts to introduce an interpretation of the concept of ideas of ideas with regards to consciousness based on strict ontological monism, conceptual dualism, and self-similarity architecture, which concludes in distinguishing mental and psychic reality. While we might attribute mental reality, or mentality, to every extended thing, psychic reality is constituted by conscious ideas. And it seems to follow from Spinoza's theory that the more 'psychic' the mind is, the more it knows God. and Filozofie mysli Barucha Spinozy svým rigorózním naturalistickým monismem podněcuje mnohé diskuze o povaze vztahu mysli a těla. Jednota mysli a těla je konsekventní jeho substanční metafyzice, avšak koncepce jednoty mysli a její ideje oprávněně mate Spinozovy komentátory. Mnozí z nich jsou nakloněni interpretovat tento koncept jako Spinozovu variaci na koncept (sebe)vědomí, přesto se však zdá, že jako takový ještě nebyl zcela adekvátně a celostně uchopen. Příspěvek představuje interpretaci konceptu idejí idejí v kontextu vědomí, přičemž metodologicky vychází z ontologického monismu, konceptuálního dualismu a sebe-opakující se architektury mysli a zahrnuje logické vyvození možné diferenciace mentální a psychické reality. Zatímco mentální realitu neboli mentalitu je možné na základě Spinozova učení připisovat každé rozprostraněné věci, psychická realita neboli psychika je konstituována vědomými idejemi. Ze Spinozova učení přitom také vyplývá, že čím více psychiky jednotlivá věc "má", tím více poznává Boha.
Studie předkládá novou interpretaci zpráv o oběhu nebeských těles podle Anaximena z Mílétu. Nebeská tělesa se v jeho pojetí nemají pohybovat pod Zemí, ale naopak kolem Země. Anaximenés měl danou koncepci přiblížit motivem plstěného klobouku, který se otáčí kolem naší hlavy. Případné vysvětlení oběhu nebeských těles pomocí nakloněné Země podél její horizontální osy však patrně mylně vychází až z koncepce kulové Země a sklonu ekliptiky. Je možné, že dochované texty ve skutečnosti navazují na problém sklonu nebeské osy a popisují původní situaci oběhu nebeských těles předtím, než se "nebe naklonilo". and This study presents a new interpretation of reports about the paths of heavenly bodies according to Anaximenes of Miletus. In his view, they do not move under the Earth but rather around it. Anaximenes is said to have likened this idea to a felt hat moving around our head. The alleged explanation of orbits of heavenly bodies that is based on Earth being tilted around its horizontal axis is, probably erroneously, derived from a later conception of spherical Earth and the tilt of the ecliptic plane. It is possible that extant texts in fact elaborate on the issue of the incline of the heavenly axis, describing the original situation of orbits of heavenly bodies before "the heaven became tilted".