In my response to Martin and Wiebe's academic "confession", I try to show that there is a major inconsistency in their argument. This inconsistency resides within their partial and therefore biased application of universal unconscious mechanisms that constrain the human mind, where the application should have been complete. Their argument should have been directed at all sciences or at science in general in order for it to be sound, and not particularly at Religious Studies. This would result in the argument that any scientific discipline is a delusion, which is an outcome Martin and Wiebe do not hold, as they make science a sine qua non for their own argument.
Filozofie ve 20. století ztratila velkou část svých kompetencí a pro svou údajnou neužitečnost se stala terčem kritiky ze strany přírodních vědců. Vztah mezi filozofií a vědou lze řešit pomocí tří stanovisek, kterými jsou antiscientismus, konceptuální analýza a naturalismus. Obsahem článku je charakteristika jednotlivých přístupů a identifikace problémů, s nimiž se musí jejich zastánci potýkat. Autorovi se jako nejslibnější jeví Quinem inspirovaný naturalismus, podle něhož má veškeré poznání povahu syntetických aposteriorních výroků, a filozofie je proto kontinuální s přírodní vědou. Není třeba obávat se zániku filozofie jako samostatné disciplíny, naturalismus může naopak přispět k dořešení mnohých filozofických problémů pomocí metodologie a poznatků přírodních věd. and Philosophy in the 20th century lost many of its competencies and was criticized by natural scientists for its alleged uselessness. The relationship between philosophy and science can be solved by adopting three standpoints, which are anti-scientism, conceptual analysis and naturalism. This article comprises characteristics of the different approaches and identification of problems which their advocates must confront. According to the author, the most promising one seems to be naturalism inspired by Quine, according to which all knowledge has the nature of synthetic a posteriori statements, and philosophy is therefore continuous with natural science. There is no need to worry about the extinction of philosophy as a separate discipline. On the contrary, naturalism may contribute to resolving many philosophical problems using the methodology and findings of science.
Neuroscience is a fascinating discipline – its dynamic progress has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary research programmes with great potential. One of these research areas is neuroeconomics. As will be shown in this article, this discipline, which is diffi cult to clearly characterize and defi ne, is faced with many problems. Th is paper argues that social scientists should be interested in the problems and tendencies in social neuroscience for several reasons. Neuroeconomics, and other disciplines inspired by neuroscience, will compete with their parent disciplines in many fi elds of interest. On one hand it will be necessary for scientists to defi ne and defend the irreplaceable roles of their disciplines, but also critically evaluate the potential of new approaches on the other. In the context of this discussion, which reopens questions about the scientifi c status of economics and its roles, this paper introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics. Th is paper concludes that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science. and Neurověda je fascinující disciplínou – její dynamický rozvoj podněcuje vznik nových interdisciplinárních výzkumných programů s velkým potenciálem. Jednou takovou oblastí je i neuroekonomie. Jak se ukáže v článku, tato disciplína, kterou je obtížné jednoznačně vymezit a určit její defi nici, se potýká se spoustou problémů. Článek y jj fi argumentuje, že by se společenští vědci měli těmito problémy a tendencemi v sociální neurovědě zabývat, a to hned z několika důvodů. Neuroekonomie, a také další neurovědou inspirované disciplíny, budou svým mateřským oborům konkurovat v mnoha oblastech, přičemž bude nezbytné, aby vědci byli schopni na jedné straně defi novat a obhájit nezastupitelné role svých disciplín, na straně druhé kriticky vyhodnocovat potenciál nových přístupů. V kontextu této diskuze, která znovu otevírá otázky ohledně vědeckého statusu ekonomie a jejích rolí, článek vymezuje základní problémy, s nimiž se neuroekonomie potýká. Práce dospívá k závěru, že tyto problémy představují široké pole působnosti pro společenské vědce a metodology vědy.
In his book Physics of the Impossible, Michio Kaku thinks that psycho-kinesis-i.e., a direct causal influence on physical processes by mental powers-will become a real possibility in a near future. From the point of view of metaphysical realism, this means that mental entities and mental causality are real phenomena. Contemporary scientific methodology regards the use of scientific instruments that amplify our sensibilities as a cognitive technology that deepens our knowledge of, and power over, real processes. It appears that the strongest and most productive methods are connected with scientific theories-they are theories ''in action''. Thus, scientific theories can regarded as mental cognitive technology by means of which humans get to know, and at the same time shape, reality. and Břetislav Fajkus
The main purpose of this paper is to compare two pluralistic approaches to knowledge, Goodman’s theory of worldmaking and Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism. It therefore examines firstly, the concept of world-versions, which according to Goodman create our worlds and at the same time are crucial for achieving a better understanding of reality; and secondly, the concept of alternative theories which are built upon pluralism and, according to Feyerabend, secure knowledge and make scientific progress possible. Feyerabend’s concept has been rejected by many, seemingly for its lack of limitations. In line with this argument, I propose that based on the comparison of these two pluralistic approaches, the alternative theories can be understood as a part of worldmaking, for Goodman’s theory has wider applicability since it encompasses not only science but also art. Furthermore, I suggest adopting Goodman’s principle of rightness, the criterion of functionality in his worldmaking, as a criterion within Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism when establishing the prevailing theory. It is to be expected that such a juxtaposition will uncover inconsistencies, in particular regarding boundless relativism and the vague terminology in both conceptions.