Filozofie ve 20. století ztratila velkou část svých kompetencí a pro svou údajnou neužitečnost se stala terčem kritiky ze strany přírodních vědců. Vztah mezi filozofií a vědou lze řešit pomocí tří stanovisek, kterými jsou antiscientismus, konceptuální analýza a naturalismus. Obsahem článku je charakteristika jednotlivých přístupů a identifikace problémů, s nimiž se musí jejich zastánci potýkat. Autorovi se jako nejslibnější jeví Quinem inspirovaný naturalismus, podle něhož má veškeré poznání povahu syntetických aposteriorních výroků, a filozofie je proto kontinuální s přírodní vědou. Není třeba obávat se zániku filozofie jako samostatné disciplíny, naturalismus může naopak přispět k dořešení mnohých filozofických problémů pomocí metodologie a poznatků přírodních věd. and Philosophy in the 20th century lost many of its competencies and was criticized by natural scientists for its alleged uselessness. The relationship between philosophy and science can be solved by adopting three standpoints, which are anti-scientism, conceptual analysis and naturalism. This article comprises characteristics of the different approaches and identification of problems which their advocates must confront. According to the author, the most promising one seems to be naturalism inspired by Quine, according to which all knowledge has the nature of synthetic a posteriori statements, and philosophy is therefore continuous with natural science. There is no need to worry about the extinction of philosophy as a separate discipline. On the contrary, naturalism may contribute to resolving many philosophical problems using the methodology and findings of science.
In this polemical article, the author identifies the essential problems of the naturalistic approach as it is presented in Juraj Franek's book Naturalismus a protekcionismus ve studiu náboženství (Naturalism and Protectionism in the Study of Religions; published in Czech in 2017). Franek argues that naturalism and protectionism are two irreconcilable approaches in Religious Studies. He also advocates the primacy of naturalistic science of religion and its reductionism. The author of this article shows that it is necessary to overcome the modernist divide between nature and culture (Bruno Latour) and to place the Study of Religions on an ontologically plural basis. He adapts Isabelle Stengers' theory, according to which science has to be "slowed down" and made symbiotic by re-establishing contact with the world of values and public interest. Object-oriented ontology (Jane Bennett, Graham Harman) is discussed as well.
In this paper I concentrate on evaluating Searle’s concept of external realism as a non-epistemic thesis . Above all, I evaluate the role it plays in our system of beliefs, knowledge and communicative obligations. There are two important questions: (1) whether a return of transcendental philosophy creates a positive alternative to philosophical naturalism (Quine); (2) whether for the same purpose Fraassens’ constructive empiricism suffices., V tomto příspěvku se zaměřuji na hodnocení Searleho konceptu externího realismu jako neepistemické práce. Především hodnotím roli, kterou hraje v našem systému víry, znalostí a komunikačních povinností. Existují dvě důležité otázky: (1) zda návrat transcendentální filosofie vytváří pozitivní alternativu k filosofickému naturalismu (Quine); (2) zda pro stejný účel postačuje Fraassensův konstruktivní empirismus., and Lukáš Zámečník
There is a plethora of naturalisms in contemporary philosophy. Instead of sorting out diverse past or present variants of this philosophical movement this article aims to define in three relatively simple points a version of naturalism that I consider as the most auspicious way for philosophy to remain a relevant and significant force in the domain of knowledge dominated by contemporary science. The tripartite definition of naturalism that is presented deliberately does not claim to be original, but seeks to capture in a concise and clear way the common core of the naturalistic mind frame. The point of the article is to point out the need to reduce internal metaphilosophical disputes within the naturalistic movement in favor of a greater emphasis on the concrete participation of philosophy in current scientific research. The claim is that the real (not only nominal) realization of the naturalistic turn in philosophy necessarily presupposes a change in the process of the education of future philosophers.
This article presents the contemporary conception of “environmental pragmatism” as an alternative strategy, still little known in the Czech context, for the solution of the problem of the relation between nature and culture. The point of departure for this conception are the ideas of the classical pragmatists, especially the naturalism and ethics of John Dewey. This philosophy bears within it an immanent environmental direction and it issues in the “Third Way” in the ecological movement, finding a path between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism; between individualism and holism; between instrumentalism and immanentism; between exploitation and preservation; between the dualisms of value and fact, aims and means, conservation and growth, and so on., Emil Višňovský., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v "denaturalizácii" morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. and The aim of the paper is to identify anti-naturalist features in Duns Scotus's ethics. The prerequisite is to clarify the meaning of the term naturalism. In theoretical philosophy metaphysical, scientific-methodological and semantic-analytical naturalism can be distinguished. In practical philosophy naturalism is present in the ethics of virtue, which, in achieving a good life, considers the emotional-affective part of man to be a relevant element of ethical reasoning. The ethics of rules can be regarded as an opposite to the ethics of virtue, one in which emotionality is irrelevant. On the basis of an analysis of some of Duns Scotus's works, the author argues that his ethics is antinaturalistic in these aspects: the understanding of will in opposition to nature; the separation of morality and bliss; a secondary role of emotion in ethical reasoning; a universally binding imperative of love to God; will as the seat of moral virtues. The connection between bliss, virtue and nature, according to Scotus, loses internal cohesion, the natural and the moral good do not converge, which is reflected in the ‘denaturalisation’ of morals. Having identified the anti-naturalist features of Scotus's ethics, the author concludes that his ethics is closer to the ethics of rules.
The article summarizes the main tenets of the monograph Naturalismus a protekcionismus ve studiu náboženství (Naturalism and Protectionism in the Study of Religions), published in Czech by Masaryk University Press in 2017. The monograph, to be published in English by Bloomsbury in 2020, identifies a serious methodological schism between naturalism and protectionism in the modern (19th and 20th century) Study of Religions, tracks the earliest roots of these competing paradigms to Pre-Socratic philosophy and early Christian literature, and evaluates the contribution of the Cognitive Science of Religion to the renewal of the naturalist approach.
Fenomenologie není pouze specifi cká metoda filosofi ckého zkoumání, ale též svébytná fi losofi cká pozice. Husserl je znám a diskutován spíše jako autor právě zmíněné metody, ovšem ta přeci měla sloužit jakožto organon pro vytvoření samostatné fi losofi cké nauky. Proto se bude v příspěvku věnovat pozornost Husserlovu chápání toho, co je to filosofi e, a to v kontrastu proti dobově populárním fi losofi ckým pozicím, jimiž byly naturalismus a fi losofi e světového názoru s jeho nejodpudivější podobou nazývanou Husserlem pejorativně „Tiefsinn“: důvtipná duchaplnost. Husserl zamýšlí odstranit oba zmíněné typy fi losofi e skutečně přísně vědeckou fi losofi í, jež bude fi losofi í fenomenologickou. and Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientifi c philosophy. Th is may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another “brand” of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called ‘Tiefsinn’. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientifi c philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.
This article examines the mechanisms and semantic manifestations of how fictional characters and the social/natural space are depicted in the work of the post-war Greek author Spyros Plaskovitis, who exploits description as a way to organise his works conceptually and aesthetically. The paper focuses on a study of the descriptive pauses in Nature Morte, from the Naked Tree collection (1952), which is a short story not previously thoroughly studied by criticism wherein the author manages to structure the plot and the ideological core of his story with reference to naturalistic standards. An analysis of the narrative reveals the extent to which Plaskovitis converses with previous European and Greek prose tradition but at the same time achieves modernisation and adaptation to the aesthetic/cultural needs of his time.
A comparison of the aesthetic system of Émile Zola, as the founder of European naturalism, with naturalist sequences in Tolstoi's drama The Power of Darkness, concentrated, similarly to those in the drama A Bitter Fate by A. F. Pisemsky, in the scene of the murder of a baby. Tolstoi's technique of drama is compared with his dramatical postulates expressed in his essay On Shakespeare and on dramaturgy. Tolstoi's drama is built on an anti-Shakespearean conception of dramatic illusion based on the life reality. Naturalism used in Tolstoi's drama The Power of Darkness intensifies its ethical meaning and moral message.