Feyerabend’s alternative theories within goodman’s worldmaking

Title:

Feyerabend’s alternative theories within goodman’s worldmaking

Creator:

Fišerová, Nicole

Identifier:

https://cdk.lib.cas.cz/client/handle/uuid:3b436665-fa92-451a-8857-4aab83ca012e
uuid:3b436665-fa92-451a-8857-4aab83ca012e
doi:10.31577/orgf.2020.27302

Subject:

alternative theories, methodological anarchism, Nelson Goodman, Paul Feyerabend, philosophy of science, theory of symbols, worldmaking, and world-versions

Type:

model:article and TEXT

Format:

bez média and svazek

Description:

The main purpose of this paper is to compare two pluralistic approaches to knowledge, Goodman’s theory of worldmaking and Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism. It therefore examines firstly, the concept of world-versions, which according to Goodman create our worlds and at the same time are crucial for achieving a better understanding of reality; and secondly, the concept of alternative theories which are built upon pluralism and, according to Feyerabend, secure knowledge and make scientific progress possible. Feyerabend’s concept has been rejected by many, seemingly for its lack of limitations. In line with this argument, I propose that based on the comparison of these two pluralistic approaches, the alternative theories can be understood as a part of worldmaking, for Goodman’s theory has wider applicability since it encompasses not only science but also art. Furthermore, I suggest adopting Goodman’s principle of rightness, the criterion of functionality in his worldmaking, as a criterion within Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism when establishing the prevailing theory. It is to be expected that such a juxtaposition will uncover inconsistencies, in particular regarding boundless relativism and the vague terminology in both conceptions.

Language:

Slovak

Rights:

http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/
policy:public

Coverage:

302-324

Source:

Organon F: filozofický časopis | 2020 Volume:27 | Number:3

Harvested from:

CDK

Metadata only:

false