On the occasion of 80th birthday of an excellent Slovak philosopher Pavel Cmorej, some characteristic features of his work are presented. Cmorej is shown as a solid thinker who always took care of precisely expressing his thoughts. One of his remarkable works is a collection of his philosophical dialogues (published in 2007) where Cmorej’s analysis of various philosophical problems demonstrates his ability to develop analytic philosophy so that (the desirable) English translations of his works would certainly surprise his contemporary world analytic philosophers. and Pavel Materna
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that procedurally structured con- cepts are central to human communication in all cultures and throughout history. This thesis is supported by an analytical survey of three very different means of communication, namely Egyptian hieroglyphs, pictures, and Inca knot writing known as khipu. My thesis is that we learn, communicate and think by means of concepts; and regardless of the way in which the meaning of an expression is encoded, the meaning is a concept. Yet we do not define concepts within the classical set-theoretical framework. Instead, within the logical framework of Transparent Intensional Logic, we explicate concepts as logical procedures that can be assigned to expressions as their context-invariant meaning. In particular, complex meanings, which structurally match complex expressions, are complex procedures whose parts are sub-procedures. The moral suggested by the paper is this. Concepts are not flat sets; rather, they are algorithmically structured abstract procedures. Unlike sets, concepts have constituent sub-procedures that can be executed in order to arrive at the product of the procedure (if any). Not only particular parts matter, but also the way of combining these parts into one whole ''instruction'' that can be followed, understood, executed, learnt, etc., matters., Cílem příspěvku je ukázat, že procesně strukturované koncepty jsou ústředním bodem lidské komunikace ve všech kulturách a v průběhu dějin. Tato práce je podpořena analytickým průzkumem tří velmi odlišných komunikačních prostředků, konkrétně egyptských hieroglyfů, obrázků a psaní uzlů Inků známých jako khipu. Má diplomová práce je, že se učíme, komunikujeme a myslíme pomocí konceptů; a bez ohledu na způsob, jakým je význam výrazu zakódován, významem je pojem. Nedefinujeme však koncepty v rámci klasického teoretického rámce. Místo toho, v logickém rámci Transparentní Intenzionální Logiky, vysvětlujeme pojmy jako logické procedury, které mohou být přiřazeny výrazům jako jejich kontextově invariantní význam. Zejména složité významy, které strukturně odpovídají komplexním výrazům, jsou složité postupy, jejichž součástí jsou dílčí postupy. Morální návrh, který tento článek navrhl, je toto. Pojmy nejsou ploché soupravy; jsou to spíše algoritmicky strukturované abstraktní postupy. Na rozdíl od sad, koncepty mají dílčí dílčí postupy, které mohou být provedeny, aby se dospělo k produktu postupu (pokud existuje). Nezáleží jen na jednotlivých částech, ale také na způsobu spojování těchto částí do jedné ,,instrukce'', kterou lze sledovat, chápat, realizovat, učit se atd., Záleží na tom., and Marie Duží
In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says, it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.
The concept of expressivity of a theory or a system ́(for example a system of concepts or - derivatively - of basic expressions) is surely important: a theory (system) is the more expressive the more problems it allows to be solved. We will try to formulate or at least to suggest an explication of this notion. We will, of course, assume that an appropriate explication of the notion of problem has been given., Pojem expresivity teorie nebo systému ́ (např. Systém pojmů nebo - derivativně - základních výrazů) je jistě důležitý: teorie (systém) je výraznější, čím více problémů umožňuje řešit. Pokusíme se formulovat nebo alespoň navrhnout vysvětlení tohoto pojmu . Samozřejmě budeme předpokládat, že byl poskytnut vhodný výklad pojmu problému ., and Pavel Materna
Příspěvek se zabývá porovnáním frazeologismů tří slovanských jazyků a vyhledáváním kulturně významných informací v jejich sémantice a obraznosti. Důraz se klade na problém reflexe genderu v jazyce a jeho cílem je přispět k popisu konceptů "muž" a "žena". Nejdříve se rozebírá samotný termín koncept a v souvislosti s tím i pojem genderový koncept. Dále se pozornost zaměřuje na analýzu frazémů v běloruštině, polštině a češtině a jejich porovnáni. V centru pozornosti jsou sémantické skupiny frazémů hodnotící sňatek a jeho účastníky a dále rčení vystihující podřízenost partnera partnerce a naopak. and The article deals with a comparison of idioms of three Slavonic languages and searches cultural information in their semantics and symbols of their metaphors. The problem of the reflection of gender in language is emphasized in the paper, with the aim to describe concepts of a "man" and a "woman". First of all it is analyzed the term concept and subsequently the term gender concept. Further, the article focuses on interpretation of idioms in Belarusian, Polish and Czech languages and their comparison. Analysis includes semantic groups of idioms which contain information about marriage and it's participants and also expressions that mean obedience of one of the partners.
The first part of the paper deals with the key question of the Searle-Derrida debate, namely, with the question of conceptual ''exactness'' and applicability of concepts to facts. I argue that Derrida makes a strict distinction between the exactness in the realm of concepts and the exactness in the realm of facts. Supposing that it is not correct to argue against him - as Searle does - that concepts cannot be exact because there are no strict boundaries between facts. The second part of the paper deals with a distinction used by John Searle: The distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker’s meaning. According to Searle linguistic meaning is constituted outside a particular context of use whereas speaker’s meaning is embedded in a particular situation. I argue this distinction is problematic as far as any meaning is constituted in a particular utterance and in a particular context of use., První část práce se zabývá klíčovou otázkou debaty Searle-Derrida, konkrétně otázkou konceptuální ,,přesnosti'' a aplikovatelnosti konceptů na fakta. Tvrdím, že Derrida rozlišuje mezi přesností v oblasti pojmů a přesností v oblasti faktů. Předpokládejme, že není správné argumentovat proti němu - jak to dělá Searle -, že pojmy nemohou být přesné, protože mezi fakty neexistují striktní hranice. Druhá část práce se zabývá rozlišením, které používá John Searle: Rozlišení mezi jazykovým významem a významem mluvčího. Podle Searle je lingvistický význam vytvořen mimo konkrétní kontext použití, zatímco význam mluvčího je zakotven v určité situaci., and Tomáš Koblížek
The work is a contribution to the understanding of the structure and status of Hegel’s dialectic methods. In accordance with other commentators (Cramer, Düssing, Henrich, Horstmann), the author propounds the interpretation of Hegel’s logic as a theory of subjectivity sui generis. In a critical response to an article by H. F. Fulda, the author attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s use of the term “pure determination of thought” (and similar terms) and their mentalistic interpretation do not imply a psychologisation of Hegel’s logic., Jindřich Karásek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Autor článku se zabývá cestami metod a koncepcí v oboru literární věda v areálu střední Evropy v průběhu 20. století. Ve vědě většinou víme, kdy určitý směr, určitá koncepce nebo určitý přístup za- číná a známe zpravidla i místo. Ale není už jasné, kdy a kam se koncepce šíří. Cesty šíření jsou různé, časová období často fázově posunutá, např. ruský formalismus není uplatňován v českých zemích jen ve třicátých letech spolu s brněnským (pražským) strukturalismem, ale ještě v letech padesátých 20. století spolu s marxistickými koncepcemi odrazu a sociologickými tendencemi i později. V článku ukazuje na svém (tedy jedinečném) příkladu, jak se koncepce a metody proplétaly a znovu-ožívaly ve 20. století. and The author of the article deals with ways of methods and concepts in the field of literary studies in the area of Central Europe during the 20th century. We generally know in science when a certain direction or a certain concept of access begins and we usually known the place when is begins. But it is not so clear when and where the concept spreads. The paths of propagation are different, the periods of time are often out of phase, for example Russian formalism is applied in the Czech Republic not only in the thirties along with Brno (Prague) structuralism (Czech school), but also in the fifties of the 20th century, along with Marxist conceptions of reflection and sociological tendencies. The article points to his (ieunique) example of how the concepts and methods intertwined and re-came alive in the 20th century
Language acquisition is one of the currently much discussed topics in the field of psycholinguistics. Considerable space for future research can be seen in the development of vocabulary in Czech-speaking children. In our case, we are mainly interested in the meaning, i.e. the content of acquired words (concepts), and the role of so-called semantic features in mental representation.
The intended goal of our research is to bring new information from the above-mentioned area, to confirm or disprove some existing theoretical statements and to compare the results of foreign research with data obtained using the Czech language material. Similar research has been conducted in various world languages, but so far there are not many papers that address the issue in the Czech language environment. As part of our work, a comprehensive database of semantic features for selected concepts has been prepared. This database has been statistically processed and subsequently the data has been analyzed and interpreted on the basis of theories about the development of the child's speech competence. This material, obtained from children aged 8-9 (lower primary school) growing up in a Czech language environment, has been used in the next phase of research, in which an experiment with subjects belonging to the same age category has been performed: in a semantic task based on the phenomenon called semantic priming, the effect of featural similarity of two concepts on decision in a speeded task has been observed.
The results of the research expand the range of information published so far in this scientific field in the Czech environment. This research can provide valuable insights into children's language acquisition issues. The data gathered can also be practically beneficial not only for teachers, psychologists and speech therapists, but also for parents, for example.
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.