The paper deals with the problem whether the number is a property or an object. The authors are convinced that from the logical point of view the number is an object, but from the ontological point of view the number is a special kind of property (briefly spoken the property of a system or a structure). and Prokop Sousedík, David Svoboda
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.
Husserlova fenomenologie je široce považována za filosofii idealistickou, tento text si klade za cíl prostřednictvím analýzy klíčového epistemologického pojmu, tj. objektu, představit empirickou stránku Husserlovy filosofie. Výzkumem především prvních a posledních Husserlových spisů (které jsou věnovány problematice založení logiky) představí nutnou součást fenomenologického pojetí předmětu – jeho vnější aspekt. Tento aspekt je sice začleněn do obecného fenomenologického pojetí poznání, které prima facie vykazuje znaky idealismu, avšak prostřednictvím zkoumání níže uvedených konceptů by měla být objasněna pevnost vazby, kterou je toto pojetí propojeno s vnějškem. and Husserl's phenomenology is widely considered an idealistic philosophy, this article aims to present the empirical side of Husserl's philosophy by analyzing a key epistemological concept, i.e., an object. The research of the first and last of Husserl's writings (which are devoted to the issue of constituting logic) will present a necessary part of the phenomenological conception of the object – its external aspect. This aspect is, on the one hand, based on the general phenomenological conception of knowledge, which prima facie contains the features of idealism, but, on the other hand, by examining the concepts below, the strength of the bond that connects this conception with the outside should be clarified.