This review-study aims to present a critical exposition of the ground-breaking work in the study of secularisation, Charles Taylor's Secular Age. The study points to the links with Taylor's preceding work, Sources of the Self, which consist above all in the contrast between the porous self and the buffered self. It also presents Taylor's conception of secularisation: secularisation is not the retreat of religion from the public sphere, but the widening of the social process that makes it impossible for one world-view to make claim to a privileged status. The study also focuses on Taylor's rejection of modernity which, in the shape of a scientistic world-view and a universalistic morality understood as the hegemony of exclusively-human categories. In the context of this rejection, the article discusses Taylor's attempt to weaken the "hegemony of the human" by a relation to transcendence., Tereza Matějčková., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This article aims to reconstruct Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation as a model of practical rationality. The concept of strong evaluation offers an attractive alternative to proceduralism, whether of a utilitarian or Kantian type, because it enables specific moral claims to be legitimised in the life of a person, and their justification does not abstract from the motivation of the person who lives in harmony with these standards. The sense of the concept of strong evaluation consists in its ability to highlight the all-transcending nature of values and evaluation in the real life. We will seek a response to the question of whether Taylor’s interpretation of the concept of strong evaluation is sufficiently broad as to cover the three relevant components of ethics: the question of values, moral norms and moral evaluation. With respect to this question we will also give an overview of Laitinen’s reinterpretation of this concept which, on the view of the author, illuminates the inner relations between the subject and morality and, by a treatment of the nature of moral norms in concepts or reasons for actions (as distinguished from the Kantian grounding of morality), points to the complementary nature of values and moral norms., Zuzana Palovičová., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Moderné individualistické ideológie na čele s neoliberalizmom považujú za zdroj väčšiny problémov štát, spoločnosť a komunitárne hodnoty. Aj totalitné a autoritárne režimy sú podľa klasikov liberalizmu výsledkom kolektivistických ideológií, ktoré si údajne nevážia človeka ako indivíduum. Vo svojom príspevku sa snažím ukázať, že presný opak je pravdou. Po prvé, pokúšam sa dokázať, že totalitné a autoritatívne prejavy sú vo svojej podstate vedľajším produktom individualistických, nie kolektivistických projektov. Atomizovaná masová spoločnosť, v ktorej prevládajú hodnoty individualizmu, inštrumentalizmu a konzumerizmu, vytvára predpoklady pre totalitné myslenie väčšmi než ktorákoľvek totalitná ideológia. Politický systém straníckej demokracie takisto prispieva k negatívnym prejavom autoritativizmu, ako aj ku vzniku rasistických predsudkov a totalitných ideológií, napr. fašizmu. V tejto súvislosti rozvíjam myšlienky vybraných predstaviteľov tzv. frankfurtskej školy (Herbert Marcuse), ale aj analýzy niektorých teoretikov totalitarizmu (Hannah Arendtová) či teoretikov sionizmu (Max Nordau, Nachman Syrkin). Po druhé, pokúšam sa ukázať, že kolektivistické ideológie zďaleka nemožno obviniť z toho, že by si nevážili jednotlivca, slobodu či individuálne ľudské práva. Na filozofickej problematike sociálnej spravodlivosti sa v rámci rawlsiánskeho a neomarxistického diskurzu snažím ukázať, že aj z individualistických východísk možno dospieť k veľmi egalitárskym teóriam a princípom spravodlivosti a dajú sa na nich postaviť aj koncepcie, ktoré by klasici liberalizmu označili za kolektivistické (napr. demokratický socializmus). V tejto časti svojej argumentácie vychádzam zo svojej monografie Späť k Marxovi? a v stručnosti predstavujem svoju antiakcidentálnu teóriu spravodlivosti, aby som preukázal, nakoľko je možné z metodologického individualizmu dospieť k normatívnym záverom, ktoré možno považovať za kolektivistické., Modern individualist ideologies, including neo-Liberalism, consider the state, society and communitarian values to be the source of the majority of political and social problems. According to the classics of Liberalism even totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are the consequence of the collectivist ideologies that do not respect the individual. In my contribution, I attempt to prove the opposite thesis. Firstly, I would like to prove that totalitarian and authoritarian phenomena are, substantially, the by-products of individualist (not collectivist) projects. The atomized mass society, dominated by the values of individualism, instrumentalism and consumerism creates the substratum for totalitarian thinking more than any totalitarian ideology. Even the political system of the partocratic democracy contributes to the negative phenomena of authoritarianism including racial prejudices and totalitarian ideologies, e.g. fascism. In this connection I analyse the ideas of chosen representatives of the Frankfurt School (Herbert Marcuse), the theoreticians of totalitarianism (Hannah Arendt) and the theoreticians of Zionism (Max Nordau, Nachman Syrkin). Secondly, I would like to prove that collectivist ideologies cannot be blamed for lack of respect towards individuals, liberties or human rights. I attempt to present philosophical discourse about social justice and its Rawlsian and neo-Marxist connotations to prove that it is possible to use the methodological individualist presuppositions to establish egalitarian theories and principles of justice, i.e. it is possible to use individualism to establish conceptions that would be labelled “collectivist” by the classics of Liberalism (e.g. democratic socialism). I briefly introduce my anti-accidental theory of justice to demonstrate how we might defend collectivist normative conclusions on the basis of methodological individualism., and Ľuboš Blaha.
Slovenský teolog Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló se ve svém článku Má človek vo vesmíre zvláštne postavenie medzi inými živočíchmi? pokouší podrobit filosofické kritice etické myšlení Petera Singera. Ve své polemické reakci ukazuji, že autor interpretuje Singera velmi zavádějícím, často zcela chybným způsobem. Určuji, že příčinou je poměrně závažný fakt: slovenský teolog pravděpodobně nečetl hlavní díla kritizovaného autora. Pokouším se některé nejvážnější omyly uvést na správnou míru a v rámci diskuze přiblížit, jak Singer skutečně smýšlí o speciesismu a o svém preferenčním utilitarismu., The Slovak theologian Inocent-Mária V. Szaniszló, in his article Does man have a special status in the world in relation to other animals?, attempts to subject the ethical thought of Peter Singer to a philosophical critique. In this polemical reaction I show that the author interprets Singer in a very misleading, and often quite mistaken, way. I attribute the reason for this to a relatively serious fact: the Slovak theologian has probably not read the main works of the criticised author. I attempt to set forth the most serious mistakes and, in the context of this discussion, to describe in detail how Singer really understands speciesism and his own preference utilitarianism., and David Černý.
The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative., Ladislav Koreň., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Tázání po podstatě fikce a fikčnosti literatury patří k základním otázkám literární teorie a v konečném důsledku souvisí se zkoumáním samotné identity (fikční) literatury. Možných odpovědí na tyto a podobné otázky existuje vícero. Předkládaná studie mapuje konkrétní postup, jistou posloupnost voleb, které je nutné uskutečnit, aby nás dovedly k jedné specifické možnosti takové fikční teorie. Jednotlivé dichotomicky spárované návrhy, mezi nimiž je voleno, pocházejí z nejrůznějších oblastí teoretického bádání (filozofie, logika, sémiotika aj.) a představují konkrétní možnosti ideových a metodologických přístupů na cestě ke konzistentní teorii fikce. Takovou konzistentní teorii fikce splňuje jedinečná teorie fikčních světů, jejíž výsledný tvar získáváme poté, co jsme prošli množinou všech proponovaných voleb., The quest for the basis of fiction and fictional literature belongs to the fundamental questions of literary theory and, ultimately, is connected to the inquiry into the very identity of (fictional) literature. There are multiple possible answers to these and similar questions. This study maps a concrete approach – a certain series of choices which it is necessary to make in order to arrive at one specific possibility of such fictional literature. A particular dichotomous linking of suggestions between which to choose originates from the most various areas of theoretical study (philosophy, logic, semiotics and so on) and presents concrete possibilities of conceptual and methodological approaches on the way to a consistent theory of fiction. One such consistent theory of fiction is the unique theory of fictional worlds whose ultimate form we gain after we have gone through the set of all proposed choices., and Lubomír Doležel.
The discussion study takes as its starting point the thinking, which Professor Šmajs and others presented in Filosofický časopis 6, 2013 on evolutionary ontology. The author shows an enduring aspect of evolutionary ontology: ontology as the product of human culture attains to knowledge that has the seeming character of objective truth - it thus expresses the true nature of the ontic order of nature. This is not, however, the usual nonsense of inconsistent philosophy. The author of the text identifies as lying behind the step Kantian and Hegelian strategies which make possible this shift from the order of culture to the order of nature. These strategies are (i) a sign of the grounding of Professor Šmajs´ ideas in early-modern thinking; and (ii) they are the cause of a strongly anthropocentric attitude, which unwittingly influences the system of evolutionary ontology. At the end of the study, the author points to the fact that it would be more appropriate for evolutionary ontology if its proponents were able to give up their early-modern argumentative approach, and thus rid themselves of their strong anthropocentrism. In this way they would be able to avoid the conceptual conflict which makes evolutionary ontology "frozen" from within., Radim Šíp., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Tato studie recenzuje knihu: Charles CAMIC - Neil GROSS - Michèle LAMONT (eds.), Social Knowledge in the Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, a zasazuje ji do kontextu současných úvah o proměnách výzkumné praxe sociálních věd, akademické kultury, stylů myšlení a psaní. Pokouší se analyzovat v knize ohlašovaný „obrat k praxi" a ukazuje, nakolik samotné výzkumné praktiky v sociálních vědách ovlivňuje neexistence „standardních" forem, způsobů či stylů bádání. Detailně jsou představeny rovněž výchozí myšlenky takzvané „nové" sociologie idejí, jež stojí v pozadí celého projektu analýzy sociálních praktik projevujících se v procesech „produkce, evaluace a aplikace" sociálního vědění. Jako klíčová se ukazuje potřeba nově promyslet samotnou koncepci „profesionalizované" sociální vědy, jež byla v dřívějším vývoji odmítnuta jako morálně i prakticky neudržitelná, neboť s demokratizací výzkumného procesu a proměnou vztahu mezi sociálními vědami a jejich publikem se stále zřetelněji projevuje, že s odklonem od konceptu profesionální sociální vědy se veřejná irelevance sociálního vědění spíše stále více prohlubuje., This study reviews the book: Charles CAMIC - Neil GROSS - Michèle Lamont (eds.), Social Knowledge in the Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, and puts it into the context of contemporary accounts of the changing practice of social science research, academic culture, styles of thinking and writing. It attempts to analyze the "turn to practice" heralded in the book and demonstrates how the actual research practices in the social sciences are af- fected by the absence of "standard" forms, methods or styles of research. The core ideas of the so-called "new" sociology of ideas, which is behind the whole project aiming at the analysis of social practices manifested in processes of the "production, evaluation and application" of social knowledge, are also presented in detail. It follows from the argument elaborated in this text that it seems inevitable to rethink the very concept of "professional" social science, which was rejected in an earlier development as morally and practically untenable, since the democratization of the research process and the transforma- tion of the relation between the social sciences and their audience(s) manifest more and more distinctly that with the departure from the concept of professional social science, the public irrelevance of social knowledge is more and more transparent and pervading., and Jan Balon.