Článok je pokusom o interpretáciu Platónovho dialógu Faidón vo svetle prvých Sókratových slov, ktoré v ňom zaznievajú. Sókratova krátka úvaha o vzťahu príjemného a nepríjemného je vzápätí vsadená do kontextu konfrontácie filozofického a básnického typu explanácie. Zaujímavé je, že Sókratov komentár k snu, ktorý ho kedysi vyzval k praktizovaniu múzického umenia, neprezentuje oba prístupy ako navzájom sa vylučujúce, ale skôr ako komplementárne. V tejto perspektíve je možné čítať Faidóna ako náčrt "vysokej" filozofie oddelených ideí, a zároveň ako výzvu o jej doplnenie "nižšou" filozofiou zmesí. and The paper tries to interpret Plato's dialogue Phaedo in the light of the first Socrates’ words. His short monologue about the relation of pleasant and unpleasant is immediately brought into the context of philosophical and poetical type of explanation. The author finds interesting that the Socrates' elucidation of the dream which once exhorted him to exercise the music does not present both approaches as exclusive, but rather as complementary. Consequently, it is possible to read the Pheado as an outline of a "higher" philosophy of separated forms as well as an invitation to complete it with a "lower" philosophy of mixtures.
Príspevok sa venuje problematike mýtu v závere dialógu Gorgias, v súvislosti s funkciou trestu v Platónových dialógoch. Gorgias je jedným z dialógov, ktoré sú kľúčové pre porozumenie problematike trestu. Zameraním pozornosti na záverečný eschatologický mýtus by sa mohlo zdať, že autor v súvislosti s daným otázkami zastáva nejednoznačné stanovisko. K protirečeniu dochádza na úrovni mythos – logos: na jednej strane je v celom priebehu dialógu prezentovaný nápravný účel trestu. V závere však nastáva obrat a Platónov eschatologický mýtus prezentuje na prvý pohľad odlišné stanovisko. Je možné že mýtus odporuje Platónovej téze o nápravnom účele trestu a do popredia tu vystupuje jeho retributívny charakter? Alebo v skutočnosti k žiadnemu protirečeniu nedochádza a jednotlivé prvky dialógu sa navzájom dopĺňajú? Cieľom príspevku je demonštrovať, že zmena pohľadu na formu trestu a uvažovanie o treste ako o metóde elenchos by mohlo byť kľúčom k porozumeniu vzťahu mythos – logos v predmetnom dialógu. and The article is dedicated to the problem of myth at the end of the dialogue Gorgias in connection with the function of punishment in Plato's dialogues. Gorgias is one of the dialogues that are crucial for understanding of the problem of punishment. It may seem that focusing on final eschatological myth, author holds ambiguous view in connection with given questions. There is a contradiction at the level mythos – logos: on the one hand, a remedial purpose of punishment is presented in the whole dialogue. However, there is a switch at the end and Plato's eschatological myth presents a view that is distinct at the first sight. Is it possible that a myth opposes Plato's thesis of remedial purpose of punishment and its retributive character comes to the fore? Otherwise, there is no contradiction at all and particular elements of dialogue fit. The aim of the article is to demonstrate that a change of view on form of punishment and considering punishment as a method elenchos could be the key to understand the relation of mythos – logos in the given dialogue.
Cieľom tejto štúdie je uvedenie Antisthenových rečí Aias a Odysseus do širšieho kontextu sókratovskej literatúry. Výklad vychádza z otázky, či je možné čítať tieto reči z hľadiska sókratovskej dialektiky. Prvá časť pripomína diferenciu medzi rétorikou a dialektikou, ktorú naznačuje Platón v Prótagorovi, keď stavia do protikladu dlhú monologickú reč (makros logos) a krátku dialogickú reč (brachylogia). Druhá časť sa venuje výkladu niektorých Antisthenových zlomkov, ktoré naznačujú, že Antisthenés spájal brachylogiu so skúmaním zdatnosti (areté), ale zároveň kritizoval Platónove pokusy o jej esencialistické uchopenie. Proti Platónovi namieril zrejme aj svoj koncept oikeios logos a tézu o nemožnosti sporu, ktorú by sme mohli uchopiť pomocou sókratovského učenia o škodlivosti nevedenia. Posledná časť sa zaoberá viacerými aspektmi Antisthenových rečí, dáva ich do vzťahu s predošlým výkladom a poukazuje na ich dialektický charakter, ako aj na Antisthenovo osobité poňatie vzťahu medzi rétorikou a dialektikou., The aim of this study is to introduce Antisthenes’ declamations Ajax and Odysseus into the wider context of Socratic literature. The interpretation has as its starting point the question of whether it is possible to read these declamations from the viewpoint of Socratic dialectic. The first part reminds us of the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, which Plato adumbrated in the Protagoras, where the long monological declamation (makros logos) is opposed to the short dialogical declamation (brachulogia). The second part is devoted to the interpretation of some of Antisthenes’ fragments which adumbrate how Antisthenes connects brachulogia with the investigation of virtue (aretē), but at the same time criticised Plato’s attempts to find an essentialist understanding of them. It was against Plato that he evidently aimed his concept oikeios logos and the thesis concerning the impossibility of contradiction, which we might understand with the help of the Socratic doctrine of the harmfulness of unknowing. The last part tackles the various aspects of Antisthenes’ declamations, relates them to the foregoing interpretation and shows their dialectical character, as well as Antisthenes’ peculiar understanding of the relation between rhetoric and dialectic., and Vladislav Suvák.
Cílem studie je srovnání Platónova a Aristotelova výkladu vlastností těžké a lehké. Nejprve jsou představeny hlavní motivy obou výkladů a poté následuje srovnání z hlediska využití empirických dat, z hlediska jejich explikační síly a také co do blízkosti modernímu pojetí tíže. V závěru se ukazuje, že Aristotelova koncepce těžkého a lehkého je propracovanější a komplexnější, ovšem mnohem stručnější výklad Platónův má také značné explikační možnosti a v určitých ohledech Aristotelovu teorii předčí. and The aim of the paper is to compare Plato's and Aristotle's theories of qualities heavy and light. First, the main features of both theories are introduced, then the comparation follows from the viewpoint of their empirical base, their explanatory strenght and from the viewpoint of modern theory of weight as well. The conclusion is the Aristotle's theory is more elaborate and more complex, but the much briefer Plato's theory also shows a great explanatory potential and even surpasses the Aristotle's one in some aspects.
Příspěvek je zamyšlením nad proměnami sebepojetí logiky v závislosti na proměnách obrazu světa a kosmologii. Pro Platóna jde o uspořádání bludných cest v nitru, přičemž vzorem jsou zde dokonalé dráhy planet – mikrokosmos se má uspořádat podle vzoru makrokosmu. Jistým vrcholem tohoto pojetí je Aristotelés, pro něhož je zákon vyloučeného třetího základním principem vůbec a platí tedy nejen pro dokonalý nadměsíční, ale je východiskem i pro zkoumání podměsíčního světa. Proměny sebepojetí logiky v novověku lze chápat i na základě toho, že kosmos je od Descarta chápán především jako res extensa a pro zkoumání takového kosmu se "hodí" spíše matematika. Na druhé straně zde velmi vlivně působí Kantův kopernikánský obrat, který bychom metaforicky mohli shrnout tak, že dráhy planet se řídí podle drah našeho myšlení. Po zpochybnění kantovské představy o jednotnosti a univerzálnosti racionality je tak ve 20. století legitimována stále se rozrůstají pluralita logických systémů. and This paper is a reflection on the transformations of self-concept of logic depending on the changing world view and cosmology. For Plato, it is the organization of stray paths inside, the patterns are perfect planetary orbits - a microcosm should be organised according to the pattern of macrocosm. A certain peak of this conception is Aristotle, for whom the law of excluded middle is the basic principle of all, valid not only for the perfect sublunar world, but it is also a starting point for exploring the underlunar world. Transformations of self-conception of logic in modern times can be understood on the basis of the fact that cosmos is from Descartes understood primarily as res extensa and for exploring such a space "fit" much more mathematics. On the other hand, there is very influential Kant's Copernican turn, which we could summarize metaphorically so that the planets are governed by the tracks of our thinking. After challenging of the Kantian idea of the unity and universality of rationality is in the 20th century legitimized the growing plurality of logical systems.
Th e image of a dismantled statue of Lenin from Ukraine being transported up the Danube in Th eo Angelopoulos’s 1995 fi lm Ulysses’ Gaze is the starting point for a discussion of the fi lm’s urgent resonance with the questioning of “Europe” in the present day. Th is image foreshadows the destruction of Lenin statues in Ukraine during the ongoing civil war and is more than a fortuitous indicator of the historical context of the present Ukrainian crisis in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Exploring the territory of seven post-Cold War Eastern European states and ending amid the rubble and destruction of the besieged city of Sarajevo, Ulysses’ Gaze off ers a panoramic, yet highly subjective, depiction of a Europe undergoing a painful and as-yet-undecided transition. Th is article will show the strong connections between the understanding of Europe that emerges from the fi lm and that elucidated in the work of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Both the fi lm and Patočka’s thought seek the European on a utopian level that transcends particular temporal and territorial borders, recalls Classical polity and philosophy, and consists primarily in introspective thinking. Th e recurrence, in today’s Europe, of questions from the immediate post-Cold War era indicates that the work of defi nition undertaken after 1989 is not yet completed and suggests that fi lms from that period may contain images that have the capacity to guide the process of understanding Europe in the present day.
In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides. Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a compositional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma.