Cílem článku je ukázat, že německá raná romantika, která položila
filosofické základy romantického hnutí, nebere příklon k subjektivitě prožívání jako odklon od poznání, nýbrž jako jiný způsob poznání. Romantická niternost nachází svůj protějšek ve zkušenosti světa, jemuž umění dokáže propůjčit hlubší význam než racionální filosofie a věda. Tento nový pohled na poznání je romantiky použit jak na výklad přírody, tak duchovní lidské skutečnosti. Článek upozorňuje na to, že vedle dědictví spinozismu měla romantická epistemologie důležitý zdroj v některých úvahách Kantovy Kritiky soudnosti. Tato vazba je sledována zvláště na příkladu filosofie umění F. W. J. Schellinga. Argumentace článku je rozvinuta v kritické konfrontaci se subjektivistickou interpretací romantiky H.-G. Gadamera, čímž se ozřejmuje její širší epistemologický dosah i aktuálnost. Návaznost německých romantiků na Kantovu Kritiku soudnosti se spíše než tendencí k subjektivizaci estetiky projevovala ve snaze o estetizaci poznání., The aim of the article is to show how German romanticism, which laid the philosophical foundations for the Romantic Movement, understood the shift toward lived subjectivity not as a deviation from knowledge, but as another form of knowledge. Romantic inwardness finds its counterpart in the experience of the world, which is granted deeper meaning by art than it is by rational philosophy or science. This new view of knowledge is applied to both nature and human spiritual reality. The article notes that, besides the legacy of Spinozism, another importance source of romantic epistemology was the thoughts Kant put forth in his Critique of Judgement. This link is traced in particular in the philosophy of art of F. W. J. Schelling. At the same time, the article pursues a line of argument that critically confronts the subjectivistic interpretation of romanticism espoused by H.-G. Gadamer, what unveils the epistemological reach and current relevance of the topic. Th e German romantics’ embrace of Kant’s Critique of Judgement is manifested not so much in a tendency to subjectivize aesthetics as in their attempt to aestheticize the knowledge., and Martin Ďurďovič.
This text discusses the notion of rationality with respect to economics. First, it states the essential meanings of this notion and then goes on to the possibilities of rationality, which is a synonym for the effectiveness of human action. It distinguishes three types that may correspond to this meaning, where each type is unique and independent of the other two. In the end, it relates the presented typology to the work of Ludwig von Mises. His radical ap¬proach provides for good instruction of the sides of economic thought that I want to call attention to. Economics as a deductive science is interested in very strong assumptions about human action, and ambiguities about the notion of rationality provide for rhetorical tactics that can justify it. Elucidation of the notion and the presented typology of the meanings and assumptions of rationality should contribute to the revelation of these tactics. and Vít Horák.
My aim is to assess an argument against final causation being an irreducible metaphysical category. The argument in question is based upon the supposition that for anything to count as a cause, it must exist at the very moment of executing its causal action, which requirement can supposedly never be met by anything rightly pretending to be called a final cause. I argue that this argument is far from conclusive as there seem to be ways of blocking it - namely through adopting either a version of the eternalist ontology of temporal dimensions, or else a version of the possibilist ontology, each combined with either a version of the "Humean" approach to analysis of causal relations, or else with a version of the realist approach to causation., Jan Palkoska., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii