Tento článek se zastává skepticko-realistického tzv. novohumovského, výkladu Humovy teorie kauzality navzdory kritice ze strany Zuzany Parusnikové. Autor však v souladu se svou vývojovou interpretací hájí tzv. „nového Huma” pouze pro pozdní tvorbu tohoto skotského filosofa., This article recommends the sceptical realist, or New Hume, interpretation of Hume’s theory of causation, in spite of Zuzana Parusniková’s critique. However, the author, in line with his developmental interpretation, defends the New Hume only for the Scottish philosopher’s mature philosophy., and James Hill.
This text provides a detailed examination of realism as a philosophy of natural science and its implications for the practice of social science. It also summarises some of the central themes of realism and its relations with other philosophical traditions. Realism is seen as essentially an ontological doctrine which means that it shares with neo-pragmatism a critique of the predominantly epistemological stress - most evident in rationalism - of much recent philosophy. It is argued that on the relation between science and philosophy, realism adopts intermediate position between the anti-philosophical philosophy of the pragmatists and the rationalist conception as the judge of science. In conclusion, new realist philosophy of science - newly defined against earlier versions of realism - is offered as a sufficient tool with which the endemic problems of the social sciences might be addressed., William Outhwaite, z angličtiny přeložil Jan Balon., Tento text je překladem vybrané kapitoly z knihy New Philophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermaneutics and Critical Theory, and Obsahuje bibliografii
Debata o tzv. "Novém Humovi“ byla v posledních desetiletích dominantním tématem humovské interpretace. James Hill ve svém příspěvku v tomto časopise (2011) podporuje hlavní požadavek "novohumovců“, který vymezuje Huma jako epistemologického skeptika a ontologického realistu. Vůči tomuto pojetí máme několik výhrad. Některé se týkají nejasností v definici realismu a celkově i smysluplnosti projektu „Nový Hume“. Některé se týkají konkrétních Hillových argumentů zaměřených na Humovy Dialogy a především jeho tvrzení, že v tomto díle lze nalézt další důkaz Humova realismu., The New Hume Debate has dominated the interpretations of Hume’s philosophy in the last few decades. James Hill in his contribution in this journal (2011) supports the central claim of the New Hume, defining Hume as an epistemological sceptic and an ontological realist. I raise certain objections to Hill’s views. Some concern the confusions in the definition of realism and, on a more general level, question the meaningfulness of the whole New Hume project. Some concern Hill’s arguments focused specifically on Hume’s Dialogues, in which he claims to have found further confirmation of Hume’s realism with regard to Causation., and Zuzana Parusniková.
An analysis of Rádl’s Útěcha z filosofie (The Consolation of Philosophy) reveals it to be a work in which Rádl, ailing and overcome by events, resorts to mere moralising. It is my view that, even here, he maintains the full dynamic unity of wordly reality, which governs life itself, and abstract morality, which is supported by philosophical theories and systems. Despite the fact that many theses and concepts in the Consolation give the impression of a stereotypical moralising of life (“The Moral Order”), we always find in the text, alongside these themes, counterbalancing realist theses (life itself, the individual). I understand this balance between a concrete and a moral approach to human life as the principle reason for treating Rádl as closer to Socrates than to Plato (on the basis of the conception of the difference between Socrates and Plato in “Eternity and Historicity”, I take issue with Patočka’s “Platonic” interpretation of Rádl)., Tomáš Hejduk., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii