Tento článek se zastává skepticko-realistického tzv. novohumovského, výkladu Humovy teorie kauzality navzdory kritice ze strany Zuzany Parusnikové. Autor však v souladu se svou vývojovou interpretací hájí tzv. „nového Huma” pouze pro pozdní tvorbu tohoto skotského filosofa., This article recommends the sceptical realist, or New Hume, interpretation of Hume’s theory of causation, in spite of Zuzana Parusniková’s critique. However, the author, in line with his developmental interpretation, defends the New Hume only for the Scottish philosopher’s mature philosophy., and James Hill.
“Neutral monism”, a view of the relation between the mental and the physical held among others by Bertrand Russell, was by many of its proponents seen as a more plausible alternative to both idealism and dualism. According to a common objection, however, neutral monism implies that all reality is ultimately of a mental – rather than neutral – nature, and so the position really amounts to a form of panpsychism, idealism or phenomenalism. I argue that – at least when it comes to an influential formulation of neutral monism expressed in Russell’s 1927 book The Analysis of Matter – we have reasons to resist this mentalist suspicion since it presupposes a concept of consciousness which Russell would presumably reject.