Debata o tzv. "Novém Humovi“ byla v posledních desetiletích dominantním tématem humovské interpretace. James Hill ve svém příspěvku v tomto časopise (2011) podporuje hlavní požadavek "novohumovců“, který vymezuje Huma jako epistemologického skeptika a ontologického realistu. Vůči tomuto pojetí máme několik výhrad. Některé se týkají nejasností v definici realismu a celkově i smysluplnosti projektu „Nový Hume“. Některé se týkají konkrétních Hillových argumentů zaměřených na Humovy Dialogy a především jeho tvrzení, že v tomto díle lze nalézt další důkaz Humova realismu., The New Hume Debate has dominated the interpretations of Hume’s philosophy in the last few decades. James Hill in his contribution in this journal (2011) supports the central claim of the New Hume, defining Hume as an epistemological sceptic and an ontological realist. I raise certain objections to Hill’s views. Some concern the confusions in the definition of realism and, on a more general level, question the meaningfulness of the whole New Hume project. Some concern Hill’s arguments focused specifically on Hume’s Dialogues, in which he claims to have found further confirmation of Hume’s realism with regard to Causation., and Zuzana Parusniková.
The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community., Zuzana Parusniková., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii