An analysis of Rádl’s Útěcha z filosofie (The Consolation of Philosophy) reveals it to be a work in which Rádl, ailing and overcome by events, resorts to mere moralising. It is my view that, even here, he maintains the full dynamic unity of wordly reality, which governs life itself, and abstract morality, which is supported by philosophical theories and systems. Despite the fact that many theses and concepts in the Consolation give the impression of a stereotypical moralising of life (“The Moral Order”), we always find in the text, alongside these themes, counterbalancing realist theses (life itself, the individual). I understand this balance between a concrete and a moral approach to human life as the principle reason for treating Rádl as closer to Socrates than to Plato (on the basis of the conception of the difference between Socrates and Plato in “Eternity and Historicity”, I take issue with Patočka’s “Platonic” interpretation of Rádl)., Tomáš Hejduk., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The familiar division of political thinkers into moralists and realists leads the author to the question of how to classify Ladislav Hejdánek’s unique yet ambiguous approach to public weal and matters politic. Does Hejdánek base his understanding of democracy and liberalism (and of liberties an drights thereunto appertaining) on morality (on philosophy or on system theory) or does he recognise the primacy of matters politic? Though in Hejdánek’s writings moral appeals are frequent and fundamental, the author seeks to show that realism prevails. In the present text, the author delineates the specific realism of this Czech thinker more precisely by analysing Hejdánek’s texts, especially his Epistles to a Friend.
Kniha Viktora Knappa Problém nacistické právní filozofie (první vydání 1947) je významným příspěvkem k porozumění povaze národně-socialistické (= NS) jurisprudence. Knapp správně tvrdí, že základním principem NS-teorie práva je tzv. teze spojení práva a morálky. Právo a morálka tvoří jednotu, takže plnění morálních povinností může být vynucované právem. To je už samo o sobě nebezpečná proti-liberální idea. V konečném důsledku totiž nacistický režim může svým občanům mocensky vnucovat vlastní koncepci dobrého života. Mnohem horší je však skutečnost, že nacisté zneužili morálku k ospravedlnění hrubě nemorálních praktik, včetně vyhlazování jiných národů. I morálka může být nemorální. Nacistická morálka je toho „dobrým“ příkladem. and Viktor Knapp’s book Problém nacistické právní filozofie (first edition 1947) is an important contribution to the understanding of the nature of national socialist (= NS) jurisprudence. Knapp rightly claims that the fundamental principle of NS-legal theory is the thesis of the necessary connection
between law and morality. Law and morality set up unity, therefore moral obligations can be enforced by means of law. This fact alone is a dangerous anti-liberal idea.Ultimately, this is how the nazi regime can impose its own conception of the good life on its citizens. Much worse, Nazis abused morality for justification of grossly immoral practices, including the extermination of other nations.Morality can be immoral as well. Nazi morality is a “good” example.