Text se zabývá Latourovým pojetím překladu. Poukazuje na některé epistemologické problémy, které vyplývají ze zohledňování překladu jako předmětu zájmu. Tyto problémy lze redukovat na otázku, zda se na výsledné podobě překladu podílí jen poznávající subjekt, nebo také studovaná skutečnost. Podle způsobu řešení této otázky lze rozlišit mezi lingvistickým a nelingvistickým přístupem. Latourovu snahu o systematičtější vymezení překladu lze chápat jako odklon od lingvistické tradice ve prospěch nelingvistických forem podílejících se na vymezení programu epistemologického obratu. V textu jsou v tomto směru diskutovány především problémy redukcionismu, asymetrie, zobecněné symetrie, aktérství a role badatele ve výzkumném procesu. V Latourově perspektivě tento proces není záležitostí fakticity, nýbrž ontologické politiky, v níž dochází k vyjednávání o tom, co činí svět reálným., The article deals with translational concept of Bruno Latour, focusing on some epistemological issues that arise from the consideration of translation as object of interest. These issues can be reduced to the question whether the final form of translation involves only the knowing subject, or the studied reality as well. Based on the solution to this question, we can distinguish between linguistic and nonlinguistic approaches. Latour's attempt at systematic conceptualization of translation can be seen as a deflection from the linguistic tradition in favor of non-linguistic forms involved in the program of the ontological turn. In this sense, the text describes primarily the issues of reductionism, asymmetry, generalized symmetry, agency and the role of researcher in the research process. In Latour's view, this process is not the matter of facts, but matter of concerns, in which ontological politics consists of the process of negotiation over what makes up the real world., and Tomáš Kobes.
The so-called ontological turn, drawing largely on Viveiros de Castro´s notion of Amazonian perspectivism, has attracted considerable attention in contemporary anthropology. The proponents of ontological relativism were indeed submitted to strong criticism focusing, among other things, on the questions of obscurity, solipsism or meta-ontology. In the theoretical section of the study, I present selected themes of this approach, its merits, but also its difficulties that I try to overcome by means of present-day phenomenological anthropology. The key question - in which are the examined otherness and its apprehending grounded? - I attempt to answer through the concepts of the everyday experience and the lifeworld. In the empirical section of the study, I illustrate the theory with the ethnography of Maya perception of crosses, mountains and caves, which are considered to be living and acting beings.
Recent writing associated with the so-called “ontological turn” provokes many theoretical questions. Anthropologists associated with the ontological turn deny the representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as clusters of beliefs that operate like different perspectives on a single world. These authors speak about many “worlds” instead of many cultures, and therefore it seems to imply a kind of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays.