Recent writing associated with the so-called “ontological turn” provokes many theoretical questions. Anthropologists associated with the ontological turn deny the representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as clusters of beliefs that operate like different perspectives on a single world. These authors speak about many “worlds” instead of many cultures, and therefore it seems to imply a kind of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays.
John MacFarlane argues against objectivism about ''tasty''/''not tasty'' in the following way. If objectivism were true then, given that speakers use ''tasty''/''not tasty'' in accordance with a rule, TP, speakers would be using an evidently unreliable method to form judgements and make claims about what is tasty. Since this is implausible, objectivism must be false. In this paper, I describe a context in which speakers deviate from TP. I argue that MacFarlane’s argument against objectivism fails when applied to uses of ''not tasty'' within this context. So objectivism about ''not tasty'' is still a viable position within this context., John MacFarlane argumentuje proti objektivismu o ''chutném'' / ''ne chutném'' následujícím způsobem. Pokud by objektivismus byl pravdivý, vzhledem k tomu, že reproduktory používají ''chutné'' / ''ne chutné'' v souladu s pravidly TP, mluvčí by používali zjevně nespolehlivou metodu k tomu, aby vytvořili soudy a prohlásili, co je chutné. Protože to je nepravděpodobné, objektivismus musí být falešný. V tomto článku popisuji kontext, ve kterém se mluvčí odchýlí od TP. Argumentuji, že argument MacFarlane proti objektivismu selhal, když se v tomto kontextu vztahuje k použití ''ne chutných''. Tak objektivismus ''ne chutné'' je stále životaschopný postoj v tomto kontextu., and Alexi Davies