György Lukács’s infl uential interpretation of commodity fetishism as “reifi cation” shapes many contemporary critiques of the apparently objective and impersonal form taken by capitalist social relations. Such critiques seek to debunk the false veil of objectivity that results from fetishism, revealing the real character of the social relations underneath. Th is line of criticism, however, often attributes totalising power to capitalism, which undermines its own critical standpoint. I argue that the solution to this dilemma lies in understanding the fetish not as an ideological veil that needs to be debunked, but instead as a novel form of social interdependence that is genuinely – not illusorily – impersonal. Th is impersonal form is generated by a diverse array of disparate social practices whose interaction yields this unanticipated and unintended result. Within this framework, the diversity of the underlying social practices off ers a practical potential basis for constituting new forms of social interdependence that lack not only the semblance, but also the reality of capitalism’s oppressive objectivity.
This study discusses the limits of Marx’s reinterpretation of Hegel’s conception of dialectics as a self-mediation of the fundamental by way of historical reality: we will show Marx’s disessentialisation of the (already quite monistic) Hegelian absolute spirit, and the consequences of Marx’s conception of consciousness as of a conscious being for the concept of culture, reduced that is to interest-conditioned, “ideological” praxis and its self-reflection. The study thus subjects to criticism the reduction of objectivi¬ty to totality in György Lukács, the founder of modern western Marxism; it points to the residuum (in no way objectively unlicensed) of self-positing subjecti¬vism in his “class-consciousness”; and it compares this immanentist conception with, on the one hand, the utopian conception of Ernst Bloch, foreshadowing Derrida’s stress on the auto criti¬cism of Marxism as a philosophy of the historicity of categories (as Lukács himself theo¬retically understood it!), and, on the other hand, with the dialectical non identity of the possible of Theodor W. Adorno. By reflecting on Marx’s concept of (historical) consciousness (of conscious Being) through critical insight into its most (in our view) signi¬ficant interpretations of the 20th century, the study attempts to capture the limi¬ts of the monistically-conceived dialectic for democratic social pra¬xis, preserving the “principle of hope” in the openness of the unsubsumable individual.
Předkládaná stať aplikuje Hegelovo "vyvrácení" spinozismu na Marxe. Nejprve osvětluje povahu Hegelova pojetí filosofické kritiky, kterou Hegel staví do kontrastu s pouhou polemikou – střetem jedné geniální mysli s druhou. Na tomto pozadí lépe vyniká Hegelovo "vyvrácení" spinozismu jako ukázky filosofické kritiky, a nikoli pouhé polemiky. Filosofická kritika si nárokuje být imanentní. Kritizovanou filosofii ničím zvnějšku neobohacuje, ale přihlíží, jak ona sama sebe překonává. Příkladem takového sebepřekonání je pochopení substance zároveň jako subjektu, či jako ducha. Toto pochopení vlastně dělá to, že dává ontologický význam tomu, čemu Hegel říká "vnější myšlení" a co na první pohled žádný ontologický význam nemá, co se zdá být pouhou ideologií, afekcí či více či méně adekvátní ideou. V této "ontologizaci myšlení" Hegel vidí to jediné skutečné vyvrácení spinozismu. Mým návrhem je přihlížet téže "ontologizaci" – řekněme "ontologizaci ideologie" u Marxe. Toto sebepřekonání Marxovy filosofie spatřuji v Hegelově vyvození pojmu státu z pojmu občanské společnosti. Hegelem vypracovaný logický či pojmový přechod od občanské společnosti ke státu odpovídá re-konceptualizaci substance v ducha. Tato re-konceptualizace vyvrací nejen spinozismus, ale i marxismus. and The proposed paper applies Hegel's "refutation" of Spinozism on Marx. First, it illuminates Hegel's conception of philosophical critique and contrasts it with a mere polemic – the clash of one brilliant mind against another. Against this background, Hegel's refutation of Spinozism excels as a case of philosophical critique and not a mere polemic. Philosophical critique demands for itself to be immanent. It does not enrich the criticised philosophy with anything external. Rather, it observes (zusehen) how the criticised philosophy overcomes itself. Hegel's famous comprehension of substance also as subject, or as Spirit, can serve as an example of such self-overcoming. What this comprehension actually does is that it provides the ontological meaning for what Hegel calls "external thinking", which, at first sight, gives the impression to be ontologically meaningless, to be a mere ideology, affection or, more or less, adequate idea. This "ontologisation of thinking" is, for Hegel, the only genuine refutation of Spinozism. The paper proposes that the same "ontologisation" – let us call it the "ontologisation of ideology" – is to be observed in order to genuinely refute Marx's philosophy. This self-overcoming of Marx's philosophy is to be observed in Hegel's deduction of the concept of the State form the concept of civil society. The logical or conceptual transition from civil society to the State developed by Hegel corresponds to the re-conceptualisation of substance into Spirit. This re-conceptualisation genuinely refutes Spinozism as well as Marxism.
Th is article considers the relevance of the ideas of Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis for debates about the relationship between Marxism and justice. In particular, it employs these ideas as a criticism of those who seek to supplement Marx’s critique of capitalism with liberal theories of justice, paradigmatically those of John Rawls. Pashukanis’s analysis of the legal form as a kind of fetish, arising on the basis of capitalist relations of production, opens up the possibility of a similar criticism of theories of justice. Th is involves more than just the familiar critique that such theories are ideological; Pashukanis suggests an approach that recognises the practical eff ectiveness of theories of justice while also recognising their limits from the perspective of radical critique. Th is new approach allows for a better understanding of how theories of justice might form part of radical theory and practice today.
John Bellamy Foster is editor of the Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon. Since the publication of his book Marx’s Ecology in 2000 he has become one of the most significant voices in uncovering Marx’s ecological thinking and developing ecological Marxism. In this interview we discuss his most recent work, the legacy of Soviet environmentalism, the long-running debate over “the dialectics of nature”, and the idea of production according to need.
John Bellamy Foster is editor of the Monthly Review and professor of sociology at the University of Oregon. Since the publication of his book Marx’s Ecology in 2000 he has become one of the most significant voices in uncovering Marx’s ecological thinking and developing ecological Marxism. In this interview we discuss his most recent work, the legacy of Soviet environmentalism, the long-running debate over “the dialectics of nature”, and the idea of production according to need.