The article interprets the not of "common sense" as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid's epistomology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid's use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the "principles of common sense". The "principles of common sense" play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The "principles of common sense" are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term "common sense", on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience., Petr Glombíček., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Slavná kniha Elementární formy náboženského života francouzského sociologa Émile Durkheima je jedním z nejdůležitějších příspěvků k sociologii náboženství. Po řadu let byla vychvalována a citována, stejně jako kritizována a zavrhována. Kniha se stala chartou celé řady sociálně vědních badatelů, zejména těch, kteří se zaměřovali na studium společnosti a náboženství. V roce 1966 však vyšel článek amerického antropologa Clifforda Geertze nazvaný „Náboženství jako kulturní systém“, v němž autor tvrdil, že Durkheimova teorie náboženství, stejně jako teorie náboženství Sigmunda Freuda, Bronislawa Malinowského a Maxe Webera, by měla být překonána dokonalejší teorií náboženství. Touto dokonalejší teorií měla být Geertzova teorie. Porozuměl však Geertz Durkheimove teorii dostatečně, aby nás to opravňovalo k tvrzení, že Durkheim byl na poli teorie náboženství překonán?, Émile Durkheim’s famous book Elementary Forms of Religious Life is one of the most important contributions to the sociology of religion. For years, it had been praised and cited as well as criticised and condemned. The book had become a charter of subsequent generations of social scientists, especially those who studied phenomena of society and religion. However, in 1966, an American cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz presented his opinion claiming that Durkheim’s theory of religion as well as the theories of religion of Freud, Malinowski and Weber should be substituted with more subtle and superior theory of religion. A superior theory of religion was supposed to be Geertz’s theory presented in a paper entitled “Religion as Cultural System”. Did Geertz understand Durkheim’s theory adequately, so that we can agree with Geertz’s claim of surpassing the classic authors like Durkheim?, and Nikola Balaš.
The basic aim of this study is to draw attention to certain inaccuracies in the recent discussion about evolutionary ontology. After a brief presentation of Šmajs’ theory, the author describes his standing in contemporary environmental thought and he classifies evolutionary ontology as “ecological ecocentrism”. In the second part he attempts to show that evolutionary ontology, in its character and claims, belongs to a different level of scientific knowledge than standard scientific theory pertaining to a limited sphere, and that therefore certain critical remarks pointing to its overly-broad range are misplaced. The conclusion of the study reminds the reader of the main controversial points of evolutionary ontology that give rise to discussion. The first of these is the paradox of unappreciated cultural information, the second is the above-mentioned “frozenness” of evolutionary ontological thought and the third is the attempt at a quick expansion of the ready evolutionary-ontological approach., Bohuslav Binka., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The first part of this study is devoted to analysing the prevailing western ethical systems and to a comparison of them with a conception of a new environmental ethics. The author here, with reference to J. Passmore, divides the western approach into a “dominant tradition”, in which man conducts himself with regard to the things of nature, and to nature itself, as a tyrannical ruler, and the less widespread tradition of man as superintendent (or supervisor), and man as perfecter. According to Sylvan, environmental ethics is in conflict with each of these conceptions. The second part of Sylvan’s text introduces thought-experiments which demonstrate the inconsistency of the environmental tradition of western ethics based on (human) chauvinism. First of he introduces the thought-experiment of “the last man” and then the thought-experiment of “the last people”, “the great businessman” and “the disappearing species”. The third part of Sylvan’s text then briefly considers the possible consequences connected with the acceptance of an environmentally-ethical attitude. This brings with it, in Sylvan’s view, changes to one’s ethical conception and changes to meta-ethics. New concepts are needed to treat old and new realities; a fundamental change in perspective is required., Richard Sylvan., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Článek se zabývá interpretací filosofie Richarda Rortyho z pohledu postmoderní filosofie náboženství. V první části se autor blíže věnuje kontextu, v němž se Rortyho filosofie vyvíjela, a mapuje základní epistemologická a filosoficko-sociální východiska jeho tvorby. Argumentační linie části druhé naproti tomu směřuje k prokázání skutečnosti, že byť může být Rortyho filosofie interpretována jako veskrze sekulární, až ateistická, je uveditelná do souladu s některými koncepcemi postmoderního křesťanství. Na pozadí analýzy některých (zejména pozdějších) Rortyho textů a myšlenek lze totiž dokázat, že je jeho pohled na předmětnou problematiku nejen slučitelný s určitým, stále výrazněji se prosazujícím pojetím religiozity, ale že se jedná o perspektivu, kterou můžeme nahlížet jako další rortyovské stavění mostů mezi kulturními a intelektuálními tradicemi. Autor se snaží prokázat, že Rortyho konečná vize společnosti, v jejímž konceptuálním rámci sehrávají centrální úlohu takové pojmy, jako jsou solidarita, romance či naděje, se v nosných momentech podobá té, kterou prezentují autoři jako Gianni Vattimo či John D. Caputo., The article concerns itself with an interpretation of the philosophy of R. Rorty from the point of view of post-modern philosophy of religion. In the first part the author gives a detailed account of the context in which Rorty’s philosophy developed, and describes the groundplan of the basic epistemological and philosophico-social sources of his writings. In part two it is argued that, despite the fact that Rorty’s philosophy can be interpreted as thoroughly secular, or even atheistic, it can be brought into harmony with some conceptions of post-modern Christianity. On the basis of an analysis of some of Rorty’s (especially later) texts and thoughts, it can be shown that his view of the problematic of objectivity is not only in keeping with a certain, increasingly prominent, conception of religiosity, but that we are presented with a perspective which we can treat as a further building of bridges between the cultural and intellectual traditions, so typical of Rorty’s thought. The author attempts to demonstrate that Rorty’s final vision of society – in the conceptual framework of which a central role is played by such concepts as solidarity, romance and hope – is in certain important respects similar to the vision presented by such authors as G. Vattimo and J. D. Caputo., and Roman Madzia.
Text sleduje motív prehodnotenia zmyslu poznania a myslenia na základe funkcie omylu spočívajúceho v nároku na podstatu/pravdu v poznaní. Problém podrobne interpretujem v úzkom rozmedzí dvoch Nietzscheho textov, Lidské, příliš lidské (prvá hlava„O prvních a posledních věcech“) a Radostná věda (piata kapitola „My nebojácní“). Analýza omylu ústi do prehodnotenia zmyslu poznania, ktoré následne môžeme rozlíšiť na pozitívne a negatívne. Negatívne poznanie je chápané ako základné, zmysel majúce, ale zmysel nehľadajúce poznanie, ktoré nemá poznatok ako predpokladaný cieľ, jeho zmysel spočíva v jeho činnosti. Poznanie pozitívne je konceptuálne poznanie, ktoré po nahliadnutí jeho základnej nefunkčnosti v oblasti pravdy nadobúda funkciu orientácie. Myslenie prestáva byť na produkt zameranou činnosťou vymedzeného úseku času, je súčasťou žitia a pohybovania sa vo svete. Toto sa v druhej časti prehlbuje na analýzach vedomia a poznania z Radostné vědy, ktoré zdôrazňujú význam netematizovanosti v myslení a poznaní, zvlášť obrazom vedomia ako zrkadla. Tu je poznanie chápané ako pojmová konštrukcia bázy, ktorou je individuálne zažitá, netematizovaná skúsenosť. Omylom je tu potreba premeny neznámeho na známe na základe strachu. Táto potreba poukazuje na neznáme ako na činiteľa vykazujúceho problém, ktorý je nutný pre udržanie poznania., The text traces the motif of the re-evaluation of the sense of knowing and thinking based on the function of error consisting in the claim to ground/truth in knowledge. I interpret the problem in detail in the narrow confines of Nietzsche’s two texts, Human, All Too Human (the first heading “On First and Last Things”) and the The Gay Science (fifth chapter “We the Fearless”). An analysis of error issues in the re-evaluation of the sense of knowledge which, subsequently, we can distinguish into the positive and negative. Negative knowledge is understood as basic, having sense, but not sense-seeking, which does not have knowledge as the assumed aim, but whose sense consists in its activity. Positive knowledge is conceptual knowledge which, once one perceives its basic non-functionality in the area of truth, gains the function of orientation. Thought, when it stops being focused on a product by the directed activity of a demarcated section of time, is a part of living and moving in the world. This, in the second part, is deepened in analyses of consciousness and knowledge from The Gay Science, which stress the meaning of the unthematised in thinking and knowledge, especially the picture of consciousness as a mirror. Here knowledge is understood as a conceptual construction of the ground by which the unthematised experience is individually lived. The error here is the need to transform the unknown into the known on the basis of fear. That need points to the unknown as the agent that reveals the problem which is necessary for the maintenance of knowledge., Daniela Šterbáková., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
This article presents the contemporary conception of “environmental pragmatism” as an alternative strategy, still little known in the Czech context, for the solution of the problem of the relation between nature and culture. The point of departure for this conception are the ideas of the classical pragmatists, especially the naturalism and ethics of John Dewey. This philosophy bears within it an immanent environmental direction and it issues in the “Third Way” in the ecological movement, finding a path between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism; between individualism and holism; between instrumentalism and immanentism; between exploitation and preservation; between the dualisms of value and fact, aims and means, conservation and growth, and so on., Emil Višňovský., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii