In this paper I concentrate on evaluating Searle’s concept of external realism as a non-epistemic thesis . Above all, I evaluate the role it plays in our system of beliefs, knowledge and communicative obligations. There are two important questions: (1) whether a return of transcendental philosophy creates a positive alternative to philosophical naturalism (Quine); (2) whether for the same purpose Fraassens’ constructive empiricism suffices., V tomto příspěvku se zaměřuji na hodnocení Searleho konceptu externího realismu jako neepistemické práce. Především hodnotím roli, kterou hraje v našem systému víry, znalostí a komunikačních povinností. Existují dvě důležité otázky: (1) zda návrat transcendentální filosofie vytváří pozitivní alternativu k filosofickému naturalismu (Quine); (2) zda pro stejný účel postačuje Fraassensův konstruktivní empirismus., and Lukáš Zámečník
There is a plethora of naturalisms in contemporary philosophy. Instead of sorting out diverse past or present variants of this philosophical movement this article aims to define in three relatively simple points a version of naturalism that I consider as the most auspicious way for philosophy to remain a relevant and significant force in the domain of knowledge dominated by contemporary science. The tripartite definition of naturalism that is presented deliberately does not claim to be original, but seeks to capture in a concise and clear way the common core of the naturalistic mind frame. The point of the article is to point out the need to reduce internal metaphilosophical disputes within the naturalistic movement in favor of a greater emphasis on the concrete participation of philosophy in current scientific research. The claim is that the real (not only nominal) realization of the naturalistic turn in philosophy necessarily presupposes a change in the process of the education of future philosophers.
This article presents the contemporary conception of “environmental pragmatism” as an alternative strategy, still little known in the Czech context, for the solution of the problem of the relation between nature and culture. The point of departure for this conception are the ideas of the classical pragmatists, especially the naturalism and ethics of John Dewey. This philosophy bears within it an immanent environmental direction and it issues in the “Third Way” in the ecological movement, finding a path between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism; between individualism and holism; between instrumentalism and immanentism; between exploitation and preservation; between the dualisms of value and fact, aims and means, conservation and growth, and so on., Emil Višňovský., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Fenomenologie není pouze specifi cká metoda filosofi ckého zkoumání, ale též svébytná fi losofi cká pozice. Husserl je znám a diskutován spíše jako autor právě zmíněné metody, ovšem ta přeci měla sloužit jakožto organon pro vytvoření samostatné fi losofi cké nauky. Proto se bude v příspěvku věnovat pozornost Husserlovu chápání toho, co je to filosofi e, a to v kontrastu proti dobově populárním fi losofi ckým pozicím, jimiž byly naturalismus a fi losofi e světového názoru s jeho nejodpudivější podobou nazývanou Husserlem pejorativně „Tiefsinn“: důvtipná duchaplnost. Husserl zamýšlí odstranit oba zmíněné typy fi losofi e skutečně přísně vědeckou fi losofi í, jež bude fi losofi í fenomenologickou. and Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientifi c philosophy. Th is may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another “brand” of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called ‘Tiefsinn’. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientifi c philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.