Cynismus Hegelovy filosofie je téma, které již dávno, rozhodně od Popperovy Otevřené společnosti, přesahuje úzké hranice odborného žánru. Chvála války jako prostředku utužování státu či obdiv k „světodějným“ osobnostem typu Caesara či Napoleona, to vše shrnuté v šokujícím tvrzení: co je skutečné, je rozumné, jsou čteny jako jasné vyzdvihování statu quo, tedy pruského státu, v němž našly dějiny své vyvrcholení a Hegel kýženou mocenskou pozici. Výrok „Tím hůře pro skutečnost“, který údajně Hegel pronesl v reakci na kritiku své disertace o planetárních drahách, rozšiřuje tento cynický moment i na jeho teoretickou filosofii. V článku nejprve zmíním, proč je tato představa už věcně chybná, v další části se pak zaměřím na pojmovou stránku problému. Má teze je, že Hegelův cynismus je sice reálný, jeho funkce je ale primárně didaktická, manifestující komplikovanou logickou strukturu naší řeči o tom, co „je“., The Open Society and Its Enemies, extended beyond the narrow confines of the specialist genre. The praise of war as a means of strengthening the state or the admiration of “world historical” personalities such as Caesar or Napoleon – all encapsulated in the shocking statement: what is real is rational – are read as a clear exaltation of the status quo, that Prussian state in which history found its culmination and Hegel his coveted position of power. The statement “So much the worse for reality,” with which Hegel allegedly answered a criticism of his dissertation on planetary orbits, extends this cynical moment to his theoretical philosophy as well. In the article, I will first touch on why this topic is, right from the start, factually wrong; in the next part, I will focus on the conceptual side of the problem. My thesis is that Hegel‘s cynicism is real, but its function is primarily didactic, manifesting a complicated logical structure of our speech concerning that which “is.”, and Der Zynismus von Hegels Philosophie ist ein Thema, das schon seit langem, ganz bestimmt seit Poppers Werk Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde, die engen Grenzen der Fachdiskussion überschreitet. Die Verherrlichung des Krieges als Mittel zur Festigung des Staates bzw. die Bewunderung „weltgeschichtlicher“ Persönlichkeiten wie Cäsar oder Napoleon, dies alles zusammengefasst in der schockierenden Behauptung: was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig, werden als Erhebung des Status quo, d.h. des preußischen Staates, aufgefasst, in dem die Geschichte ihren Höhepunkt fand und Hegel seine ersehnte Machtposition. Das Zitat „Umso schlimmer für die Wirklichkeit“, das angeblich Hegels Antwort auf eine Kritik seiner Dissertation über Planetenbahnen wiedergibt, erweitert dieses zynische Moment auch auf Hegels theoretische Philosophie. Im Artikel wird zunächst dargelegt, warum diese Vorstellung schon von der Sache her falsch ist. Schwerpunkt des folgenden Teils ist der begriffliche Aspekt des Problems. Laut meiner These ist Hegels Zynismus zwar real, seine Funktion besteht jedoch primär in der Didaktik. Sie manifestiert die komplizierte logische Struktur unseres Redens darüber, was „ist“.
Author focuses on conception of world as simultaneously constituted and lived by humans in the thought of Karel Kosík and Erazim Kohák. He seeks first an overall interpretation of the thought of Karel Kosík which would bridge the apparent gap between his early Marxist thought and his later essayistic critique of modern age. He comes to the conclusion that both phases of Kosík’s thought share substantive traits and even that Kosík’s later criticism of global capitalism is possible only on the foundations laid in his early works. Susequently the author presents phenomenologically oriented thought of Erazim Kohák which in spite of differences in overall philosophical framework manifests numerous parallels with Kosík’s thought. In Kohák’s work the author traces the problem of values and of valuing in general. On that basis he then analyses Kohák’s idea of home and offers it as a possible answer to the question of anchoring and orientating of lived experience in the dynamics of a world constituted by human being and living.
Recently, the term “Ecological Leninism” has emerged as a popular invocation in the works of Marxist thinkers attempting to grasp dialectically the numerous intersecting ecological crises. Yet, beyond a few introductory remarks, little has been said about the content of this concept and, even less, its relation to Lenin. Generally, the concept attempts to combine Leninist political theory with the ecological analyses of the growing number of ecosocialists and eco-Marxists working both within the academy and without. This paper intends an initial, philosophical contribution toward developing Ecological Leninism: (1) by providing an interpretation of Lenin’s philosophical method, that is, dialectical and historical materialism; and (2) explicating the way in which this philosophy gives rise to a political ecological theory and practice, Ecological Leninism, that addresses the crisis of the metabolic rift between nature and society. We intend to contribute to the development of Ecological Leninism by clarifying the philosophy through which the political method is articulated. Thus, we hope to show that, under the conditions of a global metabolic rift produced by capitalist society, Ecological Leninism as a political ecological theory signals the possibility of securing a just and sustainable world for future generations.