The revival of the UN Security Council’s regulatory powers after the end of the Cold War as well as new challenges to international peace and security have led to the development and diversification of UN operational tools. In the absence of United Nations’ own material capacities to undertake necessary military action, due to the non-conclusion of agreements provided for in Article 43 of the UN Charter by which UN Member States would commit to provide the necessary force and other assistance to the Security Council upon its call, the latter developed other means. Today, there co-exist two mandated operations by the Security Council vested with the power to use force, each however within a different scope, limits and objective: UN-led “Blue Helmets” and UN-authorized military operations. This functional rapprochement causes nevertheless a great confusion, both in practice and recently in the judicial sphere. Hence, the clarification of the legal regime of each is essential. While the UN-led Blue Helmets vested with the limited power to use force represent the new generation of peacekeeping operations, the UN-authorized operations constitute a decentralized execution of the Council’s enforcement measure. In the latter case the Security Council turns to UN Member States or regional organizations and delegates them its exclusive power to use force under Article 42 of the UN Charter to execute it under set conditions. The limitation of the use of force by the UN-led operation to the strict defence of its civilian mandate does not exempt it from the regime of coercion established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter either. This raises a question of the legal status of this UN-led operation and whether possibly such tool approaches the original concept of UN enforcement forces laid down in Article 43. Analysis of the converging and diverging elements of both operations shows the complexity of this operational domain, the clarification of which is proposed in this article via a legal perspective.
Příspěvek řeší výzkumnou otázku, jak má stát využít mezinárodního práva veřejného, když chce čelit kybernetickým útokům ze zahraničí. Jako modelový příklad používá DDoS útoky uskutečněné v minulosti na cíle v České republice. Nejdříve se zabývá kvalifikací kybernetického útoku jako mezinárodně protiprávního chování. Zkoumá možný objektivní prvek (porušení práva) takovéhoto chování a ověřuje, za jakých podmínek představuje kybernetický útok použití síly zakázané Chartou OSN a kdy je narušením suverenity státu.Následně se zaměřuje na subjektivní prvek protiprávního chování, tzn. na přičitatelnost kybernetického útoku státu.Ve třetí části se zabývá častými situacemi, kdy není zcela prokazatelně přítomen subjektivní prvek (přičitatelnost) kybernetického útoku jako mezinárodně protiprávního chování. V této souvislosti uvažuje o odpovědnosti státu za útoky pocházející z jeho území a o dalších možných
alternativách. and The article poses a research question how a state can use public international law when countering cyber-attacks from abroad. It uses, as amodel example,DDoS attacks carried out in the past on targets in the Czech Republic. Firstly, it qualifies cyber-attack as internationally wrongful
conduct. It explores possible objective element (infringement) of such conduct. It attempts to identify the conditions under which cyber-attack breaches national sovereignty or constitutes the unlawful use of force and as such violates the Charter of the United Nations. Then, the article focuses on the subjective element of unlawful conduct, i.e. the attribution of cyber-attack to a country. The third part deals with frequent situations when the subjective element (attribution, imputability) is not demonstrably present. In this context, the article considers the liability of states and other possible alternatives.