The article focuses on the relationship between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Thailand before and after World War II. The author first seeks to show how this relationship developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries and what the salient characteristics of it were. The second part of the article describes the American attitude toward Thailand during the war and the importance of wartime events for the future of the Thai-American relationship. Finally, the closing section deals mainly with the postwar developments and the reasons for the emergence of the strategic partnership between Bangkok and Washington. Attention is paid to the motivations and expectations of both sides, as it relates to their cooperation. The aim of the article is mainly to show the changed nature of this bilateral relationship, resulting from World War II and events that followed closely in its wake. It also seeks to point out that the common struggle against communism, although important in later years, was neither the sole nor the prevalent reason for the newly emerging American interest in Thailand in the immediate postwar period.
The sovereignty of contemporary state is a key question in the international relationships. The sovereigntyis exceptional right of every state without any external coercion to deciding of problems of internaland external policy. Many states have their own concept of the sovereignty. It has a big influence on the nationaljudicial systems and judicial community’s. In this article author considers the some issues of problemsof implementation of ECHR decisions in the Russian Federation.
Zpochybnění či popření „klasických“ pojmů politické teorie a ústavního práva, jako je (národní) stát či suverenita, jejíž koncept se stal těžištěm debaty o postvestfálské státnosti, se staly běžným topos akademické diskuse posledních dvou desetiletí. Zatímco David Held si v roce 1996 postěžoval, že teoretici demokracie se takřka nevěnují otázce, nakolik může stát zůstat v centru myšlení o demokracii, stal se od té doby vztah mezi státem, demokracií a suverenitou předmětem řady zásadních prací. Poststrukturalističtí kritici suverenity, její redefinice v „metodologickém kosmopolitismu“, stejně jako radikálně-pluralistická transformace suverenity do podoby plurálních „nároků na suverenitu“ jsou výzvou pro klasická chápání tohoto pojmu.Přesto nemohou ani současné přístupy k „pozdní“ suverenitě postvestfálské epochy uniknout zásadním logickým obtížím při popisu kritických situací, v nichž se politické entity buď rekonstituují, nebo
zachraňují před vlastním zánikem prostřednictvím mimořádných opatření porušujících jejich vlastní pravidla.V tomto článku se pokouším obhájit relevanci pojmu suverenity, nikoli však jako konceptu popisujícího materiální povahu mocenských vztahů, nýbrž jako normativního pojmu, jehož smysl spočívá v imaginaci sociální a politické reality. Suverenita jako prostředek této imaginace umožňuje legitimizaci politických systémů, v níž lze uchovat paralelní vztah mezi principem demokracie a principem právního státu, který je v alternativních konceptech legitimity zásadně zpochybněn. and It became a topos of academic debate of last two decades to question or even contest “traditional” concepts of the political theory and constitutional law like the (nation-)state and the sovereignty, whose notion became the focal point of the debate about post-Westphalian statehood. While David Held stated yet in 1996, that the scholars on democracy “have not seriously questioned whether the nation-state itself can remain at the centre of democratic thought,“ the relation between nation-state, democracy and sovereignty had been elaborated in several major works since then.
The poststructuralist critic of sovereignty, the redefinition of its term in “methodological cosmopolitism” as well as radical-pluralist transformation of sovereignty into multiple “sovereignty claims” are challenging classical understandings of sovereignty. However, the new approaches to the “late”
sovereignty of post-Westphalian period cannot escape major logical difficulties in dealing with critical situations, in which political units are either re-constituting themselves or are saving themselves before a destruction with the means of emergency measures breaching their own rules. In this article, I try to defend the relevance of the concept of sovereignty, not as a description of the material quality of power relations but as a normative concept whose sense consists in the imagination of social and political reality as a unity. This form of imagination is a precondition for any conception of legitimacy of a constituted order with a balance between the rule of law and democracy. It is precisely this balance, that is endangered by current alternative conceptions of legitimacy without sovereignty.
Diceyho teorie je založena na absolutní suverenitě, kterou pro absolutní vládce vytvořil Bodin. Parlament tak hraje v tomto scénáři roli nejvyššího pistolníka. Tato teorie může být jednoduše odmítnuta jako zastaralá. Když se Dicey snaží vysvětlit, proč rozhodující osoby uznávají nejvyšší moc Parlamentu, argumentuje politickou suverenitou Parlamentu, která znamená jeho skutečnou moc ve fakticitě. Přestože tento přístup směšuje normativní a deskriptivní pohled, považuji ho za poněkud atraktivní popis určité mentální mapy. Článek dále popisuje spory mezi sirem Ivorem Jenningsem, sirem Williamem Wadem a dalšími ohledně možného sebeomezení Parlamentu. Byly vytvořeny tři základní koncepce. Podle Williama Wadea je Parlament omezen pravidlem, že se nemůže omezit. Sir Ivor Jennings tvrdí, že Parlament se může omezit jen z procesního hlediska. Jiní jako Nick Barber zastávají názor, že se může omezit neomezeně. Závěrem ukazuji, že Hart považoval soudní rozhodování ohledně citlivých ústavních otázek za politickou činnost, která se však děje výjimečně.Podle Harta soudy musí získat dostatečnou legitimitu pomocí rozhodování podústavních případů.To znamená, že jsou legitimizovány v podstatě technokratickou procedurou,
což kontrastuje s Diceyho koncepcí politické moci jako zdroje právní suverenity. and The Diceyan theory is based on absolute sovereignty imagined for the sake of absolute rulers by Bodin. In this scenario Parliament plays the role of a supreme gunman. This theory can be easily dismissed as old fashioned.When Dicey is supposed to explain why officials are recognizing the supreme power of Parliament, he claims that Parliament possesses “political sovereignty”, which means it is supreme in reality. Although this attitude confuses the normative and descriptive point of view, I consider it to be somehow appealing as basically psychological description of certain mental structure. Furthermore, the paper describes clashes between Sir Ivor Jennings, Sir William Wade and others regarding the possible limitation by which Parliament could fetter upon itself. Three basic conceptions have been developed.William Wade claims that Parliament is limited by the rule that it cannot limit itself. Sir Ivor Jennings holds that Parliament can issue rules concerning its manner and form. Others, namely Nick Barber, think that any limitation is possible. In conclusion, I point out that Hart considered the judicial decision-making regarding highly sensitive constitutional matters as a political act, but exceptional. According to Hart, courts have to gain sufficient legitimacy through the process of deciding ordinary cases. That means they are legitimized by technocratic procedure, which contrasts with Diceyan conception of political power as a source of legal sovereignty.
The text analyzes the discourse on sovereignty in the Czech politics in the light of current processes of the transformation of sovereignty caused by the globalization and Europeanization. The author discusses the dispute between liberal-conservative critics of the European integration and cosmopolitan critics of the sovereign statehood and points to the limits of both positions. It is argued that the conservatives who warn against the loss of sovereignty in the ongoing process of Europeanization and who call for the protection of the Czech statehood cling to an obsolete and invalid concept of sovereignty that is no longer adequate to changing social and geopolitical conditions. Similarly, it is pointed out that the defenders of cosmopolitan Europe who take sovereignty to be an old and useless category hindering the process of democratization are unable to offer an alternative capable of responding to growing concerns regarding the democratic deficit and the loss of political autonomy. The text tries to show that both positions misconstrue the challenges of globalization and Europeanization for the state and democracy., Petra Gümplová., and Obsahuje bibliografii