Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.
: Článek se snaží přiblížit přístup Josepha Priestleyho ke zkoumání lidské mysli. Postupně jsou ukázány dva kroky, ve kterých Priestley mění svůj pohled na hmotu a ducha a dochází k materialismu. V prvním kroku redefi nuje pojem hmoty a přisuzuje hmotě zcela nové vlastnosti – síly přitahování a odpuzování. V druhém kroku pomocí těchto nových vlastností vysvětluje schopnost vnímání a myšlení. V těchto krocích navíc využívá poznatky tehdejší přírodní fi losofi e, zejména mechaniky. Člověk a jeho mysl jsou podle Priestleyho součástí přírody. To znamená, že člověk a lidská mysl jsou určitým mechanismem, který pracuje podle přírodních zákonů a lze jej pomocí těchto zákonů také vysvětlit. and Th is article attempts to introduce Joseph Priestley’s approach to the research of the human mind. It is demonstrated in two consecutive steps how Priestley changes his view of matter and spirit, and how he moves to materialism. In the fi rst step, he redefi nes the notion of matter and gives it new attributes – the forces of attraction and repulsion. In the second step, using these new attributes, he explains the ability of perception and thinking. In these steps, he also uses fi ndings of the contemporary natural philosophy, especially the mechanics. For Priestley, man and his mind are part of nature. Th is means that the man and the human mind are a certain mechanism that works according to natural laws and can also be explained by these laws.
Jurisprudence není jenom bádáním o právu, izolovaným od všeho ostatního poznání. Jestliže chceme porozumět historickému vývoji jurisprudence, potřebujeme vzít v úvahu širší perspektivu, která zahrne i vývoj fundamentálních názorů v oblasti náboženství, metafyziky, svobodné vůle a metaetiky. Tento text se věnuje výkladu hlavních prvků tzv. naturalistického projektu v jurisprudenci. Můžeme si pak všimnout například skutečnosti, že právní myšlení některých autorů (typicky Olivera W. Holmese) bylo ovlivněné ateismem, materialismem, determinismem, etickým subjektivismem, utilitarismem a sociálním darwinismem. Taková kombinace názorů sice může být dobrou obranou proti manipulativní argumentaci „falešnou metafyzikou“, ale také může sklouznout ke světonázoru, ve kterém je nakonec každá argumentace jenom metodou psychologického ovlivňování druhých lidí, tedy zase jen manipulací. and The jurisprudence is not only legal research, isolated from any other knowledge. If we want to understand to the historical development of jurisprudence, we need to take into consideration a broader perspective, included the development of fundamental beliefs about religion, metaphysics,
free will and metaethics. This essay sets out the main elements of naturalistic project in jurisprudence. We can also find that legal thinking od some authors (e.g.Oliver W.Holmes) had been influenced by atheism, materialism, determinism, ethical subjectivism and social darwinism. Such combination of beliefs may be good defense against manipulative argumentation by “false metaphysics”, but it may also lapse into a world-picture, where all argumentation is only a method for psychological influencing people, in other words, only manipulation.
Over the last decade or two, judging by the frequency and jubilance of its sundry invocations, “materialism” seems to have fi nally returned from discursive exile, having barely survived and only with aid from the most unlikely ally. Th at this new materialism is barely recognizable matters little, for the stories of conceptual adventure and the promise of a world beyond our wildest conceptual grasp are so captivating that most fail to notice that the human never appears in them. Th at is precisely the point. Under the guise of materialism, a redemptive nihilism has taken the place of the revolutionary hubris that once struck fear in ruling classes and ideas alike. How did it come to this? Th e stodgy old materialism did not so much lose to the imposter in some marketplace of ideas as it was systematically appropriated, its concepts expropriated, aspirations falsifi ed and entire traditions eff aced. A sustained philosophical and political eff ort to weaken the Left Hegelian tradition – the concept of alienation in particular – preceded today’s ontological restoration, enabling new “materialists” to maintain what is entirely an absurdity (materialism that resides solely and immanently in the object) and an obscenity (radical politics built on arch-conservative principles). Th is essay will identify a few points of ontological infi ltration and argue that critical social theory, for the sake of materialism and not against it, must recuperate the prohibitively idealist conceptual framework – one that is by no means foreign to it and that once went by the name of Reason in History.
This article examines the critique of materialism in the work of Noam Chomsky which treats the doctrine as lacking in any clear content. It is argued that Chomsky’s critique is a coherent one drawing on an understanding of the Newtonian revolution in science, on a modular conception of the mind, and on the related conception of epistemic boundedness. The article also seeks to demonstrate the limits of Chomsky’s position by drawing attention to his use of the third-person point of view in considering the mental and his resulting failure to make good sense of consciousness. Finally, a dual-aspect theory is recommended which would incorporate Chomsky’s agnosticism about the nature of matter., Článek zkoumá a hodnotí kritiku materialismu v díle Noama Chomského, podle níž je materialismus doktrínou bez jasného obsahu. Ukazuje se, že Chomského kritika je koherentní v tom, že uvádí do souladu interpretaci newtonovské revoluce v přírodní vědě s modulárním pojetím mysli a související teorií kognitivní omezenosti. Dále se tento článek snaží poukázat na problematický rys Chomského kritiky, spočívající v tom, že uznává při zkoumání mysli pouze hledisko třetí osoby. Toto omezení vede k podcenění úlohy a významu vědomí. Závěrem autor navrhuje, že tento nedostatek by bylo možné opravit tím, že bychom Chomského agnostické stanovisko vůči hmotě propojili s teorií dvou aspektů (dual-aspect theory)., and James Hill.
In the paper, I discuss Robert Kirk’s attempt to refute the zombie argument against materialism by demonstrating, “in a way that is intuitively appealing as well as cogent”, that the idea of phenomenal zombies involves incoherence. Kirk’s argues that if one admits that a world of zombies z is conceivable, one should also admit the conceivability of a certain transformation from such a world to a world z* that satisfies a description D, and it is arguable that D is incoherent. From which, Kirk suggests, it follows that the idea of zombies is incoherent. I argue that Kirk’s argument has several minor deficiencies and two major flaws. First, he takes for granted that cognitive mental states are physical (cognitive physicalism), although a zombist is free to—and would better—reject this view. Second, he confuses elements of different scenarios of transformation, none of which results in the incoherent description D.