The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community., Zuzana Parusniková., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Téma smrti, neustále se vracející v mnoha Marcelových esejích, je tu těsněji spjato – jak to již ohlašuje sám název – s nadějí. Podle toho, zda akcentuje Marcel vztah k vlastní smrti či ke smrti blízké osoby, lze rozlišit i jistou modifikaci: naléhavěji pociťuje neklid právě v souvislosti s odchodem blízké bytosti než v souvislosti se svou vlastní smrtí. Takto se pro Marcela odvíjejí jeho meditace o smrti kolem osy Já-ty a intersubjektivita, jež je vlastně láskou, zakládá možnost hovořit tu o jakékoli naději. Právě kontinuita bytí je založena na intersubjektivitě: jejím základem nejsou lidské bytosti jako souhrny biologických procesů, ale jich vzájemný vztah, jenž nedovolí, aby smrt měla definitivní a poslední slovo. Marcel tu navazuje na svá dřívější zkoumání, v nichž se vyslovil pro „vtělené bytí“. Jeho základem je vztah k lidskému tělu nikoli jako k objektu, ale jako k subjektu, který jako tělo blízké osoby nemůže být nějaké „ono“, ale pouze „Ty“. Na tom Marcel zakládá vztah k blízké osobě, jež je láskou oblativní, nikoli majetnickou, tíhnoucí k pocitu vlastnění., The theme of death, which continually reappears in many of Marcel’s essays, is here connected – as the title already declares – with hope. Depending on whether Marcel focuses on the relation to his own death or to the death of a person near to him, we can distinguish a certain modification: he feels the most acute uneasiness to the departing of a near one rather than to his own death. Thus his meditations on death unfold around the axis of I-thou, and intersubjectivity (which is really love) grounds, for Marcel, the very possibility of speaking here of a kind of hope. The very continuity of being is grounded on intersubjectivity insofar as its basis is not human beings as summaries of biological processes, but for whom a mutual relation does not allow death to have the definitive and final word. Reference is made here to our previous enquiry into the body which called for “embodied being” and for the relation to body not as an object, but as a subject which, as the body of a person near to us, cannot be an “it”, but only a “Thou”. This is the basis for a relation to a person near to us which is dedicated lovingly, and not in the proprietorial spirit of ownership., Gabriel Marcel., and Obsahuje seznam literatury