The main aim of this paper is to propose an adequate interpretation of the concept esse apparens (apparent being) which was used by Franciscan philosopher and theologian Peter Auriol (c. 1280-1322), especially focusing on his account of sensory perception. Drawing on an analysis of the relevant passages of the commentary on the Sentences by Auriol, first, I introduce his famous account of sensory illusions, and then his own claims about the nature of esse appparens (Auriol refuses to treat it either as a separate entity serving as a mediator of perception, or as only an extrinsic denomination of the perceived object). In the next part, I reject the interpretation which identifies esse apparens with mental representation. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to place this concept into the context of scholastic doctrine of objectiver or intentional being (popularized mainly by Duns Scotus and his disciples). At the end of the paper, I return to Auriol's account of illusions and show that it is compatible with esse apparens being understood as mode of being., Lukáš Lička., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
According to the Oxford English Dictonary George Berkeley introduced the term a priori into English. His inspiration for this was, it seems, to be found partly in the writings of his immediate predecessors, particularly Pierre Bayle, and partly in his pedagogical work where he adjudicated disputations between his pupils. Some of his arguments against the existence of matter Berkeley tells us are a priori, others a posteriori. Even the a priori arguments are underpinned by prior semantic principles of an anti-abstractionist character, which are shown to be important particularly in the immaterialist philosophy of mathematics. Berkeley's courageously unorthodox, and generally unpublished, thoughts about mathematics thus grow from the same soil as his celebrated denial of matter., Marek Tomeček., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Berlinova dichotomie pozitivní a negativní svobody je v akademickém prostředí natolik diskutovanou problematikou, že jakékoli pokusy o její novou interpretaci čelí notnému riziku rozvíjení již řečeného, a tím i možnosti ztráty argumentační síly. Cíl tohoto článku však nespočívá v přispění k debatě týkající se funkčnosti Berlinova rozdělení, ale ve zpochybnění stereotypně přijímaných ideových zdrojů, jimiž se Berlin údajně inspiroval. V rámci linie tradic liberálního myšlení, kterou identifikuje mimo jiné sám Berlin, je totiž jeho rozlišení dvou pojmů svobody běžně ztotožňováno s principy a ideovým poselstvím klasifikace francouzského osvícence Benjamina Constanta. Směšování Berlinovy polarity pozitivní – negativní s Constantovým schématem antická – moderní je pravděpodobně důsledkem četných styčných bodů obou koncepcí, jež však vedou k automatickému vnímání souladu i u těch principů, u nichž je míra koherence problematická. Za hlavní cíl této studie lze tudíž označit jednak prokázání skutečnosti, že pro důslednou komparaci Berlinovy a Constantovy dichotomie je kromě běžně analyzované příbuznosti negativní svobody se svobodou moderní nezbytné vzít v úvahu i provázanost opačných pólů spektra, a především pak obhajobu teze, že v podstatných momentech Constantovo myšlení opouští meze liberální tradice a konotuje Pettitovy republikánské principy svobody jako ne-dominance. Takový závěr vede v konečném důsledku k tomu, že Berlinovo a Constantovo dělení nelze vnímat jako homogenní., Berlin’s dichotomy of positive and negative freedom is, in academic quarters, such a well-discussed problem that any kind of attempt at a fresh interpretation confronts the real risk of developing what has already been said and, in that way, of losing argumentational strength. The aim of this article does not, however, consist in contributing to the debate about the viability of Berlin’s distinction, but in calling into question the stereotypical reception of the intellectual sources that Berlin was inspired by. In the framework of the line of traditions of liberal thinking, which, among others, Berlin himself identifies, is his distinction between two concepts of freedom, usually identified with the principles and intellectual meaning of the classification by the French enlightenment thinker Benjamin Constant. The mixing up of Berlin’s polarity positive–negative with Constant’s scheme of ancient–modern is probably a consequence of the numerous common points in the two conceptions. These, however, lead to the automatic perception of agreement even in those principles for which the level of coherence is questionable. The main aim of this study is, therefore, to indicate, firstly, the proven fact that for a consistent comparison of Berlin’s and Constant’s dichotomy one must examine, in addition to the commonly analysed relationship of negative freedom with modern freedom, the connectedness of the opposite poles in the two cases. Secondly, and more importantly, the thesis is advanced that, in its fundamental properties, Constant’s thinking goes beyond the liberal tradition and points towards Pettit’s republican principles of freedom as non-dominance. This conclusion ultimately leads to the recognition that Berlin’s and Constant’s division cannot be seen as homogenous., Jan Květina., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The article examines the meaning of the other for Kant's idea of autonomy. Autonomy is interpreted, in relation to the universal demand of the ethical, as governing the will by principles. Autonomy as principled self-determination by means of the practical law cannot be understood as the standpoint of an isolated subject. Instead we must understand it as a standpoint taken towards others, which we treat as the aspect of spontaneity, and at the same time as a standpoint taken thanks to others, since others make possible its awakening and development - here the aspect of receptivity is discussed. In this two-way relation between autonomy (enabled by a self-determining goverment by principle) and the other, the character of dialogical mutuality is exhibited: autonomy is the principled considerateness of a good will towards others, and, in order for it to be such, it must be initiated by others., Ondřej Sikora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii