Among facilities which were built by the Roman army in the wider space of the Burgstall hill in Mušov there is a well situated to the edge of the high terrace next to the former gravel pit on the Mušov-Neurissen site. The discovery of deer antler fragments near the bottom of the shaft was considered a random intrusion, it should have been an object accidentally dragged to the gravel. Discoveries of deer bones and antlers in other places of the barbarian territories and also in the Roman provinces allow us to change the primary conclusions. Some selected examples can be proof that parts of deer carcasses were often used in nonprophane manipulations within ritual acts in the Roman era. The Mušov example enables closer observation of the circumstances around antler handling. They took place after the Romans suddenly interrupted works on deepening the well and decided to leave the site.
Římské vojenské tažení, které mělo v r. 6 po Kr. zničit Marobudem vytvořenou říši Markomanů, nebylo nikdy zahájeno. Operační plán tažení předpokládal klešťovitý úder vedený od Rýna Sentiem Saturninem a od Dunaje Tiberiem. Názory o jeho uskutečnění vycházejí z rétorického líčení událostí Velleiem Patercullem formou tzv. panegyricu na Tiberia, které zdůrazňuje vynucené dramatické ukončení tažení krátce před spojením obou vojenských uskupení. Ve skutečnosti tato vojska vůbec nevykročila z míst svého soustředění. Dávat proto do souvislosti římské opevnění u Mušova s polním tažením v r. 6 po Kr. není odůvodněné. and The military subjugation of Maroboduus’ empire, planned for 6 AD by Augustus and Tiberius: a war without campaigns. The Roman military offensive against the heart of Maroboduus’ regnum in Bohemia in AD 6 – as described by C. Velleius Paterculus – never really began. The plan of campaign was a pincer movement by two Roman army groups, one commanded by Sentius Saturninus moving in from the Rhine while the other under Tiberius approached from the Danube. Contrary, however, to the rhetorical account by Velleius – who in his panegyric on Tiberius dramatised the campaign’s abortion as having been compelled by the Pannonian revolt before the generals could unite and join battle with the enemy – the two armies never left their deployment zones. It is therefore incorrect to connect the archaeological traces of Roman fortifications at Mušov-Burgstall, and the Augustan/Tiberian age artefacts excavated at the same site, with this war.