Physicalism demands an explication of what it means for something to be physical. But the most popular way of providing one—viz., characterizing the physical in terms of the postulates of a scientifically derived physical theory—is met with serious trouble. Proponents of physicalism can either appeal to current physical theory or to some future physical theory (preferably an ideal and complete one). Neither option is promising: currentism almost assuredly renders physicalism false and futurism appears to render it indeterminate or trivial. The purpose of this essay is to argue that attempts to characterize the mental encounter a similar dilemma: currentism with respect to the mental is likely to be inadequate or contain falsehoods and futurism leaves too many significant questions about the nature of mentality unanswered. This new dilemma, we show, threatens both sides of the current debate surrounding the metaphysical status of the mind.
The paper applies the pseudo-linear algebra to unify the results on reducibility, reduction and transfer equivalence for continuous- and discrete-time nonlinear control systems. The necessary and sufficient condition for reducibility of nonlinear input-output equation is presented in terms of the greatest common left factor of two polynomials describing the behaviour of the `tangent linearized system' equation. The procedure is given to find the reduced (irreducible) system equation that is transfer equivalent to the original system equation. Besides unification, the tools of pseudo-linear algebra allow to extend the results also for systems defined in terms of difference, q-shift and q-difference operators.
In the current discussions about emergent entities there is a new topic in the problem of diachronic and synchronic conception of emergence. The diachronic conception emphasizes the emergence of new phenomena over time, the synchronic conception coexistence of new ''high-level'' objects or properties of existing objects or properties on a lower level. There is a general belief that these two concepts are conceptually different and yet they cannot find a unifying framework that would allow unifying them in a more general sense. I believe and I try to show that both concepts diverge and it is possible to create a unifying framework for them., V současných diskusích o vznikajících subjektech je nové téma v problematice diachronní a synchronické koncepce vzniku. Diachronické pojetí zdůrazňuje vznik nových jevů v čase, synchronické pojetí koexistence nových ,,objektů na vysoké úrovni'' nebo vlastností existujících objektů nebo vlastností na nižší úrovni. Existuje všeobecná víra, že tyto dva koncepty jsou koncepčně odlišné a přesto nemohou najít sjednocující rámec, který by je umožnil sjednotit je v obecnějším smyslu. Věřím a snažím se ukázat, že oba koncepty se liší a je možné pro ně vytvořit sjednocující rámec., and Vladimír Havlík
In this paper significant challenges are raised with respect to the view that explanation essentially involves unification. These objections are raised specifically with respect to the well-known versions of unificationism developed and defended by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher. The objections involve the explanatory regress argument and the concepts of reduction and scientific understanding. Essentially, the contention made here is that these versions of unificationism wrongly assume that reduction secures understanding.