V sociální a politické teorii dnes stojíme před úkolem komplexního uchopení paradigmatu globálních interakcí charakterizovaného pluralitou sociálních aktérů a zájmových konfliktů. Založení kritické teorie globálních interakcí je spojeno s řešením teoreticko-metodologických otázek i věcných problémů analýzy a interpretace. Jde o poměr kritické analýzy reálných procesů a normativněutopické projekce sociální změny. Věcné problémy jsou spojeny s analýzou předpokladů a překážek utváření globální společnosti a politiky a s tím, jak jsou vymezovány ve své komplexitě., In social and political theory today we are presented with the task of arriving at a complex understanding of the paradigm of global interaction in which there is a plurality of social actors and conflicts of interest. The grounding of a critical theory of global interactions is connected with a resolution of theoretico-methodological questions and of detailed problems of analysis and interpretation. At issue is the relation between a critical analysis of realistic processes and normatively-utopian projections of social change. The detailed problems are connected with an analysis of the assumptions and obstacles when creating a global society and global politics, and with the question of how they are to be defined in their complexity., and Oleg Suša.
Příspěvek je zaměřen na otázku z oblasti ekologické etiky, jak stanovit hranici našich morálních ohledů. Ačkoliv antropocentrismus přináší možnosti založení dobře odůvodněné ochrany přírody, autorka si všímá více neantropocentrických přístupů, u nichž existuje předpoklad, že morální ohledy bychom měli brát na mimolidské tvory kvůli nim samým. Mezi neantropocentricky orientovanými filosofy panuje neshoda v otázce, co do těchto ohledů má spadat – zda to, co je schopno trpět (P. Singer), či to, co má zájmy (R. Attfield), dobro nebo vlastní hodnotu (P. Taylor). Tak se hranice morálních ohledů rozšiřuje od člověka přes vyšší druhy zvířat až ke všemu životu. Ve druhé části příspěvku autorka na příkladu posledního člověka (R. Routley a R. Attfield) zpochybňuje vhodnost hledání rozlišujícího kritéria pro morální ohledy. Ekologická etika však představuje určitý základ pro společensko-politickou praxi a pro tyto účely se kritérium života a morální princip úcty ke všemu životu jeví jako nejvhodnější., This article focuses on the question, in the area of ecological ethics, of how to determine the bounds of our moral considerations. Although anthropocentrism does provide possibilities for the proper founding of a justification for the protection of nature, the author finds a greater number of non-anthropocentric approaches which assume that our moral considerations should be extended to non-human creatures for their own sake. Among the non-anthropocentrically oriented philosophers there is no consensus on the question of what should be included in those considerations – whether it is that which is susceptible of suffering (P. Singer), or that which has interests (R. Attfield), or that which has the good or its own value (P. Taylor). Thus the bounds of moral considerations are extended from man, first to the higher forms of animals, then to all life. In the second part of the article the author, using the example of the last man (R. Routley and R. Attfield), calls into question the appropriateness of seeking a distinguishing criterion for moral considerations. Ecological ethics, however, present a certain basis for socio-political praxis and for the aims which the criterion of life and the moral principle of respect to all life reveal as most appropriate., and Marie Skýbová.
This review study looks at David Clemenson’s book Descartes’ Theory of Ideas from both the historical and systematic points of view. From the historical point of view, the theme of the (late) scholastic influences on Descartes’ theory of ideas is tackled, while from the systematic point of view Descartes’ theory is interpreted dealing with the question of Cartesian representationalism or direct (cognitive) realism. An analysis of the immediate Scholastic texts, written by Jesuits (and taught at the Jesuit college La Flèche, where the young Descartes studied) is used by Clemenson to support his argument for a so-called weak version of direct realism, actually identical with a weak version of representationalism. The author of this review study, despite appreciating the connection of these two levels, making possible a consistent interpretation of some of Descartes’ ostensibly contradictory statements, draws attention to certain deficiencies and obscurities concerning, primarily, the scholastic dimension of the subject-matter., Daniel Heider., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Using the example of Catherine of Siena († 1380), one of the possible motivations of writing down the legend is followed in the study, and the exploitability of Catherine for the promotion and official confirmation of the Dominican Third Order (1405). In the documents promoting the Third Order, her as-yet uncanonised holy example has an important place as a model for a Tertiary. This fact, however, is in contradiction with the evident "inappropriateness" of Catherine´s life as a real model for Tertiaries, for her extreme practices, exceeding the limits of the Rule. The real function and importance of St. Catherine´s model in the life of the Tertiaries should therefore be complementary viewed in the context of the legend of her repetant successor Mary of Venice, whose author is a great suppporter of Catherine´s holiness and Third Order, Tommaso da Siena. Whereas Catherine served as an ideal, Marie should be an example for practical imitation for Tertiaries., Kateřina Ptáčková., and Obsahuje poznámky pod čarou
The study answers the question who delivered the first sermon at the funeral of Emperor Charles IV, held on 15 December 1378. The second funeral oration was delivered by Adalbert Ranconis de Ericini. Until the 1960s, Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim was considered the author of the first eulogy, or rather sermon, without any reservations. It was Jaroslav Kadlec who suggested the possibility that the oration at the Emperor’s casket was delivered by the successor of Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim, John of Jenstein. The author also expresses the opinion that the Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim remained in active service until the beginning of March 1379; thus, it can be proven that he held funeral services for the deceased Emperor. It is likely that both orators were appointed by the current Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim, who was carrying out other duties at the funeral in his capacity as Archbishop. and František Šmahel.
The subject of the study is the analysis of two arguments that have appeared in the Czech-Slovak philosophical setting in the context of discussions about the moral evaluation of research into stem cells of human embryos. We have presented various reasons (varied understandings of potentiality and the vagueness of the expression “living human body”), on the basis of which we must reject the argument of P. Volek concerning the unconditional protection of each human zygote. With respect to the argument of A. Doležal, D. Černý a T. Doležal, we have shown that their critique of the conception of non-individuality of the early human embryo relies on the identification of the concept of the “individual” with the concept “particular” which, for ontological reasons, cannot be accepted. In both of the analysed bioethical arguments the key role of metaphysical concepts and conceptions is easily demonstrated., Peter Sýkora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii