The main views on the nature of narrative in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy are analyzed. It is shown how, realizing the research narrative, he paid attention to the linguistic means of expression of our thoughts, reference to the actual reality, the logical component of argumentation. It is shown that in order to place worldview ac-cents more clearly and strengthen the expressive effect of thought, Wittgenstein pragmatized the narrative, in particular, used metaphors, images of learning, took into account the historico-cultural context. It is important for him to show that the form of the narrative influences what meanings the interlocutor will comprehend. Through a system of micro- and macro-narratives, Wittgenstein intended to express his opinion as clearly as possible, although he made the reader an active participant in the narrative. The thinker did not deviate from the analytico-scientific standards of philosophizing, although he showed that the relevant analysis of the narrative is significantly complicated by the ambiguities of its interpretation, the uniqueness of human experience and the identity of each narrator’s value system. It is argued that a pragmatic approach to narrative analysis significantly expands the research methodology of the analytic thinker and, accordingly, makes it possible to deepen our understanding of reality and human existence, as well as more clearly define the specifics of their knowledge.
Larry Laudan v článku z roku 1983 označil problém demarkace, tj. rozlišení „vědy" a „pseudovědy",, za filosofický pseudoproblém, kterým není třeba se zabývat; a slova „vědecké" a „pseudovědecké" za prázdné pojmy, které můžeme z našeho slovníku zcela vyškrtnout. V předkládané studii zpochybňuji toto Lau-danovo stanovisko a předkládám argumenty ve prospěch tvrzení, že 1) rozlišení vědy a pseudovědy představuje důležitý a aktuální problém, kterým je třeba se zabývat, a že 2) možný způsob řešení tohoto problému nabízejí současná sociální studia vědy. Jejich východiskem je pojetí vědy jako „formy života" a pojetí demarkačního kritéria jako proměnlivého souboru charakteristik, který sice nelze jednoznačně definovat, ale přesto jej lze zkoumat, a to prostřednictvím sociologické analýzy vědecké praxe. Mým záměrem je na příkladu několika vzorových studií představit specifika sociologického přístupu z hlediska jeho metodologie i povahy nabízených řešení a zhodnotit jeho možnosti i omezení pro filosofii vědy., In 1983, Larry Laudan considered the demarcation problem, i.e. the demarcation between "science” and "pseudoscience”, as an irrelevant philosophical pseudoproblem, and the terms "scientific” and "pseudoscientific” as empty notions, which should be removed from our vocabulary. This paper challenges this statement by proposing arguments supporting the view that 1) the demarcation between science and pseudoscience represents an important problem deserving a serious attention, and that 2) a possible way to its solution has been opened by recent social studies of science. Their approach is based on understanding science as a "form of life” and the demarcation criterion as a dynamic cluster of characteristics, which cannot be defined exactly, but nevertheless can be examined via sociological analysis of scientific practice. The paper demonstrates the specifics of the sociological approach with regard to its methods and proposed solutions on selected exemplar studies, and evaluates its possibilities and limits for philosophy of science., and Libor Benda.