Recently the account of free will proposed by Harry Frankfurt has come under attack. It has been argued that Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness is in conflict with prevalent intuitions about free will and should be abandoned. I will argue that empirical data from choice blindness experiments can vindicate Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness. The choice blindness phenomenon exposes that individuals fail to track their own decisions and readily take ownership of, and confabulate reasons for, decisions they did not make. Traditionally this has been taken to be problem for the notion of free will. I argue that Frankfurt’s account does not face this problem. Instead, choice blindness can be fruitfully applied to it, and vice versa. Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness, I suggest, delineates the range of the choice blindness effect. This makes wholeheartedness a useful meta-theoretical concept for choice blindness research. I conclude that, pace the recent criticism, wholeheartedness is a useful notion and should not be abandoned., Nedávno byl napaden útok na svobodnou vůli, který navrhl Harry Frankfurt. To bylo argumentoval, že Frankfurt je představa o bezstarostnosti je v konfliktu s převládajícími intuicemi o svobodné vůli a should být opuštěný. Tvrdím, že empirická data z vybraných experimentů slepoty mohou obhájit frankfurtský pojem celistvosti. Fenomén slepé selekce odhaluje, že jednotlivci nedokážou sledovat svá vlastní rozhodnutí a snadno se chopit odpovědnosti za rozhodnutí, která neučinili. Tradičně to bylo považováno za problém pro pojetí svobodné vůle. Tvrdím, že frankfurtský účet tento problém neřeší. Namísto toho může být na něj vhodně aplikována slepota a naopak. Navrhuji, aby frankfurtský pojem celistvosti vymezil rozsah efektu slepoty. To činí z celého srdce užitečný meta teoretický koncept pro výběr výzkumu slepoty. Uzavírám to,tempo nedávné kritiky, bezúhonnost je užitečná představa a neměla by být opuštěna., and Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Our article focuses on the late philosophy of Levinas, which can be characterized as an ethics of radical passivity, and on its limits (especially in the relationship between ethics/society). The aim is not, however, to overcome the dichotomy of passiv-ity/activity as other phenomenological authors attempt to do, but to deepen this differentiation to such an abysmal level that any sort of philosophy of action is eliminated from this late project of the ethics of passivity. Such a thorough separation of the ethics of responsibility from the entirety of the philosophy of action, one of the main aspects of Levinas’s late works, also has its limitations in Levinas’s thought itself. These limitations are associated with the entrance of the so-called “third party” into the sphere of the infinite responsibility for the Other. We attempt to interpret this contradiction of infinite ethics and finite Justice with the help of Foucault’s concepts of decisions, division, and exclusion.