Following Carnap’s Principle of Subject Matter, Pavel Tichý proposed a methodological principle I call the ''Denotational Principle of Aboutness''. It says that expressions are about their denotata. Denotata are modelled as possible world intensions or (common) extensions. Nearly the same principle was recently defended by Marie Duží and Pavel Materna under the name the ''Parmenides Principle''. However, Duží and Materna did not react to Tichý’s late proposal which I call the ''Constructional Principle of Aboutness''. It says that the subject matter of expressions consists not in their denotata but in their meanings. The meanings are explicated by Tichý, and also by Duží and Materna, as so-called constructions; constructions are complex entities akin to algorithms, they construct intensions or extensions. In this paper, I argue in favour of the Constructional Principle of Aboutness. I show that there are not only single arguments, but the whole net of methodological principles which support it. This is why the topic largely transcends the debate among Tichý’s followers., Pavel Tichý navrhl podle Carnapova principu předmětové záležitosti metodický princip, který nazývám ,,Denotační princip onessness''. Říká se, že výrazy jsou o jejich denotatech. Denotata jsou modelována jako možná světová rozšíření nebo (společná) rozšíření. Téměř stejný princip nedávno obhájila Marie Duží a Pavel Materna pod názvem ,,Princip Parmenidů''. Duží a Materna však nereagovali na Tichý pozdní návrh, který nazývám ,,stavebním principem onessness''. Říká, že předmět výrazů nespočívá v jejich denotatech, ale v jejich významech. Významy vysvětluje Tichý a také Duží a Materna jako tzv. Stavby; Konstrukce jsou složité entity podobné algoritmům, konstruují intensions nebo extensions. V tomto \ t Argumentuji ve prospěch stavebního principu onessness. Ukazuji, že neexistují pouze jednotlivé argumenty, ale celá síť metodických principů, které ji podporují. To je důvod, proč toto téma do značné míry přesahuje debatu mezi následovníky Tichého., and Jiří Raclavský
The first part of the paper examines the historico-philosophical roots and re-evaluations of the traditional link between the notion of individual substance and the subject-position in the structure of judgement, focusing on Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. The second part is devoted to Peter Strawson’s revival of the Aristotelian account and his attempt to derive a (hierarchically ordered) system of logico-grammatical asymmetries between the subject- and predicate-terms from the basic categorial opposition between particulars and general concepts. While Aristotle typically combines the categorial account of the subject-predicate distinction with the aboutness principle, Strawson emphasizes that both criteria can give incompatible results and opts for the former as philosophically more fundamental. In polemics with Strawson, the author defends the aboutness criterion (the ''legein ti kata tinos'' principle) and attempts to show that it meets the basic requirements which philosophy of language and mind should impose on the analysis of the subjectpredicate distinction. and Petr Koťátko