Writing strategic documents is a major practice of many actors striving to see their educational ideas realised in the curriculum. In these documents, arguments are systematically developed to create the legitimacy of a new educational goal and competence to make claims about it. Th rough a qualitative analysis of the writing strategies used in these texts, I show how two of the main actors in the Czech educational discourse have developed a proof that a new educational goal is needed. I draw on the connection of the relational approach in the sociology of education with Lyotard’s analytical semantics of instances in the event. Th e comparison of the writing strategies in the two documents reveals diff erences in the formation of a particular pattern of justifi cation. In one case the texts function as a herald of pure reality, and in the other case as a messenger of other witnesses. Th is reveals diff erent regimens of proof, although both of them were written as prescriptive directives – normative models of the educational world. and Psaní strategických dokumentů je zásadní praxí mnoha aktérů usilujících o to, aby jejich vzdělávací ideje byly realizovány v učebních osnovách. V těchto dokumentech jsou argumenty systematicky rozvíjeny tak, aby se vytvořila jak legitimita nového vzdělávacího cíle, tak i kompetence těch, kteří tyto cíle prosazují. Na kvalitativní analýze strategií psaní použitých v textech tohoto druhu ukazuji, jak dva hlavní aktéři českého vzdělávacího diskurzu vytvořili důkaz, že je zapotřebí nový vzdělávací cíl. Studie vychází ze spojení relacionistické sociologie vzdělávání s Lyotardovou analytickou sémantikou pozic v určité události. Porovnání strategií psaní ve dvou dokumentech odhaluje rozdíly ve formování konkrétního vzorce ospravedlnění. V jednom případě text funguje jako ohlašovatel čisté reality a v druhém případě jako posel jiných svědků. Studie odhaluje různé režimy dokazování v těchto dokumentech, ačkoli oba byly psány jako preskriptivní směrnice – normativní modely vzdělávacího světa.
This article pauses and reflects on why Lyotard (who was an avid reader of Levinas) discusses the face in a purely Merleau-Pontyesque context. Thus, in the matter of the face, Lyotard has decisively misappropriated Levinas’s thought. However, I would like to show that the obvious disagreement between Levinas and Lyotard in the issue of the face is, in fact, the result of Lyotard’s deep dedication to Levinas. We attempt to report about Lyotard’s silence on Levinas when he deals with the face; we also try to explain that point of affinity where both authors tell us of the reorganization of rela-tionships between singularity and anonymity by having the heretofore accepted oppo-sites disintegrate. Keeping in mind this weaving of the faithfulness and unfaithfulness of Lyotard to Levinas, we should ask ourselves one more question: is it truly necessary to choose between the shock of the ethical demand and the shock of the senses when dealing with the face? Is it necessary to choose between the “ethical face” that de-mands (Levinas), and the “face-landscape” as a libidinal kidnapping or instinct (Lyo-tard)?