This paper critical y examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwil (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, I argue that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states., Tento článek kriticky zkoumá dvě námitky a vznáší novou námitku proti teorii morálního úsudku. Za prvé, Smith (1994) poznamenává, že víra, že p má tendenci vypršet, zatímco touha, že p má tendenci vytrvat na vnímání, které není p. Jeho pozorování nevyvrací sofistikovanou verzi teorie besiru, která by měla být přesvědčena, že p má věřit, že p a touha jednat v souladu s vírou, že p. Zadruhé, Zangwil (2008) tvrdí, že síla motivace se může lišit, zatímco míra přesvědčení zůstává konstantní. Besiristé by odpověděli, že besire přiznává jak stupeň, tak sílu. Konečně, argumentuji, že víra, že p trvá, zatímco touha jednat na víře, že p vyprší se zavedením nové tělesné podmínky, a proto že víra a touha jsou odlišné duševní stavy., and Seungbae Park
The paper focuses on the issue of the will in the work Fons vitae devoted to metaphysics, written by the medieval Jewish thinker Avicebron. It shows how Avicebron's definitions of the divine will may be understood in different contexts throughout his work. It questions the interpretation of the divine will as desire, as presented by Sarah Pessin in her Theology of Desire opposing the doctrine of the divine will. There is no indication to be found in Avicebron's metaphysics that the notion of the divine will is used incorrectly and that the notion of desire should be used instead. On the contrary, if this notion is deprived of its mistakenly assigned Augustinian influence and is understood in the context of its Arabic foundation, then the notion of the divine will supports an emanationist reading of Avicebron’s metaphysics rather than a creationist one. Careful reading of Fons vitae shows that Avicebron had no intention of presenting a creationist view in which God creates through the intermediary of his will. The divine will as defined in Fons vitae serves as the path through which the being flows from the creator onward to the lower levels of the chain of being.