The essay deals with the Czechoslovak state's measures put in place against the properties of the Liechtenstein primogeniture shortly after the liberation of the country in 1945. It analyzes the reasons behind these steps, which are apparent in the negative relationship the Czech society had towards to the family connected with events in Bohemia following the Battle of White Mountain (1620) but also in the treatment of the German speaking population in Bohemia after the Second World War (the transfer/expulsion of Germans). This all happened without regard for the foreign citizenship and status of the Liechtensteins as a ruling family in the independent Liechtenstein Principality that had remained neutral during the war. The author also links the implementation of the national administration to the post-war shift of Czechoslovak politics to the left and points to the communist-run Ministry of Agriculture, which had made the decision on the above measures. In large part the essay also deals with the defense of the Liechtensteins using diplomacy, especially to the role that Swiss diplomacy played as well as to the fruitless attempts made by the family to positively influence Czech administration.
This article by political scientist and long-standing high-ranking diplomat Roland Marxer provides an insight into Liechtenstein-Czech relations seen through the eyes of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Principality of Liechtenstein. For Liechtenstein as a state, for the princely family, but also for individual Liechtenstein nationals who did not belong to the princely family, a difficult situation arose after the Second World War, largely as a result of the Beneš decrees. Liechtenstein repeatedly stated to Czechoslovakia that it considered the confiscation of Liechtenstein property as assets of persons of "German nationality", which took place in 1945, to be an unacceptable violation of international law. Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, numerous initiatives have been taken at both bilateral and multilateral level in order to achieve lasting recognition of the sovereignty of Liechtenstein by Czechoslovakia, or more exactly, by its two successor states. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the associated changes in Eastern Europe, the European political landscape changed fundamentally, raising promising hopes for future cooperation in Europe. It must have seemed strange that three European states which were members of different European and international organizations and, as a result, were committed to cooperation that pursued the same goals, still did not have a resolution – in addition to the still unresolved issues of compensation – to mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations. An agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations and future cooperation was signed on 8 September 2009. On 7 April 2010, a Memorandum on the Establishment of the Czech-Liechtenstein Commission of Historians was signed, followed by a visit by the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs to Vaduz.
Přemysl Otakar II was the first of the Czech Přemyslid kings to turn his attention to Lithuania. Incidentally, Heidenreich Bishop of Chelmno from the Order of the Teutonic Knights stayed at his court; in 1253 he crowned the Lithuanian duke Mindaugas. The king came to the aid of the Teutonic Knights against the Prussians at the turn of 1254/1255 and for the second time in 1267/1268, when the eventual Christianisation of Lithuania also played an important role in his ultimately unsuccessful plans to establish a capital in Olomouc. The knightly King John of Luxembourg marched three times (1329, 1336/1337, 1344/1345) against the Lithuanians together with the Order of the Teutonic Knights and forces from western Europe. Undoubtedly of interest is the letter of Charles IV to Grand Duke Algirdas dated 21 April 1358, when he addressed him as monarcha mundi with an offer of baptism.
The author analyzes the diplomatic sources related to the negotiations between the Teutonic Knights and the Polish-Lithuanian Union after the truce in October 1414. As the compromise was not agreed within the set two-year period, the truce had to be extended, which was eventually done several times until 1421. Negotiations for the extension of the truce were quite tough. The King of Poland used the threat of non-renewal of the truce to put pressure on the Grand Master who was afraid of resuming war against a powerful adversary. Uncertainty surrounding the extension of the truce forced the Grand Master to hire mercenaries every year in the Empire. He also objected to the July deadline (St. Margaret) for the truce set each year, because this month was the most convenient time to begin a war campaign. Nevertheless the Grand Master refused to hand his three villages of Kujawy, which had formed an enclave on Polish territory, over to the King of Poland. Negotiations sometimes took place in several places simultaneously which caused some communication difficulties. The content of the charters extending the truce was drawn a comparison.