This paper explores the notion of “power” prevalent in Václav Havel’s understanding of the post-totalitarian regime. With this notion of power, which is “seeping” in nature, rather than rooted solely in an individual agent’s actions, the role of the individual in the formation of the political “we” becomes a central issue. The starting point is Havel’s well-known example of “the greengrocer,” that illustrate how Havel pictures the way out of the post-totalitarian regime as one in which individuals move from living a lie to living in truth. I show how Havel’s talk about truth and authenticity, and his emphasis on a life in truth (which may appear judgemental, naive and cliché-like) is best understood. The wrong way to understand this is simply to say that people who merely obeyed that government, as the greengrocer did, are to be held accountable because they did not put up a fight against their oppressor. Such an understanding goes wrong because it fails to take into account the complexity of the relationship between power and language. In contrast to this, I argue that the central issue here is not that particular agents are to be held responsible for countersigning messages that they think are false. More precisely, I argue that the moral difficulty here is that the greengrocer’s deeds, which appear as countersignatures of the regime, are possible because the messages conveyed are “innocent” on the surface, in a “literal” sense. The moral dimension of the greengrocer’s actions, aiming to shed light on the complex relation between the government and the individual, is revealed as located in a field of tension between inherited sense and new projections. This, in turn, can help us to see the real nature of the transition Havel’s grocer undergoes when he moves from living a lie to living in truth. It is not a matter of negating a false statement or utterance, nor of replacing it with a true one. It is a matter of realising that the responsibility for meaning is, ultimately, ours – and that the way in which he, the grocer, is one of us is something that has to be earned.
The article presents, in an integrated form, the main lines of Hejdánek’s thinking regarding ideology. It is based on published and unpublished texts and on sound recordings from his “apartment” seminars. Hejdánek does not approach ideology as being a fixed, ready-made system of tenets or dogmas, instead seeking a deeper understanding of the ideological mode of thought. The rise of ideologies is, according to him, a modern phenomenon, and Hejdánek considers it to be a kind of reprise of the myth in the modern age. He shows what is the precondition for the possibility of ideology, how ideology conditions human consciousness and how we can free ourselves from its power. According to Hejdánek, the starting point for this does not lie in a struggle with ideology on its own turf. Ideology can be overcome only by something that stands in radical opposition against it – that is, by the development of people into spiritual beings by way of truth, conscience and faith. and Článek v ucelené podobě představuje hlavní myšlenkové linie Hejdánkova uvažování o ideologii. Opírá se o vydané i nevydané texty a o zvukové záznamy bytových seminářů. Hejdánek nezkoumá ideologii jako určitý hotový systém pouček či dogmat, ale sestupuje k hlubším předpokladům ideologického způsobu myšlení. Vzestup ideologií je podle něj teprve novověký fenomén a Hejdánek jej pokládá za jakousi novodobou reprízu mýtu. Odhaluje, co je podmínkou možnosti ideologie, čím si ideologie podmaňuje lidské vědomí a jak se můžeme vysvobozovat z její moci. Východisko podle Hejdánka nespočívá v souboji s ideologií jejími vlastními prostředky. Ideologie může být překonána jedině něčím, co se postaví do radikálního protikladu proti jakékoli ideologičnosti – tedy rozvojem člověka jako duchovní bytosti skrze pravdu, svědomí a víru.
As soon as the socialist regimes failed in East-Central Europe, there disappeared from the public sphere the positive, a priori understanding of the offi cial, public discourse of the socialist era. What the author of this article calls “premisunderstanding” has become part of the new anti-communist consensus and ethos. Th is premisunderstanding is rooted not only in an ideological and moral antipathy toward the socialist regime but also in the fact that the regime’s discourse diff ers signifi cantly from other types of discourse, including, not least, liberal discourse. When this kind of premisunderstading is applied to texts originating in the socialist era or to texts or statements that represent this era, the author calls this “reading in the spirit of the post-Velvet-Revolutionary consensus.” In the more extreme forms of this premisunderstanding, the interpreter presumes that the historical actor is lying, is dishonest, or is mistaken. Although this tendency toward premisunderstanding has become weaker in the face of revisionist conceptions in historiography, and in the face of increasing nostalgia throughout society, this ideological barrier to understanding the recent past survives to this day in various forms of anti-communist rhetoric.
In this paper I argue that there is an affinity between the ‘dissident’ in Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless” and the ‘spectre’ in Derrida’s readings of Marx. Both are manifestations of a specific modern temporality that Derrida calls “disjointed”, because it is haunted by a revolutionary force and claim for justice. Both also evoke the weak messianic power inherent in Walter Benjamin’s historiography and the spectral responsibility recognised by this power, that is, our responsibility for past and future generations. In post-totalitarian Czechoslovakia, the “nonpolitical” dissident community prefigured the renewal of moral experiences of responsibility and solidarity. In contemporary discussions of democracy, the figure of the spectre is a reminder of the significance of the Marxist legacy beyond its ideological doctrine.