The author considers the place of the individual in the course of history which unfolds on the ground of the self-realisation of the absolute. The focus is on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly on the chapter „Rational self-consciousness which is self-realising“ in which Hegel explores the relation between substantiality and subjectivity in the phase of the emergence of modern society. In this phase of history man shows his self-consciousness and free individuality, but at the same time suffers the loss of his substantial grounding. Hegel’s philosophy presents a grand attempt at uniting these two perspectives according to which the full development of peculiarity and uniqueness is in harmony with and a condition of the fulfillment of an impersonal, dynamically-realising, absolute principle. The author argues that Hegel’s metaphysical framework does not provide sufficient space for the recognition of the authenticity of man, emphasised in modern discussion, since subjectivity itself is, to a certain extent, the manifestation of the absolute. But, if we adopt Hegel’s metaphysical standpoint, another interesting prospect opens up: the individual satisfies his essential need of a sense of belonging to a whole, and gradually understands that he is part of a grand process and that he shares in the common work of mankind.
Pierre-Daniel Huet, významný učenec, který se zabýval filosofií, teologií, historií i literaturou, zemřel právě před 300 lety. Své současníky Huet nejvíce zaujal ostrou kritikou kartezianismu. Ze stanoviska empirismu a skepticismu odmítl pozici arogance rozumu v epistemologii a důvěryhodnost racionálních důkazů Boha v teologii. Největší vliv na vývoj novověké filosofie měl však jeho skepticismus, ve kterém Huet rozvíjel myšlenky antických skeptiků především s důrazem na nemohoucnost lidské mysli dospět k pravdivému či jistému poznání. V článku rozvíjím analýzu Huetova skepticismu v širším kontextu znovuoživení antické skeptické tradice v západní Evropě v 16. a 17. století a propaguji relativně novou interpretaci formování novověké filosofie, v níž hraje tato tradice klíčovou roli., Pierre-Daniel Huet (Huetius, 1630–1721), a scholar of immense erudition, died 300 years ago. Huet wrote many works on philosophy, theology, history and literature. At his time Huet was best known for his fierce criticism of Cartesianism. From an empiricist and sceptical standpoints, he attacked the position of the arrogance of reason in epistemology and the credibility of rational proofs of God in theology. But it was Huet’s scepticism, developing the arguments of the ancient sceptics and insisting on the principal weakness of human mind to achieve true and certain knowledge, that had the biggest impact on the development of early-modern philosophy. I analyze Huet’s scepticism in the context of the revival of the ancient sceptical tradition in Western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries and promote a relatively new interpretation of the formation of early-modern philosophy, in which scepticism is supposed to play a constitutive role., and Pierre-Daniel Huet (Huetius, 1630–1721), éminent savant, théologien, historien, littéraire, mort il y a 300 ans. Huet passionna ses contemporains par sa critique lancinante du cartésianisme. Il refusa, en s’appuyant sur l’empirisme et le scepticisme, l’arrogance de la raison dans l’épistémologie ainsi qu’il refusa dans la théologie la confiance dans les preuves rationnelles de Dieu. Huet influença significativement l’essor de la philosophie moderne par son scepticisme en développant les pensées des vieux sceptiques tout en accentuant l’impuissance de l’esprit humain d’arriver à la connaissance vraie ou certaine. Je développe dans mon article l’analyse du scepticisme par Huet dans le contexte plus large de la renaissance de l’antique tradition sceptique vivante en Europe occidentale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles tout en diffusant une interprétation relativement neuve de la formation de la philosophie moderne dans laquelle cette tradition joue le rôle clé.