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2. Hegel: why liberal thought is not anti-totalitarian enough
- Creator:
- Korda, Tomáš
- Format:
- text/pdf
- Type:
- Article
- Subject:
- Arendt, experience, Hegel, the State, totalitarianism, and Philosophy
- Language:
- English
- Description:
- This paper discusses totalitarianism against the background of Hegel's concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It employs Hegel's concept of experience from the Phenomenology of Spirit so that the reader could "experience" totalitarianism (in Hegel's sense), and thereby apprehend a universal (sittlich) ethical life within the state as a true antidote against totalitarianism. "Hegel's" state, understood here as an emergent middle that balances between its relation to itself (domestic policy) and to the other states (foreign policy) is contrasted with the totalitarian state that suspended its self-relation in the name of its relation to the outside, either in the form of a "total war" (Hitler) or the "total peace" (Stalin). Contrasting the totalitarian state with that of Hegel's aims to reveal, in turn, the substantial defect of liberal thought. Despite the fact that "total war" and the "total peace" had taken place, liberal thought still stubbornly preoccupies itself with domestic issues, traditionally with the question of how to secure the "Maginot" line between the state and its citizens, at the expense of overcoming its own impoverished knowledge of the state as an instrument, since this utilitarian knowledge of the state combined with the fact that the state is also the sovereign individuality appearing on the scene of foreign relations turned out to be totalitarian. Totalitarianism and liberalism are thereby not understood simply as enemies but rather as a tragical couple. To reveal this mutually enforced interdependence, the paper illustrates it on different and more commonplace examples in order to clarify how liberal thought can overcome animosity against its totalitarian enemy, namely via "experiencing" totalitarianism as nothing but the hitherto unknown dark side of its own instrumental understanding of the state.
- Rights:
- unknown
3. Hegelovo "vyvrácení" Spinozy aplikované na Marxe
- Creator:
- Korda, Tomáš
- Format:
- text/pdf
- Type:
- Article
- Subject:
- Hegel, Marx, Spinoza, vnější myšlení, external thinking, and Philosophy
- Language:
- Czech
- Description:
- Předkládaná stať aplikuje Hegelovo "vyvrácení" spinozismu na Marxe. Nejprve osvětluje povahu Hegelova pojetí filosofické kritiky, kterou Hegel staví do kontrastu s pouhou polemikou – střetem jedné geniální mysli s druhou. Na tomto pozadí lépe vyniká Hegelovo "vyvrácení" spinozismu jako ukázky filosofické kritiky, a nikoli pouhé polemiky. Filosofická kritika si nárokuje být imanentní. Kritizovanou filosofii ničím zvnějšku neobohacuje, ale přihlíží, jak ona sama sebe překonává. Příkladem takového sebepřekonání je pochopení substance zároveň jako subjektu, či jako ducha. Toto pochopení vlastně dělá to, že dává ontologický význam tomu, čemu Hegel říká "vnější myšlení" a co na první pohled žádný ontologický význam nemá, co se zdá být pouhou ideologií, afekcí či více či méně adekvátní ideou. V této "ontologizaci myšlení" Hegel vidí to jediné skutečné vyvrácení spinozismu. Mým návrhem je přihlížet téže "ontologizaci" – řekněme "ontologizaci ideologie" u Marxe. Toto sebepřekonání Marxovy filosofie spatřuji v Hegelově vyvození pojmu státu z pojmu občanské společnosti. Hegelem vypracovaný logický či pojmový přechod od občanské společnosti ke státu odpovídá re-konceptualizaci substance v ducha. Tato re-konceptualizace vyvrací nejen spinozismus, ale i marxismus. and The proposed paper applies Hegel's "refutation" of Spinozism on Marx. First, it illuminates Hegel's conception of philosophical critique and contrasts it with a mere polemic – the clash of one brilliant mind against another. Against this background, Hegel's refutation of Spinozism excels as a case of philosophical critique and not a mere polemic. Philosophical critique demands for itself to be immanent. It does not enrich the criticised philosophy with anything external. Rather, it observes (zusehen) how the criticised philosophy overcomes itself. Hegel's famous comprehension of substance also as subject, or as Spirit, can serve as an example of such self-overcoming. What this comprehension actually does is that it provides the ontological meaning for what Hegel calls "external thinking", which, at first sight, gives the impression to be ontologically meaningless, to be a mere ideology, affection or, more or less, adequate idea. This "ontologisation of thinking" is, for Hegel, the only genuine refutation of Spinozism. The paper proposes that the same "ontologisation" – let us call it the "ontologisation of ideology" – is to be observed in order to genuinely refute Marx's philosophy. This self-overcoming of Marx's philosophy is to be observed in Hegel's deduction of the concept of the State form the concept of civil society. The logical or conceptual transition from civil society to the State developed by Hegel corresponds to the re-conceptualisation of substance into Spirit. This re-conceptualisation genuinely refutes Spinozism as well as Marxism.
- Rights:
- CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International and unknown