Defending the good dog picture of virtues

Title:

Defending the good dog picture of virtues

Creator:

Mărăşoiu, Andrei Ionuţ

Identifier:

https://cdk.lib.cas.cz/client/handle/uuid:9f0c2b58-91a3-4f9a-a362-b97dfd9e02b7
uuid:9f0c2b58-91a3-4f9a-a362-b97dfd9e02b7
doi:10.31577/orgf.2020.27408

Subject:

experience, expertise, fluency, intellectual virtue, moral virtue, necessitation, normativity, rationality, and reflection

Type:

model:article and TEXT

Format:

bez média and svazek

Description:

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

Language:

Slovak

Rights:

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
policy:public

Coverage:

539-555

Source:

Organon F: filozofický časopis | 2020 Volume:27 | Number:4

Harvested from:

CDK

Metadata only:

false