The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifical y, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind., Článek reflektuje vlivné pohledy na mysl, které pocházejí z kognitivní vědy a zdánlivě podkopávají tradiční filosofický názor, že mysl je jednoduše sjednocená a transparentní. Specifická y, modulační práce je představena, spolu s jeho důležitými modifikacemi a kritiky, navrhnout, že zdánlivá jednota může být připisována jen k vyššímu poznání, jestliže vůbec. Diskutovány jsou různé teorie, proč se mysl zdá být sjednocená, zatímco jsou složeny z autonomních modulů. Výsledkem je závěr, že naše jazykové schopnosti hrají v jednotě mysli významnou roli., and Martin Vraný
The article reacts to a critical evaluation of the cognitive revolution which Jaroslav Peregrin has presented (The Cognitive Counterrevolution?, Filosofie dnes, 4, 2012, No. 1, pp. 19-35). According to Peregrin the cognitive revolution has thrown open a Pandora’s box of naive mentalistic theories and variations on Cartesian dualism (“magical theories of the mind”), which “do not belong to science, nor even to sensible philosophy”. Although I agree with the rejection of magical theories of the mind, I attempt to show that the cognitive turn in the 50’s and 60’s of the last century is susceptible of a quite different interpretation, according to which cognitive science, as a result of its basic assumptions and methodology, does not imply or propagate any kind of Cartesian dualism, rather it explicitly denies the possibility of such an account of the relation between mind and body., Juraj Franek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The origin, development and strengthening of our identity - that is our Self - is an important part of human life. Stability and variability of such Self are both aspects necessary to preserve the integrity and status of a person as psychological and social being. The mastering of our own Self is related to some interesting phenomena, discussed by current philosophy of mind and cognitive science. These research strategies deal with issues such as naturalization of Self (Dennett, Strawson), building up a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen) and the disconnective syndrome and its interpretation (Gazzaniga) among many others. This article reflects our current understanding of the Self, and takes into account some philosophical approaches, as well as some knowledge of modern cognitive science to show how the Self as a natural phenomenon can be understood. In its conclusion two conceptual levels of the Self are introduced: primitive Self and conceptual Self. These terms are intended to be the basis for the study of the Self as a natural phenomenon. and Michal Polák