Normative naturalism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine: there are normative facts and properties, and these fall into the class of natural facts and properties. Many objections to naturalism rely on additional assumptions about language or thought, but often without adequate consideration of just how normative properties would have to figure in our thought and talk if naturalism were true. In the first part of the paper, I explain why naturalists needn’t think that normative properties can be represented or ascribed in wholly non-normative terms. If so, certain prominent objections to normative naturalism fail. In the second part, I consider the objection that normative properties are “just too different” from (other) natural properties to themselves be natural properties. I argue that naturalists have no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and talk involving forms of “genuine” or “authoritative” normativity which can drive a non-question-begging form of the objection.
Viedenské fórum pre analytickú filozofiu (Wiener Forum für Analytische Philosophie, WFAP) sa rozhodlo tento rok usporiadať prvý ročník medzinárodnej študentskej vedeckej konferencie, slúžiacej k prezentácii mladých bádateľov (alebo adeptov na bádateľov) v oblasti analytickej filozofie. Ako napovedá názov, témou konferencia bola teória pravdy. Okrem študentov predniesli svoje príspevky aj traja "keyspeakers": prof. Paul Horwich z New York University, prof. Jeffrey Kettland z Mníchovského centra pre matematickú filozofiu a prof. Leon Horsten z Bristolu...