One of the core themes of Stanisław Lem's 1961 novel Solaris is the encounter with radical otherness. The ocean planet being studied by scientists form earth is usually interpreted as a representation of radical otherness, which eludes human efforts of understanding. In this paper we argue that in Solaris Lem attempts to show not merely that the ocean is unknowable, but that the unknowability is itself impossible to adequately conceptualise and represent. However, we further argue that this impossibility is the subject of an experience in which the presence of otherness is made available. We focus on the images of chaos which Kelvin discovers on Solaris to show that Lem presents the epistemic situation of the main protagonist as radically unstable. Contrary to most interpretations, however, we argue that the discursive narration in the novel engages with the presence of otherness only superficially. Rather, we suggest that the encounter with otherness is shown as something that manifests itself in bodily emotions, and is, therefore, only possible to convey non-discursively. The fear and dread inspired by the vastness and strangeness of the ocean are always presented by appeal to sensuality and bodily experience. These emotive reactions to encounters with otherness subvert its conceptual representations. We suggest that in this way Lem attempts to convey what cannot be discursively described, or even depicted. He presents radical otherness as something impossible to represent conceptually but offers a vision of the possibility of an encounter with otherness through bodily emotions. On this interpretation Solaris is not only a novel about the encounter with otherness, but also about the very possibility of representing such an encounter.
Článok sa zaoberá tematikou filozofického problému ja. Konfrontuje rôzne teórie za cieľom prísť s alternatívou, ktorá ich v istom zmysle zároveň vyťažuje i prekonáva. Najskôr je predstavená koncepcia Colina McGinna, ktorý poukazuje na vzdorovitosť ja voči bežným teoretickým prístupom a dospieva k "transcendentálnemu naturalizmu". Tento postoj spočíva v tvrdení, že existuje skrytá objektívna štruktúra ja, ktorú však kvôli svojim kognitívnym obmedzeniam nie sme schopní nahliadnuť. Ďalej prichádzajú na radu na psychologických výskumoch založené úvahy Daniela Wegnera a Daniela Dennetta. Ja podľa nich nie je ničím objektívne uchopiteľným, ale len užitočnou konštrukciu našich myslí. Následne sú oba pohľady zhodnotené skrze optiku „anomálneho monizmu“ Donalda Davidsona: dospievame k názoru, že ja je na fyzikálnej realite závislá, no zároveň prísnym vedeckým popisom a zákonom unikajúca entita – podobne, ako Davidsonove „mentálne udalosti“. Filozofický problém ja nespočíva v obmedzenosti našej poznávacej schopnosti, ale v tom, že sme bytosti schopné žiť v dvoch navzájom nezlučiteľných konceptuálnych ríšach – vo svete prísnej vedy a vo svete slobodných a zodpovedných osôb. Ja nemá skrytú objektívnu štruktúru; je to mentálny konštrukt, ktorý má však v rámci autonómnej mentálnej ríše nesmierny význam. and This paper is concerned with the philosophical problem of the self. It confronts different theoretical approaches in order to find an alternative view which would both integrate and transcend them. First, it introduces Colin McGinn's ideas about the recalcitrance of the self and his critique of the usual attempts to domesticate the self by reducing it to familiar concepts, to deem it irreducible or mysterious, or to eliminate it altogether. Based on the refusal of these conceptions McGinn proposes a view called "transcendental naturalism": the hidden objective structure of the self exists which makes everything fall into place but we are unable to grasp it because of our cognitive limitations. Secondly, we turn to Daniel Wegner and Daniel Dennett who base their ideas on psychological research and come to the conclusion that the self (minimal and narrative) is a useful construction necessary for our functioning as complex social beings in the world of responsible agents. Finally, we confront the two theories while getting inspiration from Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism". The usual approaches, criticised by McGinn, are indeed unsatisfactory but if we consider Wegner's and Dennett's ideas and understand the self as an important mental concept, we don't have to resign to transcendental naturalism. Similarly to Davidson's "mental events", the self (being a mental concept) is completely natural and dependent on the physical events (certain brain functions) while at the same time it escapes strict scientific descriptions and laws. My conclusion is that the philosophical problem of the self dwells not in the fact that we are cognitively limited but rather in the fact that we are able to conceptualise the world in two mutually incompatible ways – on the one hand, we are scientists viewing the whole reality as purely physical, on the other hand (and perhaps primarily), we are complex beings who need to interact with others in the realm of mental events such as propositional attitudes belonging to free responsible persons.