The aim of this two-part article is to summarize and critically evaluate the thought of Claude Lévi-Strauss and its importance for the study of religion. Part one introduces Lévi-Strauss' notion of savage thought, focusing mainly on myth as its purest expression. After giving a basic presentation of mythical structures and their transformations with the help of examples from Greek mythology, the rest of the paper discusses the meaning and nature of these structures. While Lévi-Strauss' use of linguistic terminology sometimes creates the impression that myths are to be read as "signifiers" pointing to some sort of "signifieds", in actuality his theory only makes sense if we take it for granted that mythical structures signify nothing in themselves, being just neutral relational matrices whose semiotic emptiness allows them to resonate with all levels of human experience, imposing order upon them and making transitions between them possible. From this point of view, no interpretation of myth (whether etic or emic) is ever able to uncover its "true core"; rather, what all interpretations do is to carry on the narration of the myth, transferring its structures to further semantic levels. Thanks to this myth appears as an inexhaustible fount of meaning, for its empty structures can be related to ever new aspects of human life, giving us a chance to view it through their prism.
The aim of this two-part article is to summarize and critically evaluate the thought of Claude Lévi-Strauss and its importance for the study of religion. While part one proposed a positive presentation of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism, part two points out some of its limits, suggesting three main ways of reforming it. (1) In the first place, Lévi-Strauss' aversion to functionalism is shown as exorbitant. Even if myths do form an autonomous and self-communicating system, it can hardly be doubted that they are also frequently used as charters sanctioning the socio-political order. Accordingly, structural analysis of myth needs to go hand in hand with the study of its ideological and legitimising functions. (2) Also untenable is Lévi-Strauss' sole focus on synchrony, which leads him to ignore the narrative aspect of myth. Mythical stories may certainly seem arbitrary in many cases, yet we cannot help suspecting a deeper logic hidden in their narrative sequence. Its nature was convincingly exposed by Terence Turner, who has shown stories as sophisticated instruments helping to reintegrate the chaotic subjective experience of individuals into the order of normative categories. (3) Last but not least, scholars of religion cannot accept Lévi-Strauss' attempts to reduce myths to their rationally analysable structures only. In myth (as well as in religion in general) a no less important part is played by transgressive antistructure that all ordered structures are dissolved in but that also appears as their ultimate source of power. It is only through the polarity of structure and antistructure that myth can be grasped in all its fullness.
The article investigates the meaning of jokes in religion. Building up on Mary Douglas' classic analysis, it sees the essence of a joke in its ability to bring in relation disparate elements in such a way that one accepted pattern is challenged by the appearance of another, making us realize that the accepted pattern has no necessity, that any particular ordering of experience may be arbitrary and subjective. The reason why jokes often appear in religion is that here, too, we see an attempt at transcending established patterns and getting in touch with what is beyond them. For while religion and ritual help to define the categories and structural principles that a society stands upon, they also make it possible to transcend them. As Victor Turner has shown, any given social order has its limits and there are always events and situations incongruous with it, thus threatening its very existence. Religion helps to avoid this threat in that it not just establishes social orders, but also makes us glimpse their fragility and dependence on what transcends them. Religion acts not just as a supporter of order, but as an interface between order and chaos, structure and liminality. This is why it makes use of jokes, which have the same ability.