I am gratified, Sir, to have the opportunity once again to express to you our profound respect and to greet you in your capacity as President of the Security Council.

Allow me, on behalf of my Government, to express deep gratitude to the United Nations to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and his representatives for their assistance to Georgia in its time of hardship.

We should like to extend our sincere gratitude to the group of countries known as "Friends of Georgia" for their attention and their tireless efforts aimed at a comprehensive solution to the conflict. We also wish to express our gratitude to Russia, as facilitator, for its untiring peace-keeping efforts.

Our country has consistently been aware of the support of the international community. Today, hundreds of thousands of persecuted people see their prospects for salvation as based on approaches elaborated by the international community. Their hopes for the future are linked to this. This faith is today a vital force for Georgia.
It is thanks to this faith that we can survive all the festering wounds that the Abkhaz war has inflicted on many families on both sides of the Inguri River.

Today, the origin and development of the confrontation is no longer a secret. Also well-known are how the conflict arose, fed by slogans of defence of the communist empire; what the sources of weapons were; and the mandate for impunity for aggressive separatism.

The development of democratic processes condemned to failure the policy of force, which was fighting to continue the conflict in Abkhazia and in other regions of the former Soviet empire. Antagonism arose between progressively developing democracy and remaining revanchists, who stood on the sidelines; this revanchism set its roots in such hotbeds as Abkhazia.

The development of the tragic events in that region significantly promoted the process of the spread of large quantities of weapons and drugs, as well as the formation of illegal armed bands, which later became bandit units.

  Abkhazia was transformed into a powerful force for destabilization in the Caucasus, and, despite the efforts of the international community, this negative trend continues to intensify.

This conflict continues to impede the development of sound political processes and is an insurmountable barrier to economic and social progress. The Secretary-General's latest report rightly takes note of the fact that the peace process is at a standstill. The Gali region, on which international efforts are currently focused, is engulfed by lawlessness and chaos. Today the process of political settlement has been essentially undermined. Negotiations have broken off and the rare meetings merely create the illusion that they are continuing. The small number of refugees who have returned to their homes have become hostages in the hands of bandit groups, and their lives and dignity are humiliated.

The implementation of a policy of genocide and "ethnic cleansing" towards Georgians in Abkhazia was broadly recognized for the first time at the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (S/l994/l435). The Parliament of Georgia is considering a wealth of information received by the Prosecutor's office that bears witness to crimes against humanity. The policy of violence has forced three quarters of the Abkhazian population to leave their homes. The physical and moral condition of these displaced persons, who have been forced to remain without shelter, is desperate, and their death rate has significantly increased.

These ethnically-motivated murders, abductions and torture are compounded by a deterioration of the general situation of crime throughout the territory of Abkhazia.
The targets of violence are no longer selected based on ethnic criteria: Abkhazia has been transformed into a sanctuary for local and foreign criminals.

In this situation, it seems cynical at the very least for the separatists to assert that the obstacle to the return of refugees is the will of the remaining local population and that "some time" is required to change this. This issue is addressed in paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's report.
This is nothing but an attempt to create the impression that genocide and the forcible takeover of territories as a result of the allegedly provoked conflict should be taken for granted and that the majority remaining in the territory is concerned "to heal [the] wounds and to change [the] outlooks"
(S/1996/507, para. 7) of the minority inhabitants.

It is becoming clear that the breakdown in the process of negotiating the return of refugees is linked to the desire to legitimize lawlessness and play for time. The houses of refugees who have been persecuted are occupied by criminals as rewards for their crimes. At the same time, a carefully planned and well organized programme is being carried out to limit the international presence in the region.

Things have reached the point where the lives not only of the defenceless and humiliated Georgian population deprived of its rights, but also of United Nations military observers, are being threatened, not to mention their inability to carry out their mandated tasks.

This calculation has turned out to be impeccable.
The mining of a great number of areas in the region has provided to those interested in doing so the opportunity to harass the international presence in areas they have selected for terrorism. The population, in a state of constant terror, has in fact lost all hope for or faith in justice. The mining of the territory also has far-ranging consequences, allowing those who are carrying it out to create conditions in which international observers are deprived of first-hand information and in which the thwarting of the international community is planned and premeditated.

We must assume that if, in the future, the opportunity to receive objective information from the area is not reestablished, the number of reports about the Abkhaz militia's carrying out operations to quell resistance, such as those noted in paragraph 32 of the report, or about the banditry and carousal of criminal groups in areas not controlled by the Abkhaz militia, as described in paragraph 26, will continue to grow.

It is not surprising that such a description of the situation leaves us unhappy. Meanwhile, individuals who are well known to everyone are officially incorporated into the law enforcement organs of Abkhazia and have received numerous military decorations for valour, while being officially acknowledged as executioners and torturers of many innocent civilians included in the long list of victims.

It is perfectly obvious that a peaceful settlement and mutual compromise can be attained only on the basis of the good will of both parties to the conflict, as noted in paragraph 56 of the report. But was not this commitment   spelled out in Georgia's proposals on the status of Abkhazia in document S/ 1996/ 165? The guarantee of the implementation of these proposals lies in the policy of the Government of Georgia and the firm position of President Eduard Shevardnadze, who has repeatedly reiterated it. His efforts constitute a deterrent to the supporters of chaotic and radical actions.
When we speak of the prospects for achieving peace in the region, we must take into account the historic traditions of our peoples who, despite various political developments, have never changed. Only its age-old coexistence with Georgians has enabled the small Abkhaz nation to retain its identity, culture, language and opportunities for development.

The difficult but ultimately inevitable process of Georgia's revival is ineluctably linked to the future of Abkhazia. It is precisely in this connection that the President of Georgia has come up with the idea of creating a special fund to carry out the process of economic reconstruction of the region's infrastructure once the political negotiations are successfully concluded. The Government of Georgia expresses its great hope that this idea will receive broad international support and believes it to be an important incentive for the evolution of the peace process.

Georgia's Government is well aware that both sides bear responsibility for maintaining peace and stability. It is clear, on the other hand, that a true assessment of the parties' positions as reflected in their actions cannot be achieved on the basis of a balanced approach.

In these circumstances, in which the resolutions of the Security Council are ignored and the efforts of international organizations and individual States come to naught, events threaten to take a tragic turn, and the international community's determination will be able to triumph only through enforcement.

My Government cherishes the hope that all possible steps will be taken to expand the participation of the international community in a settlement of the conflict. In our view, it would be useful to send representatives of the Security Council to Georgia to study the situation on the ground. We also express the hope that the Security Council will make use of all means available to it to convince the separatists of the hopelessness of their destructive policy.
We also wish to express our certainty that the appropriate international support for a settlement will also be given through the peace-keeping activities of the regional organizations of the CIS.

We believe that higher demands and expanded action are necessary to prevent further escalation of tension and bloodshed.


My delegation congratulates you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We wish you success in your work amid these extraordinarily difficult international circumstances.

We should have liked to have been granted sufficient time, commensurate with the gravity of the statement made by the United States Secretary of State in his presentation, and not just a few minutes to rebut a statement that lasted 90 minutes. Nevertheless, Iraq will provide detailed and technical explanatory answers to the allegations made in that statement. I shall be polite and brief.

The pronouncements in Mr. Powell's statement on weapons of mass destruction are utterly unrelated to the truth and the reality on the ground. No new information was provided; mere sound recordings cannot be confirmed as genuine. Council members may have seen me smile when I heard some of those recordings; they contain certain words that I will not attempt to translate here. However, those incorrect allegations, unnamed and unknown sources, schemes and presumptions are all in line with United States policy, which is directed towards one known objective.

In the interview that he granted yesterday to former British Minister Tony Benn, President Saddam Hussain reiterated that Iraq is completely free from weapons of mass destruction - a statement repeated by numerous Iraqi officials for more than a decade.

Mr. Powell could have spared himself, his team and the Security Council a great deal of effort by presenting those allegations directly to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002). He could have left the inspectors to work in peace and quiet, to investigate without media pressure. At any rate, the forthcoming visit of Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei on 8 and 9 February will provide another opportunity to test the validity of those allegations. Ongoing inspections have shown that previous allegations and reports from the United States and Britain were false.

Iraq submitted an accurate, comprehensive and updated 12,000-page declaration that included detailed information about previous Iraqi programmes, as well as updated information about Iraqi industries in various fields.

The inspectors began their activities intensively in Iraq on 27 November 2002, with more than 250 UNMOVIC and IAEA staff, including more than 100 inspectors. As of 4 February 2003, the inspection teams had conducted 575 inspections throughout Iraq, covering 321 sites. The sites singled out by President Bush on 12 September 2002 and by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the same month, as well as in the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
report of October 2002, were at the top of the list of sites inspected by the inspection teams. Inspectors discovered that none of the allegations contained in those reports was true. Thus, the truth and accuracy of Iraq's declaration that it was free from weapons of mass destruction have been documented by the two technical agencies entrusted by the Security Council with undertaking that task.

It is well known that inspection teams took samples of water, soil, plants, air and factory and production remnants from vast areas, including cities, villages, highways, farms, factories and universities throughout Iraq north, south, east and west.
UNMOVIC and IAEA analyses of those samples concluded that there was no indication of proscribed chemical, biological or radiological agents or, indeed, of any other proscribed activities in any part of Iraq.

  Mr. Blix confirmed in his statement to The New York Times on 30 January 2003 that the inspections did not support any of the scenarios alleged by Mr. Colin Powell - that Iraqi officials were moving proscribed material within or out of Iraq with the goal of concealing it. He confirmed that he did not find sufficient reason to believe that Iraq was sending scientists out of Iraq to prevent them from being interviewed and that he had no reason to believe that President Bush was correct in saying in his State of the Union address that Iraqi intelligence agents were posing as scientists for the interviews. We would like to reiterate that Iraq encourages its scientists to submit to interviews requested by UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

As for the existence of the mobile laboratories alleged by Secretary Powell this morning, just yesterday Mr. Blix stated that to date UNMOVIC had found no proof of the presence of such mobile units.

As regards the U-2 overflights and the controversy that has developed in that connection, Iraq does not object to such flights for the purpose of conducting inspection activities. Rather, the objection is that United States and British warplanes are imposing illegal no-fly zones, contrary to Security Council resolutions. To overcome that obstacle, it would be enough for such warplanes to suspend their flights during U-2 flights. Iraq cannot be held responsible for those flights.

The allegation that trucks leave sites prior to the arrival of inspection teams is false. Inspections occur suddenly, without prior notification to the Iraqi side.
Furthermore, UNMOVIC and the IAEA have their own sources that provide satellite imagery, and they also use helicopters for surveillance and inspection activities.
We therefore believe that those two agencies are very well informed about what takes place on the ground in Iraq. It is important to remind the Council that weapons of mass destruction programmes are not like an aspirin pill - something that can be easily hidden. Rather, they require huge production facilities for research and development, weaponization and deployment. Such facilities cannot be concealed. Inspectors have criss-crossed all of Iraq and found no evidence of that.

As regards the sound recordings, suffice it to say that scientific and technical progress has reached a level that would allow for the fabrication of such allegations and for their presentation in the way that Mr. Powell presented them. Anyone can be recorded, at any time and anywhere in the world.

As for the supposed relationship between Iraq and the Al Qaeda organization, I would like to note what President Saddam Hussain has said: "If we had a relationship with Al Qaeda and we believed in that relationship, we would not be ashamed to admit it. We have no relationship with Al Qaeda".

I would like now to refer to a recent statement by a United States official as reported in The New York Times three days ago. He stated that analysts at the CIA have complained that Administration officials have exaggerated reports on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and particularly on Iraq's presumed relationship with Al Qaeda, in order to bolster their case for war.

I would like to add that Mr. Jack Straw has ignored intelligence reports from his own Government stating that there is no relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda.

Mr. Powell's assertion that Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people particularly surprised me, given that a CIA official unmasked the truth on 31 January - just a few days ago - in The New York Times. He stated that the United States Administration has known since 1988 that Iraq did not use chemical weapons against its own people for one simple reason: it does not have the chemical weapon that was used in the Halabja incident.

In conclusion, I want to say that the obvious goal behind the holding of this meeting and the presentation of false allegations by the Secretary of State of the United States was to sell the idea of war and aggression against my country, Iraq, without providing any legal, moral or political justification. This was primarily an attempt to sway United States public opinion - and world public opinion generally - in favour of launching a hostile attack against Iraq.

In return, Iraq offers security and peace and reiterates before the members of the Security Council our commitment to continue our proactive cooperation with the inspection teams in order to make it possible for them to complete their tasks as soon as possible so as to verify that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction, lift the unjust sanctions imposed against us, ensure respect for our national security and guarantee regional security by ridding the whole Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, including Israel's huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 14 of Before adjourning, may I remind Council Security Council resolution 687 (1991). members of the luncheon that my delegation will have


We thank Mr. Volcker for his detailed introduction of the Committee's report. We also thank the Secretary-General for his observations.

We appreciate the high professionalism and the exemplary meticulousness with which Mr. Volcker and other members of the Committee carried out their task under difficult circumstances. Japan welcomes the present report. Because of its large volume and the sensitivity of the matter, we need time to study it carefully and thoroughly. However, at this stage we wish to make a few preliminary observations.

First, before we start pointing fingers at the problems and shortcomings that have come to light now, it is important to note the central fact that the oil-for-food programme succeeded in saving the lives and alleviating the suffering of many Iraqis over the several years that the programme functioned through its essentially humanitarian work, thus averting a major humanitarian catastrophe. As Mr. Volcker noted, that is no mean achievement.

The programme was indeed a serious attempt -of an extraordinary scale and complexity - designed to bridge the gulf between the need to maintain effective sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Government, on the one hand, and the need to ameliorate the humanitarian conditions of ordinary Iraqi people living under the regime, on the other. The programme was unprecedented in the history of the United Nations and the Security Council, in the scale and magnitude of the values involved and in the great complexity of operations that had to be executed and accounted for. My delegation therefore once again pays tribute to the many staff members of the United Nations who dutifully carried out their responsibilities under the programme without being in any way involved in any wrongdoing or corruption.

Secondly, that having been said, it is indeed unfortunate and serious that there were apparently certain lapses and instances of wrongdoing, which are unforgivable. The report is very thorough and comprehensive in its inquiry. Given the magnitude of the alleged corruption and mismanagement, and taking into account their political ramifications, the Committee was expected to meet a very high standard so as to help restore confidence in the United Nations.
We are pleased that it has indeed met that challenge. In particular, the issue of ethics had never been taken up squarely by a United Nations report in such a fundamental way. Had it been left untouched, it might have become impossible to restore confidence in the United Nations. For that reason, the Committee's contribution is critically important. All Member States should take the Committee's findings and recommendations seriously, take those allegations that shake the international community's confidence in the United Nations very seriously, and try their best to restore that confidence.
Lastly, the four specific recommendations in the report concerning United Nations management reform are useful inputs for the ongoing discussions in the General Assembly on the summit that begins next week. We will study each one of them in detail.
Member States, particularly including those that had a close relationship to the management of the programme in the Security Council, as well as the Secretariat, have a solemn responsibility to adopt and implement the needed managerial and other relevant reforms steadfastly, so that the Organization as a whole will learn lessons from the oil-for-food programme issues and regain the world's confidence in the United Nations.


From the very outset, the Russian Federation has viewed the recent events in Kosovo as the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We strongly believe that the basic principle for a settlement of the situation in Kosovo is that that autonomous region must remain within Serbia on the basis of unswerving compliance with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the republics that make it up.

Only within this legal framework is an effective settlement of the Kosovo problem possible through peaceful political dialogue without preconditions or unilateral approaches. It is precisely in support of such a political process that the decisions of the international Contact Group, adopted at London and Bonn, are directed.

While we condemn the use of excessive force by the Serbian police, we also strongly condemn any terrorist acts on the part of the Kosovar Albanians, including the so-called the Kosovo Liberation Army, and other manifestations of extremism, which seriously destabilize the situation and complicate the search for a mutually acceptable and effective political settlement of the situation. This approach is based on a key principle of Russian foreign policy: Terrorism is categorically unacceptable in any form or manifestation and calls for the most decisive condemnation of the international community. Clearly, any foreign support for terrorism must be nipped in the bud, which requires a coordinated international effort.

Unfortunately, the events in Kosovo have an adverse regional impact. At the same time, the situation in Kosovo, despite its complexity, does not constitute a threat to regional, much less international peace and security. It is precisely this understanding that is reflected in the draft resolution before us today.

  It was extremely difficult for Russia to agree with such a measure as the introduction of a military embargo.
We embarked on this step only on the understanding -which is now embedded in the draft resolution - that the issue is not about punishing anyone, Belgrade in particular, but about specific measures designed to prevent an increase in tensions, to erect an obstacle to external terrorism, and to foster the political process with a view to a speedy and lasting settlement. The prospects for such a settlement depend on the political will and willingness to take a constructive approach of both sides - the Serbian leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanians.

One of the most important conditions for the viability of the embargo is an effective monitoring regime for its implementation, particularly on the Albanian-Macedonian border. The illegal arms traffic must be reliably impeded and mere declarations on that subject do not suffice. It is precisely from this perspective that we must consider the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. It may be useful in this context for the Secretary-General, in preparing the reports contemplated in the draft resolution, to conduct investigations on the supply of weapons, training, and financial and other support for the Kosovo terrorists from the territories of neighbouring and other countries.

Russia's position has been and continues to be that the Security Council' s establishment of a military embargo, like any military sanctions, is possible only with a clear exit strategy. In the future, we will continue to advocate the need to limit the sanctions with a clear schedule, following the expiration of which the Council will have to decide whether or not the sanctions should be extended.

Unfortunately, our approach has not, for the time being, received sufficient support in the Security Council.
Nevertheless, the draft resolution has been able to define strict criteria; if Belgrade complies with these, the Security Council will decide to lift the embargo. We note that the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia have already taken important steps in that direction.
They have announced the withdrawal of police units; the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations have been given access to Kosovo; the President of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovie, officially announced his readiness for a political dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians, without preconditions. We encourage Belgrade to intensify these positive efforts.

As the draft resolution confirms, concrete progress to resolve the issues relating to the situation in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prospects for normalization of its full participation in international institutions. Russia sincerely hopes that this will happen as soon as possible.

It is also important that the draft resolution clearly links the restrictions it imposes to existing agreements in the region on the levels of armaments, inter alia, the Florence Agreement on Subregional Arms Control.

We see the main task of the international community to be the full promotion of the consolidation of progress made in the situation around Kosovo. This must not be done by increasing sanction measures, which may have the most adverse repercussions for the entire Balkan region and many other States besides. The efforts of all interested countries and international organizations must be directed to encouraging and supporting the political process, fostering dialogue to the greatest extent possible, and preventing any deterioration of the situation. Russia will continue to work precisely to that end.


Mr. Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Considering that it is 31 March and a rather late hour, I would like to commend you, Sir, and your delegation for the most comprehensive and appropriate manner in which you have handled your presidency of the Security Council, and in particular this debate.

The development of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in spirit and substance, cannot help but be impacted by the situation in Kosovo and our neighbour in general, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Many formulate that the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia started with the unilateral repudiation of Kosovo's autonomous status within the ex-Yugoslavia and that the circle will be completed only with the just and stable resolution of this situation. The commitment of the Stabilization Force, the Office of the High Representative and other international factors, including the United Nations, have given the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina a more stable foundation, minimizing the risk of spill-over.

Nonetheless, the longer-term developments and solutions for Kosovo can only have a substantial impact   on peace, stability and the development of democracy, human rights and minority and national rights in the region as a whole. In this context, my delegation believes that it is imperative that the following fundamentals be incorporated into any process designed to produce immediate and longer-term solutions.

First, we welcome the Security Council's role, as well as that of other relevant international factors, in this process, and emphasize the determinative importance of the Security Council's remaining seized of the matter. The situation in Kosovo does have more than a passing impact upon stability and peace in the region and international security as a whole.

Second, in the same vein, the authority and active role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is unquestionable and necessary in this situation, despite the prolonged attempt of certain parties to negate its jurisdiction. Bosnia and Herzegovina itself cannot morally, politically or legally remain silent; as our former colleague, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, so appropriately put it, the Belgrade authorities will not be allowed to do in Kosovo with what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Ethnic cleansing"
is intolerable for all, but those of us who have been victims and overcome must be especially clear and add our voices to the vigilant chorus of "Never Again". We are not dealing with ethnic madness, but with the political manipulation of differences for crude, selfish power.

Third, Bosnia and Herzegovina stresses the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the States in the region, without any prejudice to the eventual solution.

Fourth, at the same time we must emphasize that the basis for solution, not only in Kosovo, but in Sandjak and Vojvodina, lies with full respect for the democratic, human, national and minority rights of all the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Fifth, the role of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been frequently addressed before this body. I do not need to remind the Council of the context of those references. However, we must emphasize that the health of our neighbour also reflects upon our own.

Sixth, let me draw the Council's attention to paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 15 of the resolution before us.
Paragraph 15 in particular addresses the neighbours of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Of course, that means us. Again, the role of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) reflected a military relationship in its dealings with our country in the past. We would like to stress the importance of the arms-control arrangements negotiated under the authority of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, both within the region and in our country. Here, the heightened vigilance of monitors can be helpful in assuring that new abuses are not invented and old abuses not repeated. Arms monitors ensuring compliance and deterring cross-border transfers should receive our most active support.

Seventh, we would like to underline the consistency of the interpretation provided by the Permanent Representative of Slovenia, Dr. Danilo Tiirk, today with that of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as this relates to paragraph 18 of the resolution before us.

Mr. President, thank you. I am confident that the most responsible members of the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, have learned the painful lessons of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the decisive importance of the right response at the right time. We soon will be able to judge as to whether today's action by the Security Council will do the job.


May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of your office and thank the Ambassador of Rwanda for the work he did in December. May I also welcome the new members who joined the Council on 1 January.

The economic sanctions imposed by this Council on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Bosnian Serbs in successive resolutions have undoubtedly been a major factor in the recent progress towards creating the necessary conditions for ending the chaos in the former Yugoslavia. Their impact on the FRY economy was largely responsible for Belgrade's decision last August to break with the Bosnian Serbs and to support unconditionally the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia.
The FRY authorities' decision to reinforce this change in their policy by accepting an international presence on their border with Bosnia was welcome and significant.
The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), the Mission Coordinator, Mr. Pellnas, and all the members of the Mission deserve our praise for their work, often under difficult conditions and involving long hours. We call on Member States to make the resources available so as further to strengthen the Mission's work in the months ahead.

It was in recognition of the significance of the FRY authorities' decision and the importance of the break between Belgrade and Pale that the Council adopted two resolutions last September. Resolution 942 (1994)
extended and tightened sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, and resolution 943 (1994) allowed for the limited suspension of sanctions against the FRY, provided that the ICFY Co-Chairmen continued to certify that the FRY was complying with the terms of its original decision to close its border with Bosnia. The Co-Chairrnen have now submitted four reports, all of which have certified that the FRY authorities are fulfilling their commitments. There have, of course, been instances of leakage. But our observation has been that the FRY authorities have reacted quickly and taken the necessary steps whenever reported violations have been brought to their attention by the ICFY Mission. We welcome the action that they have taken to maintain the effective closure of that border. It is essential that this cooperation be continued and intensified if the suspension of sanctions is to be sustained.

The resolution which the Council has just adopted, and of which my country was a sponsor, represents a reasonable and balanced response to the cooperation from Belgrade over the past hundred days. The resolution allows for a further hundred days' suspension of the various measures set out in resolution 943 (1994). It seeks to remove any ambiguity about the application of resolution 820 (1993) concerning transshipments across the FRY-Bosnian border. And it directs the sanctions Committee to give a clear priority to applications for humanitarian assistance to the FRY.

Sanctions are imposed to achieve changes in policy, not to punish. They reinforce the strategy pursued by the Contact Group, of which my country is a member, to   increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to return to the negotiating table. It is essential that Belgrade continue to support the Contact Group approach, to maintain the embargo on the Bosnian Serbs and to keep up pressure on the Krajina Serbs to cease violations of the Croatian-Bosnian border and to implement the economic agreement in Croatia. As we have said before, further sanctions relief is possible, but only if further substantial progress is made towards the objective of the achievement of a lasting political settlement in the former Yugoslavia.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) — Sanctions


Given the tragic background of inter-ethnic violence in the recent history of the Balkans, the international community has not been unjustified in reacting with disquiet to the recent events in the Kosovo region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I do not wish to minimize the complex threats to internal security posed by clandestine terrorist activity, but the fact remains that the repressive measures taken against civilians in Kosovo by Serbian police forces have provoked indignation throughout the world.

Significantly, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of South-Eastern Europe, meeting in Sofia on March 10, circulated a declaration expressing their "concern with the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and with the grave consequences of an inter-ethnic conflict and its possible spillover in the region." In addition to the Sofia meeting, there have been a number of important encounters and declarations dealing with these new episodes of Balkan instability, which have all seemed to converge towards the need for the international community to avoid the mistakes of the past by articulating a quick and effective response which will help stem the violence and create the conditions for improved dialogue and cooperation between the parties.

We have welcomed the many joint and individual diplomatic initiatives taken by those who would be potentially most affected by a new wave of unrest in the Balkans, and have remained attentive to their strategies for dealing with what might best be described as a very delicate situation. It is from this intense diplomatic mobilization that a decision has seemed to emerge in favour of an arms embargo, as a measure capable of putting pressure on the parties to negotiate while placing a limit on the presence of weapons in an already heavily armed and volatile region.

As a matter of principle, it has seemed important for my delegation to emphasize the need for clear provisions regarding the conditions for lifting the sanctions in the draft before us. We note that paragraph 16 addresses this problem in a manner which we consider satisfactory, although we would stress the need for the Secretary-General to base the assessments he is to make under that paragraph on as wide a spectrum of information as possible, and in close cooperation with the region, the countries which meet as the Contact Group - France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union.

While concurring with the imposition of an embargo, we cannot fail to stress that these measures will not yield the desired effect if they are not accompanied by parallel diplomatic efforts aimed at the promotion of a safer and more harmonious environment for those who have been most directly affected by the unrest.
Furthermore, if there is movement in a positive direction, the Security Council should acknowledge it promptly. The declaration by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the political process in Kosovo has been received by the international community as an auspicious sign. In the face of further and sustained progress, there should be no reason to doubt that the Security Council will respond accordingly. At this stage we should confine ourselves to the measures contained in the draft, in the expectation that developments will render needless the consideration of additional restrictions.

Although the Charter enshrines the principle of non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, we are all aware that this principle does not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 7. Perhaps it is not by coincidence that the proliferation of decisions authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII since the end of the cold war, and of sanctions in particular, has come about in a world where conflict has often seemed to break out within the internal borders of States. Some observers have gone as far as to suggest that there may have been a tendency to frame emergencies under Chapter VII in recent years so as to circumvent the non-intervention principle. If this were indeed the case, we would be witnessing a distortion in the waiver provided by Article 2, paragraph 7, which would seem to be incompatible with its original purpose.

On the other hand, as stated in General Assembly resolution 51/242, annex II, on the question of sanctions   imposed by the United Nations, sanctions are a matter of the utmost seriousness and concern. That text, adopted by consensus, declares in paragraph 1 that "Sanctions should be resorted to only with the utmost caution, when other peaceful options provided by the Charter are inadequate." By concluding my statement with these references to an important General Assembly resolution and to the United Nations Charter, I wish to emphasize my delegation's commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes within a context of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We believe that by exercising caution in resorting to coercive measures we are actually strengthening the authority of the Security Council in the face of serious and otherwise intractable situations.


I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing Member States to express their preliminary reactions to the most recent report of the Independent Inquiry Committee. I also thank the Secretary-General for his comments today.
And I thank Chairman Volcker for the important work he has done over the past year.

The United States will carefully review the report that Mr. Volcker has delivered, with one principal purpose in mind: to see how we can use the findings and recommendations made in his report to reform and improve the United Nations. Identifying those who failed to execute their responsibilities is a necessary part of the process; prosecuting wrongdoers is equally necessary. But what is most important is to consider the shortcomings of the oil-for-food programme as a catalyst for change at the United Nations.

It appears from the preface of the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee that, in spite of success in the humanitarian objective of ensuring that the Iraqi people were adequately fed, there is plenty of blame to go around for the failings of the oil-for-food programme. When we have had a chance to review the report, the United States may or may not agree with all of the findings of the Committee in that regard. What we can all agree on is that Saddam Hussein exploited the goodwill of the international community towards the people of Iraq. He exploited that goodwill in order to obtain billions of dollars for his own personal use and for the use of his regime so as to strengthen his authoritarian grip on his own people.

We can also agree that there was corruption both inside and outside the United Nations system and that that corruption allowed Saddam to achieve many of his illicit goals. There were bribes; there were kickbacks; there was lax oversight from the Secretariat. And some Member States turned a blind eye to that corruption.

We look forward to our heads of State arriving in New York next week to discuss, among other topics, the importance of reforming the United Nations system. We note the call by Chairman Volcker for greater auditing and management controls, including an independent audit board, stronger organizational ethics and more active management of the United Nations and its programmes by the Secretariat. Over the past several days we have been pushing for exactly that, only to meet with resistance from dozens of countries that are in a state of denial - countries which contend that business as usual at the United Nations is fine. This report unambiguously rejects the notion that business as usual at the United Nations is acceptable. We need to reform the United Nations in a manner that will prevent another oil-for-food scandal.
The credibility of the United Nations depends on it.


At the outset, may I thank Mr. Paul Volcker for introducing the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme.

I also wish to thank the Secretary-General for his important statement early in this meeting.

The clearest indication of the good work done by Mr. Volcker and his colleagues, Mr. Goldstone and Mr. Pieth, is the very lengthy report before us. Given that we obviously have not yet had time to study that very complex document, our immediate reaction here can be only preliminary. Once we have thoroughly analysed it and the conclusions and recommendations it contains, we shall comment further.

In our view, the conclusions presented by Mr. Volcker are extremely important and deserve thorough study, not only by the Security Council and the Secretariat, but also by the General Assembly, the agencies of the United Nations system, and, of course, each and every State Member of the Organization.

We continue to believe that, despite all its constraints, the oil-for-food programme was successful in alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Iraq over a number of years. It helped to provide food and medicine to innocent and vulnerable civilians.
Unfortunately, as the report indicates, the programme was manipulated by Saddam Hussein's regime for political and economic benefit. Private companies also manipulated it, and we await a more detailed report on that aspect when the Committee completes its work.

The benefits to Saddam Hussein's regime were made possible, as has been noted here, by the many breakdowns in administration, planning, auditing and supervision on the part of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The Security Council also clearly bore a certain degree of responsibility in that respect, particularly on the part of its most influential members, which allowed their attention to and management of an extremely sophisticated and unwieldy programme to be distracted.

However, we believe that is all in the past. It seems important to us to think now about the future and to act collectively in the implementation of in-depth reforms that will make it possible in the future to solve the problems identified by the Committee so as to avoid the recurrence of this kind of situation.

However, based on what he have just heard, we think it is important to underscore the fact that that reform, like all reforms that the United Nations should carry out, is a responsibility of all Member States - all the Member States of the Organization. The Security Council also has a responsibility in that area, and it is for that reason that we are prepared to work within the Council, with the requisite energy, to attempt to restore confidence in the Organization in this extremely important year for its reform. We believe that is the single major undertaking we should carry out at the moment in order to be able to mount future missions with the magnitude and complexity of that attempted by the programme we have been speaking about.


I would like, first, to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Ouane of Mali, for his most capable leadership.

Nothing would have made me happier than to be able to stand before the Council today and announce a breakthrough in the peace process. Regrettably, circumstances compel me, instead, to deliver to the Council an update on the recent events that have taken place in Jerusalem and in the West Bank and Gaza.

At the outset, I wish to express my most profound sadness at the tragic loss of human life that has occurred in recent days. In particular, I would like to express here, before the Security Council, a feeling widely shared in Israel. We mourn, together with the Palestinians, the shattering death of the young Mohammed Jamal Al-Durra, as we mourn our own losses. It is precisely this human suffering that the Middle East peace process was meant to alleviate.

The events of the last few days represent the latest and most severe developments in a wave of violence that has been building in recent weeks.
Although some are inclined to assign exclusive responsibility to Israel for these acts of provocation, the reality is far less simplistic. The present Palestinian escalation dates back to well before the Temple Mount disturbances, when, on 13 September, stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Israeli positions in the vicinity of the Netzarim junction in Gaza. This was followed by a number of increasingly violent incidents, including the killing of an Israeli soldier by a roadside bomb on 27 September and the murder of an Israeli police officer by a Palestinian policeman who served with him in a joint patrol of the West Bank on 29 September.

The events of this past Friday on the Temple Mount escalated the violence even further. Muslim worshippers, intent on provoking a violent confrontation with both Israeli police and civilians on the eve of the Jewish New Year, hurled a hail of stones at Jewish worshippers gathered at the Western Wall below. Israeli police attempted to turn back the protesters through non-violent means, but the mob persisted, trying to force its way out of the Temple Mount area and through the Mughrabim gate to the Western Wall plaza. At this point, the Israeli police, who had been deployed outside the perimeter of the Mount, were compelled to enter the area in order to push back the surging mob. The stone-throwing mob continued in its violence for a period of more than four hours.

Regrettably, the wave of widespread Palestinian violence did not stop there, despite Israeli attempts to end the clashes through dialogue. Let there be no doubt: we are not faced with peaceful demonstrators but, rather, with a coordinated escalation of violent confrontation throughout the West Bank and Gaza. In a fatal phenomenon which is now a commonplace occurrence, there have been numerous instances of live fire emanating from within rioting crowds.

Let me stress that in all the cases mentioned above, Israeli security personnel returned fire only when absolutely necessary and only when faced with an imminent threat to life and limb. Israeli forces exercised all possible restraint in their efforts to restore calm and security, and took action only as a last resort, in order to protect the lives of civilians, police officers and Israeli soldiers, as any Government would be obligated to do.

I must also stress that the responsibility for this distressing escalation lies squarely with the Palestinian Authority, not only because of its failure to take action to halt these events, but also because of its incitement of the population through inflammatory rhetoric and calls to violence. Furthermore, Palestinian Authority security forces and paramilitary groups, such as Fatah's Tanzim, have taken a leading role in the events, including the use of live ammunition against Israelis.

Even more disturbing for Israel is the wholesale violation of signed agreements regarding the use of weapons by Palestinian policemen. Yesterday alone, a soldier was ambushed and killed by a Palestinian policeman near the town of Beit Sahour. One Israeli civilian was shot and killed at close range when dropping his car off at a Palestinian-owned garage in the village of Maskheh. Palestinian attackers opened fire on an Israeli school bus near Shiloh. Israeli policemen were wounded in gunfire from armed Palestinian security forces in Jericho, Nablus, Ramallah, Netzarim and other locations. Throughout the day, I have been receiving persistent reports from our soldiers in the field about indiscriminate and unprovoked gunfire, including the use of heavy machine guns and high explosives emanating from Palestinian police positions. The Palestinian police have turned these weapons against the same Israeli soldiers with whom they carry out joint security tasks on a daily basis.

It is regrettable that at such a sensitive time in the Middle East peace process, the Palestinians have once again decided to resort to violence for political gain.

Experience has repeatedly shown that the Palestinian Authority's willingness to incite popular violence as a means to elicit concessions in the negotiations serves only to divert the peace process from its course and to hinder our ability to arrive at a permanent settlement.

At this decisive crossroads of peace negotiations, backed up by an unprecedented Israeli willingness to pursue a path of historic compromise, one major question demands our scrutiny: is Chairman Arafat truly prepared to forgo unrealistic demands and dreams and to embrace a reasonable peace? Or, will he for ever remain entrenched in his positions, and for ever play the role of the unquenchable leader of an endless Palestinian revolution? We call upon the Palestinian leadership to act with responsibility, and to do its utmost to immediately calm the situation and to help foster a climate conducive to the advancement of peace negotiations.
Specifically, we call upon the Palestinian Authority to put an end to the unrestrained use of gunfire by Palestinian police, to collect the illegal weapons in the hands of the Tanzim and to keep Palestinian protesters at a distance from Israeli positions, as is their obligation under the Oslo agreements.

I must reiterate that Israel remains committed to achieving a peace settlement with our Palestinian partners, even in the face of such violence. We call upon Chairman Arafat to contribute to the restoration of the spirit of trust and confidence between our two peoples and to resume the peace talks in earnest.

We look forward to the meeting tomorrow in Paris between Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat as an ideal opportunity to achieve this. For our part, we will continue the search for peace with the same unremitting determination that Mr. Barak has so clearly demonstrated in the recent past, and we will continue to make every effort to achieve a lasting peace and historic reconciliation between our two peoples.

Middle East situation, including the Palestinian question


In response to my Russian colleague's comments, I would like to make a couple of points. First, I would like to address his point about the legitimacy of President Yanukovych and his point about the February 21 agreement, which he has made several times.

To be clear, we commend the work done by France, Germany and Poland to mediate and negotiate that agreement, with Russia very much in observance. We would have been prepared to support the completion of that agreement. Under its terms, President Yanukovych had 24 hours to sign the first piece of action pursued in the Rada: the changing of the Constitution pursuant to the 21 February agreement. Not only did President Yanukovych not sign it but, as my Russian colleague reminds us, he left the city. Indeed he fled the city. He packed up himself and his family and he left the seat of the presidency vacant for two days while his country was in crisis. He also left vast evidence of corruption and vast evidence of the amounts that he had stolen from the Ukrainian people. In that context, with 371 votes, the democratically elected Rada voted Yanukovych out of office, with his own party turning against him. That is the history.

With respect to the present, what we have heard today - with the exception of one member of the Security Council, namely, the Russian Federation - is overwhelming support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and for peaceful dialogue. There are so many options available to Russia to safeguard the rights of ethnic Russians and to address the concerns that have been raised: so many options short of military action.
Therefore, the very simple questions for Russia today are the following. Why not support international mediation? Why is that not part of their remarks today?
Why not support an observer mission? Why not engage directly with the Ukrainian authorities who want to resolve the crisis peacefully? Why not pull back their forces instead of sending more? Why not? When military intervention in the face of a crisis like this is the first resort, it is hard to avoid concluding that Russia does not want peace and does not want a diplomatic solution. Why choose military action when the consequences could be devastating? Only someone who fears the truth would be fearful of monitors who are deployed for the specific purpose of identifying and reporting the truth. That is all.

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)


Like most of the other intra-State conflicts that have erupted in the wake of the cold war, the current situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, involves an interplay of political, humanitarian and military factors. We believe that the political process is the fundamental determining factor in this conflict and should thus be accorded the highest priority in the quest for a resolution.

In this context, we appreciate and support the efforts made by the Secretary-General, the group of "Friends of Georgia" and, in particular, the Russian Federation as facilitator to promote a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

We must agree with the Secretary-General, however, that the international community can only help the parties reach a solution if they are willing to resolve their differences in a spirit of compromise. In this regard, my delegation is of the view that the Georgian Government's proposal to grant Abkhazia far-reaching autonomy within the framework of a unified Georgian State, as outlined in President Shevardnadze's letter dated 6 July 1996, presents a solid foundation upon which to build a comprehensive political settlement.

We also join the other members of the Council in calling upon the Abkhaz side in particular to end the current standstill in the political process and to embrace a more pragmatic and flexible approach to reaching a solution based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized boundaries.

Paralysis in the political process has also been accompanied by serious humanitarian conditions.
Regrettably, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Abkhazia continues to be obstructed by the Abkhaz side. A reduction is needed in the ongoing criminality and violence that are also deterring the return of refugees and displaced persons, especially in the Gali region. In this regard, we must emphasize that any attempt to tie the return of refugees to the question of Abkhazia's political status is wholly unacceptable.

On the other hand, we are pleased to support the programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia to be implemented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We hope to receive the Secretary-General's detailed and timely report on arrangements for the establishment of a human rights office in Sukhumi so that the office can be opened as soon as possible.

On another important matter, land mines appear to pose the greatest obstacle, especially in the sense that they constrain the free movement of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).
In this vein, as a troop contributor to this peace-keeping operation, my delegation is especially pleased to note that UNOMIG personnel will be provided with both mine-protected vehicles and some engineering support for road-clearing. We also hope that the close and continued cooperation between UNOMIG and the Commonwealth of Independent States peace-keeping force will serve to enhance the safety of UNOMIG personnel.

In the light of all these considerations, my delegation will be pleased to support the Secretary-General's recommendation to extend the mandate of UNOMIG until 31 January 1997 by voting in favour of the draft resolution before us.

Finally, we would also like to express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Brunner, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, and to Mr. Bota, his resident Deputy, as well as to all the personnel under their command for their determined efforts under trying conditions.


First of all, I welcome the representative of Georgia to this meeting. The current situation in South Ossetia, Georgia, is deeply worrisome. China is gravely concerned about the military conflict and about the escalation of the conflict in the region. The first imperative is to cease hostilities and, at the same time, to exercise restraint and avoid any action that may lead to an escalation of tension and harm regional peace and stability.

On 31 October 2007, at its sixty-second session, the General Assembly unanimously adopted its resolution 62/4, which relates to the Olympic Truce during this year's Olympic Games. In a few hours, the XXIX summer Olympics will be opening in Beijing.
China shares the Secretary-General's wish for the parties concerned to comply with the Olympic Truce resolution. The Security Council and the international community should encourage the parties to cease the hostilities without delay, resume dialogue and make determined efforts to resolve their dispute in a peaceful manner.


I shall be very brief.

Today's meeting was a very emotional one, which is understandable. At times it gave rise to the question: are there any limits to the political exploitation of the feelings of the families of those who perished and who are experiencing a living horror? A number of accusations were levelled at the Russian Federation that I consider insulting and not worthy of diplomats.

Turning now to the substance of the issues, we made our arguments in our statement. I will touch on only one issue, on the outcome of the discussions. It is simply incomprehensible that a lack of understanding of one form of judicial proceedings is being equated with impunity. We made, and reaffirm, a proposal to consider various formats for judicial proceedings.
Among them are simpler ones that are more effective, more appropriate and certainly less politicized; these are the ones on which we should focus.

In his statement, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Klimkin, attempted to speak from a moral and religious position of superiority. He referred to the unacceptability of impunity and the need to cooperate. I have only two questions for him: why were civilian airliners sent to areas where military activities were under way, areas where the Ukrainian forces were fighting using military aircraft? Why were civilian flights sent through that airspace? The passengers on that airliner simply could not have known that a military conflict was under way there. Even Malaysian aviation authorities could not have known that a military conflict was under way there. But Kyiv knew it. Why did it do this? Why has it thus far not provided the recordings of its military air dispatchers? That is impunity. Did they punish anyone in Ukraine for that? Finally, the tragedy concerning Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 is a terrible event - not only for the citizens who died in that castrophe and the countries that they represented, but also for the diplomats who now are forced to deal with it. It is also a trial for the concerned politicians, experts and specialists who continue to work on this issue together. We need to walk hand-in-hand down on this road. Unfortunately, today's meeting is most unlikely to promote joint movement towards the final objective, that is, to shed light on all of the circumstances surrounding this tragedy and to bring those responsible for it to justice. Russia is ready to resume this work at expert, diplomatic and any other levels. Let us therefore move forward from tomorrow-on in this effort.


The United States, too, is seriously concerned by the escalation of violence in South Ossetia, Georgia. We appeal to all parties involved in this quickly changing situation to step back and to order their forces to disengage. We can conceive of no circumstances that warrant a continuation of the violence. We can accept no excuses from any party that refuses to disengage, and we assure all parties that we will value restraint and condemn aggression.

My Government has been working closely with the Russian Government in recent days in an attempt to de-escalate this situation. We welcome the cooperation of Tbilisi and Moscow earlier today in establishing a ceasefire and setting up a direct meeting of Georgian officials and South Ossetian representatives. We condemn the South Ossetians' refusal to attend this meeting or to honour the ceasefire.

We call on all parties to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia.
We also call on Russia to pull its troops back and not to inflame the situation by sending its forces to Georgia.
Russia must cease the transport of troops and equipment through the Roki tunnel from Russia into South Ossetia. In the days ahead it is essential that the parties agree to measures to restore stability and to rejuvenate the peace process.


May I, as the Foreign Minister of China has done, congratulate Germany on taking over the presidency of the Security Council and congratulate you personally on assuming the Chair this morning.

We have just heard a most powerful and authoritative case against the Iraqi regime set out by United States Secretary of State Powell. The international community owes him its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussain - and worse, the very great danger which that regime represents.

Three months ago we united to send Iraq an uncompromising message: cooperate fully with weapons inspectors, or face disarmament by force.
After years of Iraqi deception, when resolutions were consistently flouted, resolution 1441 (2002) was a powerful reminder of the importance of international law and of the authority of the Security Council itself.

United and determined, we gave Iraq a final opportunity to rid itself of its weapons of mass terror, of gases which can poison thousands in one go; of bacilli and viruses like anthrax and smallpox, which can disable and kill by the tens of thousands; of the means to make nuclear weapons, which can kill by the million.

By resolution 1441 (2002), we strengthened inspections massively. The only missing ingredient was full Iraqi compliance - immediate, full and active cooperation. But the truth is - and we all know this -without that full and active cooperation, however strong the inspectors' powers, however good the inspectors, inspections in a country as huge as Iraq could never be sure of finding all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Sadly, the inspectors' reports last week, and Secretary Powell's presentation today, can leave us under no illusions about Saddam Hussain's response.
Saddam Hussain holds United Nations Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) in the same contempt as all previous resolutions in respect of Iraq. Let us reflect on what that means: Saddam is defying every one of us, every nation here represented. He questions our resolve and is gambling that we will lose our nerve rather than enforce our will.

Paragraph 1 of resolution 1441 (2002) said that Saddam was and remained in "material breach" of Security Council resolutions. Paragraph 4 of that same resolution then set two clear tests for a further material breach by Iraq. The first test was that Iraq must not make "false statements" or "omissions" in its declaration. But the Iraqi document submitted to us on 7 December, as we have heard from Secretary Powell, was long on repetition but short on fact. It was not full, nor accurate, nor complete. By anyone's definition, it was a "false statement". Its central premise - that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction - is a lie.
This outright lie was repeated yesterday on television by Saddam Hussain.

The declaration also has obvious omissions, not least in a failure to explain what has happened to the large quantities of chemical and biological weapons materiel and munitions unaccounted for by United Nations weapons inspectors in 1998. And there is no admission of Iraq's extensive efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction since the last round of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
inspections ended in December 1998.

Paragraph 4 goes on to set a second test for a further material breach - namely, a "failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of" resolution 1441 (2002). Following the presentation by the inspectors last week, and today's briefing by Secretary Powell, it is clear that Iraq has failed this test. These briefings have confirmed our worst fears, that Iraq has no intention of relinquishing its weapons of mass destruction, no intention of following the path of peaceful disarmament set out in Security Council resolution 1441 (2002). Instead of open admissions and transparency, we have a Charade, where a veneer of superficial cooperation masks wilful concealment, the extent of which has been devastatingly revealed this morning by Secretary Powell.

In his report last week, Mr. Blix set out a number of instances in which Iraqi behaviour reveals a determination to avoid compliance. Why is Iraq refusing to allow the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
to use a U-2 plane to conduct aerial imagery and surveillance operations? When will Iraq account for the 6,500 bombs that could carry up to 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent? How will Iraq justify having a prohibited chemical precursor for mustard gas? And how will Iraq explain the concealment of nuclear documents and the development of a missile programme in clear contravention of United Nations resolutions? There is only one possible conclusion from all of this, which is that Iraq is in further material breach, as set out in United Nations Security Council resolution 1441 (2002). I believe that all colleagues here, all members, will share our deep sense of frustration that Iraq is choosing to Spurn this final opportunity to achieve a peaceful outcome.

Given what has to follow, and the difficult choice now facing us, it would be easy to turn a blind eye to the wording of resolution 1441 (2002) and hope for a change of heart by Iraq. Easy, but wrong, because if we did so we would be repeating the mistakes of the past 12 years and empowering a dictator who believes that his diseases and poison gases are essential weapons to suppress his own people and to threaten his neighbours, and that by defiance of the United Nations he can indefinitely hoodwink the world.

Under the French presidency two weeks ago, we had a special meeting on the dangers of international terrorism - a meeting which I greatly welcomed -and the grave danger to the world of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction through the connivance of rogue States. Secretary Powell has today set out deeply worrying reports about the presence in Iraq of one of Osama bin Laden's lieutenants, Al-Zarqawi, and other members of Al Qaeda and their efforts to develop poisons.

It defies the imagination that all of this could be going on without the knowledge of Saddam Hussain.
The recent discovery of the poison ricin in London has underlined again that this is a threat which all of us face.

Saddam must be left in no doubt as to the serious consequences and the serious situation which he now faces. The United Kingdom does not want war. What we want is for the United Nations system to be upheld.
But the logic of resolution 1441 (2002) is inescapable.
Time is now very short. The Council will have further reports from the inspectors on Friday week, 14 February. If non-cooperation continues, the Council must meet its responsibilities.

Our world faces many threats, from poverty and disease to civil war and terrorism. Working through this great institution, we have the capacity to tackle these challenges together. But if we are to do so, then the decisions we have to take must have a force beyond mere words.

This is a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for this institution, the United Nations. The pre-war predecessor of the United Nations - the League of Nations - had the same fine ideals as the United Nations. But the League failed because it could not create actions from its words. It could not back diplomacy with a credible threat and, where necessary, the use of force, so small evils went unchecked.
Tyrants became emboldened, and then greater evils were unleashed.

At each stage, good men said, "Wait. The evil is not big enough to challenge". Then, before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late.

We owe it to our history, as well as to our future, not to make the same mistake again.


At the outset, France wishes to reiterate our condolences to our American friends with regard to the terrible tragedy that occurred with the space shuttle Columbia.

I congratulate the German presidency of the Security Council on having organized this meeting, and I thank Colin Powell, Secretary of State of the United States, for having taken the initiative of convening it. I listened with much attention to the elements that he shared with us. They contained information, indications and questions that deserve further exploration. It will be up to the inspectors to assess the facts, as envisaged in resolution 1441 (2002). Already, his presentation has provided new justification for the approach chosen by the United Nations; it must strengthen our common determination.

By unanimously adopting resolution 1441 (2002), we chose to act through the path of inspections. That policy rests on three fundamental points: a clear objective on which we cannot compromise - the disarmament of Iraq; a method - a rigorous system of inspections that requires Iraq's active cooperation and that affirms the Security Council's central role at each stage; and finally, a requirement - that of our unity. It gave full force to the message that we unanimously addressed to Baghdad. I hope that today's meeting will enable us to strengthen that unity.

Important results have already been achieved.
The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are working. The deployment on the ground of more than one hundred inspectors, with 300 visits a month on average, an increase in the number of sites inspected and full access to the presidential sites, in particular, are all major achievements. In the nuclear domain, these first two months have enabled the IAEA to make - as Mr. ElBaradei emphasized - good progress in its knowledge of Iraq's capacity, and that is a key element.

In the areas covered by UNMOVIC, the inspections have provided us with useful information.
For example, Mr. Blix has indicated that no trace of biological or chemical agents has thus far been detected by the inspectors, either in the analyses of samples taken on the inspected sites or in the 12 empty warheads discovered on 16 January at Ukhaider.

There are still grey areas in Iraq's cooperation.
The inspectors have reported real difficulties. In his 27 January report, Mr. Blix gave several examples of unresolved questions in the ballistic, chemical and biological domains. These uncertainties are not acceptable. France will continue to pass on all the information it has so they can be better defined.

Right now, our attention has to be focused as a priority on the biological and chemical domains. It is there that our presumptions about Iraq are the most significant. Regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of its capacity to produce VX and yperite. In the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capability.
Today the absence of long-range delivery systems reduces the potential threat of these weapons, but we have disturbing signs of Iraq's continued determination to acquire ballistic missiles beyond the authorized 150-kilometre range. In the nuclear domain, we must clarify in particular any attempt by Iraq to acquire aluminium tubes.

So it is a demanding demarche, anchored in resolution 1441 (2002), that we must take together. If this path were to fail and lead us into a dead end, then we rule out no option, including in the final analysis the recourse to force, as we have said all along.

In such a hypothesis, however, several answers will have to be clearly provided to all Governments and all peoples of the world to limit the risks and uncertainties. To what extent do the nature and scope of the threat justify the recourse to force? How do we make sure that the considerable risks of such intervention are actually kept under control? This obviously requires a collective demarche of responsibility on the part of the world community. In any case, it must be clear that, in the context of such an option, the United Nations will have to be at the centre of the action to guarantee Iraq's unity, ensure the region's stability, protect civilians and preserve the unity of the world community.

For now, the inspections regime favoured by resolution 1441 (2002) must be strengthened, since it has not been explored to the end. Use of force can only be a final recourse. Why go to war if there still exists an unused space in resolution 1441 (2002)? Consistent with the logic of that resolution, we must therefore move on to a new stage and further strengthen the inspections. With the choice between military intervention and an inspections regime that is inadequate for lack of cooperation on Iraq's part, we must choose to strengthen decisively the means of inspection. That is what France is proposing today.

To do this, we must define with Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei the requisite tools for increasing their operational capabilities. Let us double or triple the number of inspectors and open up more regional offices. Let us go further: Why not establish a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas already inspected? Let us substantially increase the capabilities for monitoring and collecting information on Iraqi territory. France is ready to provide full support; it is ready to deploy Mirage IV observer aircraft. Let us collectively establish a coordination and information-processing centre that would supply Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need. Let us list the unresolved disarmament questions and rank them by importance.
With the consent of the leaders of the inspection teams, let us define a demanding and realistic time frame for moving forward in the assessment and elimination of problems. There must be regular follow-up to the progress made in Iraq's disarmament.
This enhanced regime of inspections and monitoring could be usefully complemented by having a permanent United Nations coordinator for disarmament in Iraq, stationed in Iraq and working under the authority of Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei.

Iraq must cooperate actively, however. The country must comply immediately with the demands of Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, in particular by permitting meetings with Iraqi scientists without witnesses; agreeing to the use of U2 observer flights; adopting legislation to prohibit the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction; and immediately handing over to the inspectors all relevant documents on unresolved disarmament questions, in particular in the biological and chemical domains. Those handed over on 20 January constitute a step in the right direction. The 3,000 pages of documents discovered at the home of a researcher show that Baghdad must do more. Absent documents, Iraq must be able to present credible testimony. The Iraqi authorities must also provide the inspectors with answers to the new elements presented by Colin Powell.

Between now and the inspectors' next report, on 14 February, Iraq will have to provide new elements.
The upcoming visit to Baghdad by the leaders of the inspectors will have to be the occasion for clear results to that end.

This is the demanding demarche that we must take together towards a new stage. Its success presupposes, today as yesterday, that the international community will remain united and mobilized. It is our moral and political duty first to devote all our energy to Iraq's disarmament in peace and in compliance with the rule of law and justice. France is convinced that we can succeed on this demanding path so long as we maintain our unity and cohesion. This is option of collective responsibility.


Mr. Merimee (France) (interpretation from French): The beginning of your presidency has already demonstrated that the Council is in safe hands, Sir. We are pleased, but not in the least surprised.

  I should like to convey my delegation's gratitude for the Rwandan presidency last month, which met all our expectations.

My delegation welcomes the Council's decision to extend the suspension of certain sanctions applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which were adopted in September in resolution 943 (1994).
That resolution took account of a basic change that had occurred in August, when the Belgrade authorities, which had accepted the Contact Group's plan, decided to break off political and economic relations with the Pale leadership.

Since then the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have honoured their commitment to close the border with the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbian control and have cooperated with the observer Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).
All the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference attest to this. My delegation considers that the renewal of the suspension of certain sanctions applicable to Belgrade is therefore perfectly justified.

Following the conclusion of an agreement on the general cessation of hostilities, it is important to give fresh impetus to the process of negotiations on the basis of acceptance of the Contact Group's plan as a starting point.
My delegation strongly encourages the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue to honour their commitments, to further improve their cooperation with the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to continue to support the plan and the action of the Contact Group in the quest for a political solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina.


At this first formal meeting of the Security Council in January 1995, may I begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency and wishing you all success in carrying out this responsible mission. I would like to assure you that you can count on our support.

I would also like to ask the Rwandan delegation to convey our gratitude to the Permanent Representative of that country, Ambassador Bakuramutsa, for the intensive work he carried out, together with his delegation, in presiding over the Security Council last December.

I would also like to join those colleagues who have expressed gratitude to the representatives of the States that were non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1993 and 1994 for cooperating in our work, and would like to welcome the new members. May I also, through the Italian delegation, convey our gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Antonio Martino, for his statement.

Today marks the expiration of the first hundred days from the date of the partial suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). When resolution 943 (1994) was adopted a fundamental factor in the position of many States was the thought that the policy of the Government of the FRY should be judged not on the basis of words but on the basis of concrete deeds, which must be taken into account when decisions are made as to the further suspension of sanctions. As previous speakers have said, no one is left in any doubt that the FRY Government's announced intentions have been matched by concrete deeds. The Council has received four reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), corroborating the effective implementation by Belgrade of its decision to close the border with Bosnia and indicating a high degree of cooperation by the FRY authorities in the solution of problems as they arose. Such assessments are based in particular on information provided by the international members of the ICFY Mission, who are deployed on the very border and are in full control of the situation,   extending cooperation in the delivery of humanitarian supplies across the border.

It is also important to bear in mind the political aspects of the question. During the past hundred days all of us have become convinced that the constructive line of the Yugoslav Government is yielding practical results. The economic agreements signed between the Croatian Government and the local Serbian authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas mark the attainment of the long-awaited objective of the establishment of a modus vivendi in the Republic of Croatia. Two weeks ago an agreement on the complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force. Lastly, encouraging changes have occurred in the attitude of the Bosnian Serb leadership towards the peace plan of the Contact Group. All this positive change unquestionably became possible to a large extent thanks to the constructive and consistent line of the Yugoslav Government.

Russia is convinced that for all these reasons there were more than adequate grounds for agreeing on new measures to encourage Belgrade, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 943 (1994), in which the Security Council clearly stated its decision "to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation".

We believe that progress was there for all to see, and the Security Council could already as a minimum decide on the indefinite extension of the measures provided for in resolution 943 (1994) and also consider a further easing of sanctions.

In this connection, we proceed from our position of principle, which assumes a need for an adequate and timely reaction to positive changes occurring in the policies of all States to which sanctions are applied. To our great regret, the Council could not agree on a draft resolution which would have provided for further measures of encouragement and thereby give impetus to the peace process. Indeed, the draft resolution before us provides for a number of completely unwarranted innovations, which run counter to the recommendations of the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, and which we fear are capable of threatening the gains achieved through the efforts of the Contact Group. In the consultations we clearly stated our concerns, but, to our great disappointment, they were not taken into account. For this reason, in unreservedly favouring the extension of the partial extension of sanctions, Russia cannot share responsibility for the possible negative consequences of the adoption of this draft resolution in its current form, and cannot support it.

We hope that the principle already agreed upon in the Security Council - that a deserving party should be encouraged - will be implemented in the future more consistently. This is essential, both for the sake of contributing to the peace process and for reasons of elementary justice. Russia intends to continue cooperating actively with our partners in the Contact Group and with all the members of the Security Council in the settlement efforts for Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia as a whole.


Today the Security Council is taking a clear stand for peace and security in the Balkans. The United States strongly supports this resolution imposing an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In so doing, the Council sends an unambiguous message that the international community will not tolerate Violence and "ethnic cleansing" in the region of the former Yugoslavia. We must avoid the mistakes of the past, when the international community waited too long before taking decisive action. We fully recognize that the security of the region directly affects broader international interests and that deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Over the last few years, this Council and the international community have worked hard to promote ethnic reconciliation in Bosnia and Croatia. The United States and our partners in the peace effort must not now watch years of peace-building in the Balkans destroyed by repressive violence or by terrorist activity in Kosovo.

The Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group, meeting in London on March 9 and in Bonn on March 25, agreed that the situation in Kosovo is not simply an internal matter, but also has a direct impact on the stability of neighbouring countries and jeopardizes peace in the Balkans. As Secretary Albright said in Bonn, the international community has not faced a problem in the former Yugoslavia as dangerous as the situation in Kosovo since the last war in the region began.

President Milosevic knows what he must do to have the arms embargo and other sanctions lifted and to avoid further measures. As a necessary and crucial step, President Milosevic must begin an unconditional dialogue on political status issues with the Kosovar Albanian leadership. The United States joins the Council in expressing support for an enhanced status for Kosovo, including greater autonomy and meaningful self-administration. The United States believes this is the only way to achieve long-term peace and a satisfactory resolution to the conflict in the region.

The United States strongly welcomes the clear commitment of Mr. Rugova and other senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian leadership to non-violence and a negotiated solution to the crisis in Kosovo. We will not countenance terrorist activity or external support for terrorist activity. The Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals through peaceful means.

This resolution also underlines the important role of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal in gathering evidence about the violence in Kosovo which may fall within its jurisdiction. We remind the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of their obligation to extend full cooperation in this effort, as well as of their commitments under the Bosnia peace agreement to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal.

Of key importance is urgent action by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop the violence and other provocative action by its police and paramilitary security forces. In spite of assurances by the authorities to the contrary, these special police remain in Kosovo in force.
They must be withdrawn immediately, in keeping with the London Contact Group statement. Civilians and members of the international community, including international humanitarian workers in the region, have been harassed, threatened, arrested and even beaten by these police.

We believe that only sustained international pressure will ensure continued progress towards the goal of a peacefully negotiated solution in Kosovo. This resolution confirms that the international community will hold President Milosevic firmly to meeting in full the benchmarks of the London Contact Group. Otherwise, as the Bonn Contact Group recognized, additional measures may be needed.


I would like to begin by congratulating Germany on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. It is a great pleasure to see Foreign Minister Fischer chair today's meeting.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my deep condolences with respect to the tragic deaths of the astronauts aboard the space shuttle Columbia, and to convey my heartfelt sympathy to the bereaved families.

I also wish to thank Secretary Powell for his presentation.

I would now like to share the following views on Iraq. First, the fact that the Foreign Ministers of most Council members are present at today's meeting shows the importance that all parties attach to the authority and role of the Security Council and their support for a resolution of the Iraqi issue within the framework of this world body. The Security Council has basically maintained unity and cooperation on this issue. That is of crucial importance to its appropriate resolution and represents the desire of the international community.

Secondly, China welcomes the United States move to provide the United Nations with its information and evidence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which we believe is consistent with the spirit of resolution 1441 (2002) and could help increase transparency. We hope that various parties will hand over their information and evidence to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That will help make their inspections more effective. And, through their on-the-spot inspections, that information and evidence can also be evaluated. The two agencies should report their findings to the Security Council in a timely manner.

Thirdly, the inspections have been going on for more than two months now. The two agencies have been working very hard, and their work deserves our recognition. It is their view that they are not now in a position to draw conclusions, and they have suggested continuing with the inspections. We should respect the views of the two agencies and support the continuation of their work. We hope that the upcoming trip to Iraq by Chairman Blix and Director General ElBaradei on the 8th will yield positive results.

Not long ago, the two agencies pointed out some problems in the inspections. We urge Iraq to adopt a more proactive approach, to make further explanations and clarification as soon as possible and to cooperate with the inspection process.

Fourthly, the Security Council has a common stand on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This is fully reflected in the relevant Council resolutions, particularly 1441 (2002), which was adopted unanimously. The most important aspect at present remains the full implementation of this resolution. As for the next step to be taken, the Council should decide this through discussions among all members, based on the results of the inspections.

Fifthly, it is the universal desire of the international community to see a political settlement to the issue of Iraq, within the United Nations framework, and to avoid war. This is something to which the Security Council must attach due importance. As long as there is still the slightest hope for a political settlement, we should exert our utmost efforts to achieving it. China is ready to join others in working in this direction.


The Russian delegation is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution on the extension for six months of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). It is important in that it reaffirms the dedication of the international community to a political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and of ensuring the rights of the multinational people of that country.

We should like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General, his Special Envoy and the Head of the Mission of UNOMIG for their efforts to promote a settlement to the conflict. We also pay tribute to the personnel of the Mission for their difficult but very necessary work.

Russia is vitally interested in seeing Georgia, which is friendly to us, as a stable, democratic and flourishing country. To this end, it is imperative that there be a speedy settlement of the conflict and the elimination of its consequences. As a facilitator of the negotiating process under the aegis of the United Nations, Russia is carrying out intensive work with the Government of Georgia and with the Abkhaz side aimed at moving forward the peace process, first and foremost with respect to the fundamental principles for future comprehensive agreements.

We are holding active consultations with the Abkhaz leaders, combined with measures to exert strong pressure on the Abkhaz side, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of 19 January 1996, in order to   give greater flexibility and a constructive nature to the position of Sukhumi.

Another round of contacts with the Abkhaz side is currently taking place in Moscow. We are also working closely with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Georgia, Ambassador Edouard Brunner, He is awaited in Moscow next week for important consultations. We are counting on the fact that he will also hold substantive talks with the representatives of the sides.

A new and positive factor is the trend toward direct Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue, which some time ago was, in principle, impossible. We welcome and support the initiative of the Special Envoy on the organization, with the assistance of Russia, of a Georgian-Abkhaz meeting, and will do everything possible to promote its success.

We have solid grounds for considering that these efforts are having the required effect on the Abkhaz side.
In the Abkhaz leadership, there is increasingly a mood favouring of the search for compromise agreements towards a settlement. At the same time, in the light of the gulf between the sides, there will remain a need for this growing positive inclination to be transformed into concrete, forward steps on the part of the Abkhaz side.

Another subject of growing concern to us is the ongoing deadlock in the question of the organized return of refugees. We expect that a firm demand of the Security Council on this issue will ultimately enjoy a positive reception in Sukhumi.

We are extremely concerned by the deterioration of security conditions in the Gali region of Abkhazia, Georgia, as a result of the increased threat from mines. The indiscriminate laying of mines has already caused casualties and is seriously hampering the implementation by the CIS peace-keepers and the United Nations military observers of their mandates. Urgent and effective measures must be taken to eliminate the widespread danger of mines. We reaffirm Russia's readiness to assist the United Nations in achieving that objective and hope that the United Nations Secretariat will respond concretely to our proposals.